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ABSTRACT 
 
MAMMOGRAPHY EXEMPLARS IN ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY: 
PREVALENCE OF EXEMPLARS, EFFECTS ON RISK PERCEPTIONS AND 
MAMMOGRAPHY INTENTIONS, AND MECHANISMS OF ACTION 
Holli Hitt Seitz 
Joseph N. Cappella 
 Multiple prior studies have examined the nature of news coverage of 
mammography but have neglected comments generated by readers.  However, comments 
on online news stories have been shown to affect readers’ beliefs and behaviors.  
Understanding the potential effects of user-generated comments and comments with 
exemplars, in particular, is necessary to fully understand the effects of online 
mammography news on media consumers.   
Study 1 describes the prevalence, content, and representativeness of 
mammography exemplars in comments on online news about mammography using a 
content analysis of mammography news articles (n = 71) and comments (n = 5,858) 
appearing on The New York Times website from November 2009 to December 2014.  
Study 2 tests the effects of comments on risk perceptions and mammography intentions 
and mechanisms of these effects using a randomized online experiment with a sample of 
U.S. women between the ages of 38 and 48. 
Of comments on news articles about mammography, 31% included a 
mammography exemplar.  Of those, 41% included a mammogram-detected breast cancer 
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exemplar and 19% included a false-positive mammogram exemplar.  Additionally, 
articles with mammography exemplars were more likely to have comments that included 
mammography exemplars. 
 In Study 2, when compared to comments without exemplars, comments with 
exemplars did not produce effects on mammography intentions or risk perceptions.  
Compared to comments about false positives, comments about mammogram-detected 
breast cancer led to higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years, lower 
intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, and higher breast cancer risk 
perceptions.  Effects were moderated by participant education level, family history of 
breast cancer, history of prior mammography, and time spent reading the experimental 
manipulation.  Some effects on mammography intentions were mediated by changes in 
attitude toward waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram.   
This study adds to evidence suggesting that comments appearing with news 
articles have effects on readers.  Those who share content online and allow user-
generated comments should consider potential effects before allowing comments to be 
posted.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“My mother skipped mammograms in her 40's and she died. I did them 
and I lived.”  
– L. H. 
 
“I had a mammogram that came back with ‘suspicious calcifications’ in 
one spot.   I went back in for more views, and an ultrasound.  I had needle 
biopsies.  Still nothing conclusive.  I remember a doctor suggesting that I 
have the area surgically removed.   I took the ‘watch and wait’ option 
instead.   I've been waiting now for 12 years and nothing has changed - in 
fact the ‘suspicious calcifications’ area seems to have disappeared.  I'm 
told that I should feel lucky and grateful that I didn't have breast cancer 
after all that.  Strangely I don't feel lucky.”  
– A. M. 
 
The topic of mammography has been frequently covered by the news media, 
particularly in recent years.  A change in mammography recommendations in 2009 by the 
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) triggered a wave of mammography 
media coverage (Squiers et al., 2011), and new screening technology, studies on the risks 
and benefits of mammography, revised breast cancer screening guidelines issued by the 
American Cancer Society, and celebrity breast cancer diagnoses have kept 
2 
mammography in the news. While news stories undoubtedly have an effect on the beliefs 
and behaviors of news consumers, these news stories do not operate alone.  Often, online 
news stories are accompanied by reader comments (Weber, 2014), which means that 
readers’ beliefs and behaviors are being influenced not only by the original news article 
but also by any commentary that they consume along with the article. When commenting 
on articles, readers regularly illustrate their points with personal stories and individual 
cases, or exemplars.  As seen in the examples above, these mammography exemplars can 
be vivid, emotional, and persuasive.  In fact, prior research shows that exemplars can 
have greater effects on risk perceptions than statistical information (Zillmann, 2006) and 
narrative evidence can have a greater effect on behavioral intentions than statistical 
evidence (Zebregs, van den Putte, Neijens, & de Graaf, 2015).  Thus, exemplars in 
comments could potentially have more powerful effects on intentions and risk 
perceptions than the information in the articles with which they appear.  Unfortunately, 
the frequency with which exemplars appear in comments is not well-known.  In fact, 
prior content analyses of mammography coverage have not included an examination of 
user-generated commentary.  This general lack of understanding of the composition of 
comments on news stories about mammography leads to the following research 
objective: 
Objective 1: Describe the prevalence, content, and representativeness of 
mammography exemplars in comments on online news about mammography. 
Objective 1 is addressed in Study 1, a content analysis of online newspaper articles about 
mammography and the user-generated comments appearing with these articles. 
3 
There has also been little research to date on the effects of online news comments 
on readers and even less research on the effects of comments that include exemplars.  
Prior research has shown that exemplars in news stories can have effects on behavioral 
intentions (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, & Cappella, 2012) and risk perceptions 
(Zillmann, 2006), and there is reason to believe that exemplars in comments on news 
articles can have similar effects.  In general, exemplars and other forms of narrative 
evidence are known to be persuasive, particularly in the cancer context.  Green (2006) 
argues that narratives can change beliefs and behaviors by reducing counter-arguing, 
modeling behavior change, providing cognitive rehearsal of behaviors, and creating 
strong attitudes. Given the dearth of prior research in this area, this dissertation addresses 
the following research objectives related to the effects of comments: 
Objective 2: Test the effects of comments with exemplars on risk perceptions and 
mammography intentions. 
Objective 3: Explore the mechanisms of action underlying effects of exemplar 
comments on risk perceptions and mammography intentions. 
These research objectives are addressed through an experimental study of the 
effects of comments on readers.  Study 2 addresses Objective 2 by testing the effects of 
comments with exemplars on risk perceptions and mammography intentions, including 
how effects differ for different types of mammography exemplars that appear in 
comments (e.g., false-positive mammography results, mammogram-detected cancer, 
etc.).  Study 2 also addresses Objective 3 by testing predicted mediation paths to explain 
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the effects of comments with exemplars and testing potential moderators of predicted 
effects.   
With the growing prevalence and importance of user-generated comments in 
online news, and media in general, understanding the effects of these comments on 
readers is crucial for those who wish to understand media effects.  The results of this 
research may have important implications for news organizations or others who allow 
online comments, including organizations and federal agencies with public health 
functions. 
Dissertation Overview 
 This dissertation addresses the research objectives above through an evaluation of 
the media environment surrounding mammography in recent years and an online 
experiment to test the effects of different types of user-generated comments on readers.  
The content analysis includes newspaper articles about mammography appearing 
between November 2009 and December 2014 and associated reader commentary, with a 
particular emphasis on the presence and representativeness of mammography exemplars 
in user-generated comments.  The experiment examines the effects of these comments, 
specifically comments with false-positive exemplars and mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplars, on readers. 
The experimental design necessitated that a content analysis first be undertaken to 
gauge the prevalence and representativeness of mammography exemplars in comments 
appearing with online news articles.  The content analysis provided the stimuli for the 
experiment and enhances the ecological validity of the experiment by closely replicating 
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the nature of comments as they appear in online news settings.  Chapter 2 explores prior 
literature on content analyses of mammography news coverage and research on user-
generated comments.  It also outlines the rationale for the content analysis and the 
specific research questions addressed: 1) How was mammography covered in the news 
from 2009 to 2014?; 2) What is the nature of online reader commentary for these 
mammography news stories?; and 3) What is the nature of mammography exemplars in 
user-generated comments on online news articles about mammography, specifically in 
regards to prevalence, type, and representativeness of actual mammography outcomes?  
Chapter 2 goes on the present the content analysis methodology, results, and discussion.   
Chapter 3 outlines the literature and theoretical background of the main 
experiment.  Specifically, it reviews prior literature on the effects of media coverage of 
breast cancer and mammography and on the effects of news commentary.  The theoretical 
background includes a review of the effect of exemplars on behavioral intentions and the 
effects of exemplars on risk perceptions.  Chapter 3 goes on to set forth hypotheses 
regarding the effects of user-generated comments on readers’ breast cancer risk 
perceptions and mammography intentions, including specific predictions about the effects 
of comments with exemplars versus comments without and the effects of false-positive 
exemplars versus mammogram-detected cancer exemplars.  It also includes predictions 
about possible mediators of the effect of exemplars on risk perceptions and 
mammography intentions.  
 The main objective of Chapter 4 is to provide a detailed description of the 
experimental methods used to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3.  A randomized 
6 
online experiment assigned participants to one of eight conditions, with conditions 
varying on the presence or type of comments displayed: 1) no information control 
(NoInfo), 2) no comments control (NoComm), 3) false-positive comments without 
exemplars (FPNoEx), 4) mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no 
exemplars (BCNoEx), 5) false-positive comments with exemplars (FPEx), 6) 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars (BCEx), 7) false positive 
comments with exemplars removed (FPExRem), or 8) mammogram-detected breast 
cancer comments with exemplars removed (BCExRem).  Chapter 4 also presents an 
overview of experimental measures, stimuli, and an analysis plan.  Full survey 
instruments and sample stimuli are available in the appendices. 
 Results presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 address both Objective 2 and 
Objective 3.  Chapter 5 presents the results of the experiment testing the effects of 
comment conditions on mammography intentions (i.e., the intention to have a 
mammogram in the next two years and the intention to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram).  It also presents results from moderation and mediation analyses that 
attempt to elucidate the mechanisms of action underlying predicted, unexpected, and 
failed effects of comments. 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the experiment that address the effects of 
comments on risk perceptions, including perceived risk of developing breast cancer, 
perceived risk of a positive mammogram, and perceived risk of a false positive 
mammogram.  It also includes results of moderation and mediation analyses of the effects 
of comments presented. 
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 The final chapter, Chapter 7, provides a summary of the results of the dissertation 
and a general discussion of these results.  This chapter includes an overview of the 
strengths and limitations of the research, a discussion of directions for future research, 
and an overall conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EXEMPLARS IN USER-GENERATED COMMENTARY ON MAMMOGRAPHY 
NEWS COVERAGE 
Introduction 
Routine mammography is recommended as the primary breast screening modality 
for average-risk women between the ages of 50 and 74 years of age (U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force [USPSTF], 2009; USPSTF, 2016).  The American Cancer Society 
recommends beginning routine screening even earlier, at age 45 (Oeffinger et al., 2015), 
making the topic of mammography one that is pertinent for a large segment of the 
population and also somewhat controversial. Research suggests that the benefit of 
mammography for young women is quite modest and that regular mammography 
screening before age 50 may put women at high risk for false positive results, 
overdiagnosis, and overtreatment (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; Pace & 
Keating, 2014).  In fact, Pace and Keating (2014) estimate that if 10,000 40-year-old 
women are screened annually with mammography for 10 years, 3,680 (37%) will have 
normal mammograms all 10 years, 6,130 (61%) will experience at least one false positive 
(including 700 or 7% who will have an unnecessary biopsy), and 190 (2%) will be 
diagnosed with breast cancer (including between 1 and 16 women, or 0.01% - 0.16%, 
whose death will be averted due to mammography screening).  Despite the significant 
risks, women continue to overestimate the benefits of mammography (Domenighetti et 
al., 2003), and the general public remains enthusiastic toward screening (Schwartz, 
Woloshin, Fowler, & Welch, 2004).  In addition to the role played by medical 
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professionals, professional medical organizations, and advocacy organizations that 
continue to promote screening, media coverage may be partially to blame for this 
mismatch between perception, attitudes, and reality. 
Prior research has shown that mammography behaviors are influenced by media 
coverage (Yanovitzky & Blitz, 2000), but this research does not take into account the 
effect of comments generated by readers in response to mammography news presented in 
an online context.  The presence of comments on online news stories is increasingly 
common (Weber, 2014), and research has shown that comments may affect readers’ 
opinions and perceptions (Lee, 2014).  Unfortunately, little is known about the nature of 
comments that are generated in response to mammography news coverage.  Specifically, 
though we know that exemplars, or “illustrative individual cases” (Brosius & Bathelt, 
1994, p. 48), are present in user-generated comments (Holton, Lee, & Coleman, 2014; 
Len-Rios, Bhandari, & Medvedeva, 2014), little is known about how accurately these 
exemplars represent the typical mammography experience, including the ratio of false-
positive results to mammography-detected cancer.  Exemplars are of particular interest 
because research has shown they can have greater effects on health risk perceptions than 
statistical information (Zillmann, 2006).  Similarly, narrative evidence has been shown to 
have a greater effect on behavioral intentions than statistical evidence (Zebregs, van den 
Putte, Neijens, & de Graaf, 2015).  Thus, exemplars in comments could potentially have 
more powerful effects on intentions and risk perceptions than the information in the 
articles with which they appear.   
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Though more extensive research is needed to fully understand the complex media 
environment surrounding mammography and user-generated commentary on 
mammography, this limited content analysis was specifically designed as a preliminary 
step toward Study 2, which will investigate the effects of exemplars in user-generated 
commentary on mammography news articles on the readers of these comments.  First, 
this content analysis quantifies the prevalence, types, and representativeness of exemplars 
appearing in a segment of reader comments on mammography articles, which was 
necessary to help justify the legitimacy of the research questions addressed by Study 2.  
Secondly, and more practically, it provides a pool of user-generated comments (both with 
and without exemplars) from an online news source that can be used as experimental 
stimuli, which will enhance the ecological validity of Study 2.  However, this content 
analysis does not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis across media platforms 
(e.g., television, social media, etc.), nor does it seek to sample from or be representative 
of multiple news sources.  
Background 
Analyses of News Coverage of Mammography 
To understand the nature of user-generated commentary, one must first 
understand the nature of news coverage of mammography in recent years.  Several 
newsworthy events have shaped the nature of news coverage about mammography over 
the last five years: changing USPSTF recommendations regarding breast cancer 
screening, studies about the efficacy of mammography, the emergence of breast 
tomosynthesis (also called 3D mammography) as a new screening tool, legislation about 
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breast density notification, Susan G. Komen withdrawing funding from Planned 
Parenthood, and celebrity breast cancer cases.  The change in USPSTF recommendations 
alone was heavily covered in the media, and much of the immediate coverage was critical 
of the new guidelines (Squiers et al., 2011).  However, there is little research about 
coverage of other mammography topics that have received coverage in recent years.  
While there have been content analyses of news coverage of cancer in general (e.g., 
Slater, Long, Bettinghaus, & Reineke, 2008), breast cancer (e.g., Atkin, Smith, McFeters, 
& Ferguson, 2008), mammography (e.g., Schwartz & Woloshin, 2002), and the USPSTF 
controversy (e.g., Squiers, Holden, Dolina, Kim, Bann, & Renaud, 2011) few examine 
coverage over time, and none incorporate an analysis of comments. 
At least three recent content analyses examining cancer news coverage have 
discovered that, compared to actual cancer incidence rates, breast cancer is 
disproportionately represented in media coverage.  Using a representative sample of 
national and local news from television, newspaper, and magazine sources, Slater, Long, 
Bettinghaus, and Reineke (2008) analyzed cancer news coverage from 2002 and 2003.  
Slater et al. found that breast cancer was over-represented in media coverage compared to 
both its actual incidence and mortality rate in the population at the time; breast cancer 
was mentioned in 29.6% of newspaper stories about cancer (with the next most 
frequently mentioned cancer being colon cancer, mentioned in only 11.3% of newspaper 
stories about cancer).  Another recently completed content analysis attempts to show 
change in cancer news coverage trends across three different time points, including 1977, 
1980, and 2003.  Jensen, Moriarty, Hurley, and Stryker (2010) examined cancer stories 
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appearing in the top 50 U.S. newspapers during a time frame in 2003, which closely 
replicated methods used by Greenberg, Freimuth, and Bratic (1979) and Freimuth, 
Greenberg, DeWitt, and Romano (1984) to complete prior content analyses of cancer 
coverage.  Jensen et al. found that breast cancer was consistently overreported, compared 
to its actual incidence relative to other cancers, across the three time periods reported.  
Finally, Hurley, Riles, and Sangalang (2014) analyzed cancer news from the top four 
online news sources (Google News, Yahoo! News, MSNBC.com, and CNN.com) over a 
composite month in 2008.  Consistent with previous content analyses of print media 
coverage, they found that breast cancer was the most prevalent cancer mentioned.  Of 
breast cancer articles analyzed, 29% were about detection (presumably many of those 
were about mammography), 23% were about prevention, and 22% were about treatment.   
With the exception of Hurley, Riles, and Sangalang (2014), prior analyses of 
broad cancer news coverage do not comment on the prevalence of mammography 
coverage or the use of narratives or exemplars in the articles.  Others, however, have 
examined the nature of mammography coverage in the media.  Wells, Marshall, Crawley, 
and Dickersin (2001) analyzed newspaper reports on mammography appearing in high 
circulation US newspapers from 1990 to 1997.  Wells et al. found that the most common 
theme of these articles was the issue of screening mammography for women ages 40 to 
49.  Overall, articles were mostly supportive for screening in these women; of the 160 
articles with quotes, 26% included quotes supporting mammography for women in their 
40s without presenting quotes from the opposite viewpoint, 15% had quotes from both 
perspectives, and 7.5% had quotes regarding reservations about screening women in this 
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age group.  Of 619 quotes total in 160 articles, 38 quotes came from members of the 
public. Wells et al. report that these quotes often involved a member of the public 
describing her own experience with breast cancer or mammography.  Atkin, Smith, 
McFeters, and Ferguson (2008) focused specifically on the content of breast cancer news 
coverage in leading newspapers, newsmagazines, and television during 2003 and 2004.  
They found that 23% of breast cancer news stories analyzed referred to breast cancer 
detection and 17% overall referred specifically to mammography, with most of the 
articles dealing with topics of effectiveness and the age at which women should begin 
having mammograms.  They also examined the prevalence of personal narratives in 
breast cancer news coverage, finding that 48% of stories primarily about detection cited a 
“personal case” as a source.   
In addition to analyses of general mammography coverage, some authors have 
focused on coverage of various mammography controversies over time, including the 
1997 National Institutes of Health (NIH) consensus panel recommendation against 
routine screening of women in their 40s and subsequent reversal, a 2000 meta-analysis on 
the efficacy of mammography published in The Lancet, and the 2009 USPSTF breast 
cancer screening recommendations.  Schwartz and Woloshin (2002) analyzed media 
coverage for the two weeks following the 1997 National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
consensus panel recommendation against routine screening of women in their 40s and for 
the two weeks following the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) subsequent reversal of that 
decision by collecting stories from the top 10 US newspapers and 3 major television 
networks.  Despite acknowledging the uncertainty regarding whether women in their 40s 
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should have mammograms following the initial NIH recommendation, 59% of the news 
items still suggested that these women should be screened.  Following the NCI reversal, 
the expression of uncertainty dropped significantly and 96% of news items suggested that 
women in their 40s should be screened.  Though Schwartz and Woloshin reported on the 
sources of quotations found in these stories, it is difficult to tell how many included 
mammography exemplars, as quotes from breast cancer advocacy groups and survivors 
are reported together (17 quotes across 51 stories).  They did note that the American 
Cancer Society was frequently quoted (36 times across 51 stories), while the USPSTF, 
which recommended against routine screening for women aged 40 to 49 at the time, was 
only quoted once across all of the news stories.  Holmes-Rovner and Charles (2003) also 
tracked news coverage following a mammography controversy, examining news 
clippings in the United Kingdom for two weeks following the release of a meta-analysis 
in The Lancet that suggested mammography did not decrease breast cancer mortality and 
was unjustified.  They found that approximately 20% of the articles included a patient 
testimonial, and that testimonials use increased over time; articles published closer to the 
release of the study were more focused on the technical aspects of the study than those 
published during week two of coverage.  Holmes-Rovner and Charles note that many 
articles, particularly those with patient testimonials, encouraged women to disregard the 
findings of this meta-analysis and continue screening.  Findings from Schwartz and 
Woloshin and from Holmes-Rovner and Charles suggest that news coverage of 
mammography controversies is often skewed toward encouraging screening rather than 
emphasizing uncertainty and the need for informed decision-making.   
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The 2009 release of updated USPSTF breast cancer screening recommendations is 
one of the most recent mammography controversies to be studied.  Squiers et al. (2011) 
analyzed newspaper and social media coverage of the new recommendations in the weeks 
following their release.  They found that 63% of the news articles mentioned the 
guidelines for women in their 40s (the recommendations that changed most drastically), 
while only 34% discussed the guidelines for women in their 50s, suggesting an emphasis 
on the more controversial aspects of the recommendations.  The valence of the newspaper 
articles was also skewed; 55% were unsupportive of the new recommendations, 31.3% 
were supportive, and 13.8% were neutral.   
Research by Jensen et al. (2014), which found that self-reported news 
consumption was positively related to overestimation of the prevalence of breast cancer, 
suggests that the overrepresentation of breast cancer in the news affects breast cancer risk 
perceptions.  Exposure to news stories and comments that overrepresent the benefits of 
mammography while downplaying risks may have similar effects on mammography risk 
perceptions and intentions. Unfortunately, prior content analyses of breast cancer and 
mammography coverage do not provide insights into the user-generated comments that 
accompanied news coverage of mammography, meaning that some of the mammography 
information to which readers have been exposed has remained unanalyzed.  These gaps in 
research have prompted the following research questions: 
RQ1: How was mammography covered in online news from 2009 to 2014 (with a 
particular emphasis on valence toward mammography and presence and type of 
exemplars)?  
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RQ2: What was the nature of online reader commentary for these mammography 
news stories (with a particular emphasis on valence toward mammography and 
presence and type of exemplars)? 
Prior Research on User-Generated Commentary 
In addition to the lack of content analyses of media coverage that incorporate an 
analysis of comments, research in general on user-generated comments about 
mammography that appear in the public domain is limited.  Existing literature on user-
generated content about breast cancer and mammography is primarily from social media 
(Abramson, Keefe, & Chou, 2015; Lyles, Lόpez, Pasick, & Sarkar, 2013; Thackeray, 
Burton, Giraud-Carrier, Rollins, & Draper, 2013).  While these studies provide insight 
into the content of comments, they do not provide information on the interplay between 
articles and comments, nor do they provide insight into the presence or role of exemplars 
in comments.  The limited research that does exist on the prevalence of exemplars in 
comments on health news (Holton, Lee, & Coleman, 2014; Suran, Holton, & Coleman, 
2014) is not specific to mammography or breast cancer.   
Two of the analyses of online comments related to breast cancer and 
mammography come from Twitter.  Thackeray et al. (2013) conducted an analysis of all 
tweets related to breast cancer during October 2012 to capture Twitter coverage of breast 
cancer awareness month.  Using automated text analysis, they determined that 3.1% of all 
1.3 million original tweets were about breast cancer detection, including, but not limited 
to, mammography.  The majority of tweets were about wearing pink and participating in 
fundraisers and awareness activities.  Unfortunately, no further information was given 
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about the detection tweets, and it is unknown whether they included exemplars (which 
would have been necessarily brief given the 140-character limit of tweets).  Lyles et al. 
(2013) also coded a small segment of mammography tweets appearing on Twitter during 
a five-week period in early 2012.  Of 271 messages about mammograms, 25% included 
mammography exemplars.  These included women sharing experiences with 
appointments, negative sentiment toward mammogram experiences, mammogram results, 
and references to the mammograms of friends or family members.  The analysis by Lyles 
et al. was described as exploratory, and only used tweets classified as “top tweets” (those 
with higher levels of engagement from other Twitter users) were included, thus these 
results may not be representative of all tweets about mammography.  Additionally, due to 
the length limitations placed on tweets by the Twitter platform, any exemplars or 
narratives included in the tweets analyzed would be incredibly brief and would not allow 
for detailed descriptions of mammography outcomes.  Additionally, any exemplars that 
do exist would be unlikely to produce substantial cognitive involvement or narrative 
transportation.  Thus, Twitter is not an ideal source for finding and quantifying the 
presence of mammography exemplars in user-generated commentary. 
Analyses of comments on Facebook also provide limited insights into the nature 
of user-generated comments about mammography.  Abramson, Keefe, and Chou (2015) 
analyzed wall posts from October 2010 from the Facebook page of a nonprofit 
organization committed to funding free mammograms and spreading breast cancer 
awareness.  Abramson et al. found that users often used the Facebook wall of this 
particular organization as a place to share personal breast cancer stories and anecdotes, 
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though the prevalence and type of stories was not quantified.  Importantly, they also note 
that users were allowed to post health information, opinions, and stories without 
intervention or apparent oversight from the sponsoring organization, which allows for the 
spread of misinformation.  The same may be true for user-generated comments on some 
online news sites. 
Finally, though there is not available literature on user-generated comments on 
breast cancer and mammography news articles, there are limited analyses of how certain 
health article characteristics may affect the types of comments generated by readers.  
Though the research in this area focuses on frames and not the presence of exemplars, the 
presence of episodic frames may serve as a proxy for exemplars.  Holton, Lee, and 
Coleman (2014) explored the effects of framing of online health news on the volume, 
content, and framing of reader comments.  Overall, 0.34 sentences per comment were 
episodically framed, which gives some indication of the prevalence of exemplars, though 
the authors do not report the average number of sentences per comment.  They found that 
when articles had gain frames, readers were more likely to share personal stories in the 
comments.  Interestingly, episodically framed articles were not more likely to have 
episodically framed comments.  While Holton et al. examined all health topics, Suran, 
Holton, and Coleman (2014) looked specifically at whether the frames of comments were 
associated with certain health topics, including cancer.  Though some topics were 
associated with a higher likelihood of episodically-, thematically-, gain-, or loss-framed 
comments, Suran et al. did not find an association between an article being about cancer 
and the frame of the comments.   
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Because of a general dearth of research on user-generated comments in the online 
news arena and, specifically, a lack of attention to the prevalence of exemplars in these 
comments, I propose the following research question:  
RQ3: What is the nature of mammography exemplars in user-generated comments 
on online news articles about mammography, specifically in regards to 
prevalence, type, and representativeness of actual mammography outcomes? 
RQ4: How are exemplars in mammography articles related to exemplars found in 
user-generated news comments? 
Methods 
 Because this content analysis was designed to provide background information 
and stimuli for Study 2, it includes a limited analysis of news articles and associated 
reader comments related to mammography over a five year period, beginning with the 
release of the USPSTF revised breast screening recommendations in November 2009.  
The New York Times was chosen as the source for this content analysis for its broad 
readership, its role in agenda-setting (Yanovitzky & Blitz, 2000), and its online 
commenting system, the archives of which are well-maintained and easily accessible 
through the application program interfaces (APIs) provided by The New York Times.  
However, The New York Times is not representative of all news sources, nor is its 
readership representative of news readers in general.  Nevertheless, this source is useful 
for discovering the kinds of comments generated, gauging the relative frequency of 
different types of comments, and collecting stimulus materials for experimental study.    
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Article Collection Procedure 
 To collect mammography stories appearing in The New York Times in the five 
years following the release of the 2009 USPSTF mammography guidelines, the author 
first conducted a search using LexisNexis for articles or blog posts appearing between 
November 1, 2009 and December 31, 2014 that mentioned mammography or breast 
cancer screening by using the search string mammogra! OR ("breast cancer" w/2 
screen!).  The author then searched the NYTimes.com website for the same date range 
using the following search string: mammogram OR mammography OR "breast cancer 
screening" OR "screening for breast cancer" OR "screen for breast cancer."1 
Article Inclusion Criteria, Measures, and Coding Procedure 
 For each article retrieved in the searches described above, the author recorded 
basic information, including the title; any alternate titles, if applicable (since an article’s 
print and web titles sometimes differed); the date of publication; whether or not the 
article was included in the LexisNexis search results, whether or not the article was 
included in the NYTimes.com search results; the article type (news article, 
opinion/editorial, magazine article, blog post, letter/reader reaction, other);2 and whether 
the article was a duplicate of another article appearing in the search.  The full codebook is 
                                                 
1 The NYTimes.com website uses a different search syntax than LexisNexis, so it was not 
possible to exactly replicate the search string used in LexisNexis. 
2 For results from the NYTimes.com search, it was sometimes difficult to ascertain the 
article type because the URLs provided in the search results often pointed only to a blog 
post, even if the news article appeared in both print and as a blog post.  For this reason, 
article type for these results may be less accurate than for articles found through 
LexisNexis. 
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available in Appendix A.  Articles were excluded from the analysis if the article type was 
“letters/reader reactions” or “other” (which included death notices, engagement and 
wedding announcements, corrections, book reviews, and lists of headlines) or if they 
were duplicates of an article already in the dataset.  If an article appeared in the search 
results as both a blog post and an article, the blog post was coded and the print version 
was excluded as a duplicate, as online articles were typically more complete and correct 
than versions appearing in print.  Beyond these inclusion criteria, articles were included if 
either of the following was true: 1) the article title included a reference to mammograms, 
mammography, breast screening, or breast cancer screening, or 2) at least 50% of the 
paragraphs in the story included a reference to mammograms, mammography, breast 
screening, or breast cancer screening.   
 The unit of analysis was the full article.  Articles that were included in the dataset 
were coded for content variables, including whether or not the online version had 
comments, mentioned the 2009 mammography guidelines issued by the USPSTF, or 
mentioned any of the following organizations: Susan G. Komen for the Cure, the 
American Cancer Society, the National Cancer Institute, the USPSTF, or the American 
College of Radiology.  Articles were also coded for overall valence with regard to 
mammography and could be coded as “more enthusiastic than cautious toward 
mammography,” “balanced/neutral,” or “more cautious than enthusiastic toward 
mammography.”  Finally, articles were coded for the presence of exemplars, including 
breast cancer exemplars (a mention of an individual or individuals who was/were 
diagnosed with breast cancer), mammography exemplars (a mention of an individual or 
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individuals who had a mammogram or mammograms), or exemplars who chose to delay 
or not to undergo mammography.  If a mammography exemplar was present, the coder 
went on to record the type of mammography exemplar present in the article.  The types of 
exemplars included false positives (women who received a call-back or follow-up for 
additional screening, biopsy, etc.), cancer outcomes (women who had a screening 
mammogram that found a cancer), no false positives (women who have a history of 
mammograms but no false positives and no cancer diagnoses), lumps or breast cancer 
found without mammography (this includes women who had a lump detected in some 
way and went on to have a diagnostic mammogram as well as women who had a false 
negative mammogram and later found a lump or cancer), and false negatives (women 
who report that they had cancer that was missed by a mammogram).  These categories 
were not exclusive, and an article could be coded as including multiple or overlapping 
exemplar types.   
 Using the measures outlined above, the author coded all of the articles retrieved in 
the search for basic information, inclusion criteria, and content.  A second coder was 
trained and recoded a 10% sample of articles to determine inter-coder reliability for 
inclusion and content.  Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha 
and was judged to be acceptable for all variables, including the following: meeting 
inclusion criteria (α = 1), having comments (α = 1), mentioning 2009 USPSTF guidelines 
(α = .87), mentioning Susan G. Komen for the Cure (α = 1), mentioning the American 
Cancer Society (α = 1), mentioning the National Cancer Institute (α = 1), mentioning the 
USPSTF (α = .74), mentioning the American College of Radiology (α = 1), valence (α = 
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.71), inclusion of breast cancer exemplars (α = 1), inclusion of exemplars who delay or 
do not get a mammogram (α = 1), inclusion of mammography exemplars (α = 1), 
inclusion of false positive exemplars (α = 1), inclusion of exemplars with cancer outcome 
(α = 1), inclusion of exemplars with no false positive (α = .86), inclusion of exemplars 
with a lump or breast cancer detected without a mammogram (α = .86), and false negative 
exemplars (α = 1).  
Comment Collection Procedure 
 For articles that were included in the analysis and for which the online versions 
had comments, all comments were collected using the New York Times Community API 
(http://developer.nytimes.com/docs/community_api/The_Community_API_v3/).  
Comments could be retrieved through the API for all but four of the articles.  For each of 
these remaining articles, the author manually collected all comments from the New York 
Times website.  For each comment, the author recorded the author name, author location, 
comment date, whether or not the comment was classified as an “NYT Pick,” the number 
of times the comment was recommended by other readers, the full text of the comment, 
and the number of words in each comment.  Due to changes in the New York Times 
comment structure over time, author location, “NYT Pick” status, and number of times 
recommended were not available for all comments.  
Comment Inclusion Criteria, Measures, and Coding Procedure 
 From the total pool of 5,858 comments, a stratified random sample was 
constructed by drawing 20% of each article’s comments (n = 1,185).  When an article had 
fewer than five comments, one comment was randomly selected and included so that all 
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articles were represented.  Comments from this sample were included for further analysis 
if they mentioned mammography or were judged as being about mammography.  The 
codebook for comment inclusion and content is available as part of Appendix A, and the 
full comment was the unit of analysis.  Those comments that were included in the 
analysis were then coded for valence with regard to mammography: “more enthusiastic 
toward mammography than cautious,” “balanced/neutral—neither more enthusiastic nor 
more cautious,” or “more cautious toward mammography than enthusiastic.”  Comments 
included in the analysis were also coded for the presence of different types of exemplars, 
including breast cancer exemplars, exemplars who chose to delay or not to undergo 
mammography, and mammography exemplars. If a mammography exemplar was present, 
the coder went on to record the type of mammography exemplar present in the comment.  
As described in the above section on article coding, the types of exemplars included false 
positives, cancer outcomes, no false positives, lumps or breast cancer found without 
mammography, and false negatives.  As with the articles, these categories were not 
exclusive, and a comment could be coded as including multiple or overlapping exemplar 
types. 
The author coded the entire sample of comments.  A second coder was trained 
and recoded a randomly drawn 10% sample of comments (n = 100) to determine inter-
coder reliability.  Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha and 
was judged to be acceptable for most variables, including meeting inclusion criteria (α = 
.81), valence (α = .92), including a breast cancer exemplar (α = .95), including an 
exemplar who chooses not to screen (α = .88), including a mammography exemplar (α = 
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.85), presence of a false-positive exemplar (α = .78), presence of a cancer outcome 
exemplar (α = .74), and presence of an exemplar with a lump or breast cancer detected 
without mammography (α = .83).  Krippendorff’s alpha for the presence of exemplars 
who had a history of normal mammography results was .53 (88% agreement), which falls 
below an acceptable level of agreement.  This may be partly due to the rare nature of this 
type of exemplar (appearing only 13 times in 576 comments). 
Analysis 
 Statistical analyses were performed using Stata/IC 13.1 for Windows.  Analyses 
included basic descriptive statistics and chi-square analyses to examine the relationship 
between comment exemplar type and comment valence.  Logistic regression with 
standard errors clustered by article were used to examine the effect of exemplars in the 
article on exemplars in the comments on that article. 
Results 
Article Collection and Inclusion 
 The LexisNexis search yielded 485 articles; the search of NYTimes.com yielded 
319.  After accounting for overlap between the LexisNexis and NYTimes.com search, 
there were 559 entries in the database.  Of these, 43 were excluded because they were 
duplicates,3 349 were excluded because they were not primarily about mammograms, and 
                                                 
3 An entry was considered a duplicate only if it appeared twice within one of the two 
searches (e.g., if the same article appeared twice in the LexisNexis search, one of the 
entries was coded as a duplicate and excluded from the database).  An article appearing 
only once in both the LexisNexis search and the NYTimes.com search would be coded as 
an overlapping article, not a duplicate.   
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96 were excluded because they were not news articles, opinion/editorial articles, maga-
zine articles, or blog posts. The remaining 71 unique articles were included in the 
analysis.  Article source and type by inclusion status are presented in Table 2.1.  The full 
list of articles included is available in Appendix B.   
 
Table 2.1 
Article Source and Type by Inclusion Status 
 
Included, 
n = 71 
Excluded,  
n = 488 
Found through LexisNexis search only, n 2 238 
Found in both LexisNexis and NYTimes.com search, n 49 196 
Found in NYTimes.com search only, n 20 54 
Article type: 
News article, n (%) 
Opinion/editorial, n (%) 
Magazine article, n (%) 
Blog post, n (%) 
Letter/reaction, n (%) 
Other, n (%) 
 
37 (52) 
7 (10) 
2 (3) 
25 (35) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
 
221 (45) 
44 (9) 
6 (1) 
113 (23) 
48 (10) 
56 (11) 
Note. Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
Article Characteristics and Content 
 Article characteristics and content are reported in Table 2.2.  Over a third of the 
articles on mammography over the five year period were published in November and 
December of 2009, following the announcement of the updated USPSTF 
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recommendations.  A majority of the articles included in the analysis (54%) mentioned 
the 2009 USPSTF guidelines.  Relevant stakeholders mentioned in the articles varied, 
with the most commonly mentioned being the USPSTF (mentioned in 56% of articles), 
followed by the American Cancer Society (mentioned in 41% of articles).  Roughly one-
quarter of articles (27%) included at least one breast cancer exemplar, and the same 
number included a mammography exemplar (15 articles, or 21%, included both breast 
cancer and mammography exemplars).  Of those that included a mammography 
exemplar, mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were most prevalent (42%), followed 
by an equal prevalence of exemplars with cancer detected without a mammogram and 
normal mammograms (32% each).  A majority (54%) of the articles were judged as being 
neutral or balanced toward mammography.  Of the 71 articles, 32 allowed reader 
comments, and the mean number of comments was 183 (SD = 206).   
 
Table 2.2 
Characteristics and Content of Articles Included in Analysis 
Article characteristic n (%) 
Date of publication: 
November – December 2009 
January – December 2010 
January – December 2011 
January – December 2012 
January – December 2013 
 
25 (35.2) 
9 (12.7) 
6 (8.5) 
8 (11.3) 
6 (8.5) 
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January – December 2014 17 (23.9) 
Article content:  
Mention 2009 USPSTF guidelines 38 (54) 
Mention Susan G. Komen for the Cure 8 (11) 
Mention American Cancer Society 29 (41) 
Mention National Cancer Institute 11 (15) 
Mention USPSTF 40 (56) 
Mention American College of Radiology 10 (14) 
Includes breast cancer exemplar 19 (26.8) 
Includes exemplar who chose to delay or not have 
mammogram 
4 (5.6) 
Includes mammography exemplar 19 (26.8) 
     Mammography exemplar type:a  
Mammogram-detected cancer exemplar 8 (42.1) 
False-positive mammogram result exemplar 4 (21.1) 
Exemplar with lump or breast cancer detected 
through means other than 
mammography 
6 (31.6) 
Exemplar with normal mammogram 6 (31.6) 
Article valence with regard to mammography: 
Enthusiastic toward mammography 
Balanced/neutral  
 
13 (18) 
38 (54) 
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Cautious toward mammography 20 (28) 
 
Note. N = 71. USPSTF is the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. 
a Some articles with mammography exemplars did not specify the outcome of the 
mammogram and articles could include more than one type of exemplar, thus specific 
exemplar types do not add to 19, but percentages are calculated out of 19. 
 
Comment Collection and Inclusion 
 When an article was included in the analysis and the online version had 
comments, all of that article’s comments were collected.  The total number of comments 
for all articles was 5,858.  Of the 5,858 comments in the full database, 145 were 
classified as “NYT picks.” Of those for which the number of “recommends” was 
available (n = 5,281), the mean number of recommends was 12.1 (SD = 28.5).  The mean 
length of comments was 99.7 words (SD = 84.9).  A random sample of 20% of comments 
(n = 1,185), stratified by article, was drawn for detailed analysis.  When an article had 
fewer than five comments, one comment was randomly selected.  Of the 1,185 comments 
drawn, 678 were judged as being related to mammography and included for detailed 
analysis.   
Comment Characteristics and Content 
 Characteristics and content of comments included in the detailed analysis are 
presented in Table 2.3.  The overall valence of comments was almost evenly split across 
the three categories of “enthusiastic toward mammography,” “balanced/neutral,” and 
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“cautious toward mammography.”  Roughly one-third of comments (208 or 30.8%) 
included a mammography exemplar, and the frequency of types of exemplars is presented 
in Table 2.3.  Mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were the most common, followed 
by exemplars with lumps or breast cancer detected through means other than a 
mammogram, followed by false-positive exemplars.  Exemplars reporting a history of 
normal mammogram results were least common.  Slightly more than half of the 
comments coded did not include any exemplars (382 or 56.3%). 
 
Table 2.3 
Characteristics and Content of Comments Included in Analysis 
Comment characteristic n (%) 
 
Comments included in analysis (% of all comments) 
 
678a (57.2) 
Comment valence with regard to mammography: 
Enthusiastic toward mammography (% of included comments) 
Balanced/neutral (% of included comments) 
Cautious toward mammography (% of included comments) 
 
222 (32.8) 
209 (30.9) 
246 (36.3) 
Comment content:  
Comments including breast cancer exemplar (% of included 
comments) 
192 (28.4) 
Comments including exemplar who chose to delay or not have 
mammogram (% of included comments) 
63 (9.3) 
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Comments including mammography exemplar (% of included 
comments) 
208 (30.8) 
     Mammography exemplar type:b  
Comments with mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplar (% of mammography exemplar 
comments) 
86 (41.3) 
Comments with false-positive mammogram 
result exemplar (% of mammography 
exemplar comments) 
39 (18.8) 
Comments with exemplar with lump or breast 
cancer detected through means other than 
mammography (% of mammography 
exemplar comments) 
50 (24.0) 
Comments with exemplars with normal 
mammograms (% of mammography 
exemplar comments) 
15 (7.2) 
Comments without exemplars (% of included comments) 382 (56.3) 
Nonexemplar comments about false-positive 
mammograms (% of comments without 
exemplars) 
67 (17.5) 
32 
Nonexemplar comments about mammogram-detected 
breast cancer (% of comments without 
exemplars) 
92 (24.1) 
Note. a Out of a total sample of 1,185 comments. b Some comments with mammography 
exemplars did not specify the outcome of the mammogram and comments could include 
more than one type of exemplar, thus specific exemplar types do not add to 208. 
 
Results from further analysis of the relationship between the presence of different 
types of exemplars and comment valence are presented in Table 2.4.  Comments that 
include breast cancer exemplars are more enthusiastic toward mammography and less 
neutral or cautious than comments that do not include breast cancer exemplars.  The 
relationship between valence and mammography exemplar appears to vary by the type of 
exemplar present; comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were more 
enthusiastic toward mammography, while those with false-positive exemplars were more 
cautious toward mammography. 
 
Table 2.4 
Exemplar Type by Comment Valence 
 
 
Comment valence  
 
 
 Enthusiastic,  Neutral,  Cautious,  χ2 
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Exemplar type 
 
n (%)  n (%) n (%) 
 
Any breast cancer exemplar: 
Present 
Not present 
 
 
120 (62.5) 
102 (21.1) 
 
 
42 (21.9) 
166 (34.4) 
 
 
30 (15.6) 
215 (44.5) 
 
 
110.1*** 
Any mammography exemplar: 
Present 
Not present 
 
100 (48.1) 
121 (26.0) 
 
39 (18.8) 
169 (36.3) 
 
69 (33.2) 
176 (37.8) 
 
36.6*** 
Mammogram-detected cancer: 
Present 
Not present 
 
73 (84.9) 
27 (21.6) 
 
8 (9.3) 
33 (26.4) 
 
5 (5.8) 
65 (52.0) 
 
83.5*** 
False-positive mammogram: 
Present 
Not present 
 
7 (18.0) 
93 (54.1) 
 
5 (12.8) 
36 (20.9) 
 
27 (69.2) 
43 (25.0) 
 
28.6*** 
Lump or breast cancer 
detected without 
mammography: 
Present 
Not present 
 
 
 
17 (34.0) 
83 (51.6) 
 
 
 
19 (38.0) 
22 (13.7) 
 
 
 
14 (28.0) 
56 (34.8) 
 
 
 
14.6** 
Normal mammogram: 
Present 
 
6 (40.0) 
 
1 (6.7) 
 
8 (53.3) 
 
3.5 
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Not present 94 (48.0) 40 (20.4) 62 (31.6) 
Note. **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Relationship between Article Exemplars and Comment Exemplars 
 Results from an analysis of the relationship between the presence of exemplars in 
articles and exemplars in comments is presented in Table 2.5.  Overall, the presence of 
any exemplar in the article was associated with a significantly higher prevalence of 
exemplars in the comments.  This overall relationship varied, however, among different 
types of exemplars.  For example, there was no relationship between the presence of 
breast cancer exemplars in the article and breast cancer exemplars in comments, but there 
was a significant positive relationship between the presence of any mammogram 
exemplar in the article and the presence of mammogram exemplars in comments.  There 
was also a marginally significant relationship between the presence of false positive 
exemplars in the article and false positive exemplars in the article.  For all significant or 
marginally significant relationships, the pattern was the same: when articles included 
exemplars, the comments on those articles were also more likely to include exemplars. 
 
Table 2.5 
Effect of Presence of Article Exemplars on Presence of Comment Exemplars  
 
Article exemplar type 
 
Comment exemplar type Not Present, n (%) Present, n (%) 
OR (SE, 
adjusted for 
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clustering 
by article) 
 Any exemplar  
Any exemplar: 
Not Present 
Present 
 
214 (63.1) 
125 (36.9) 
 
171 (50.4) 
168 (49.6) 
1.68 (0.38)* 
 
 
Breast cancer exemplar 
 
Breast cancer exemplar: 
Not Present 
Present 
 
360 (71.1) 
146 (28.9) 
 
126 (73.3) 
46 (26.7) 
0.90 (0.20) 
 
 
Exemplar who chooses not to have a 
mammogram 
 
Exemplar who chooses 
not to have a 
mammogram: 
Not Present 
Present 
 
 
588 (92.6) 
47 (7.4) 
 
 
27 (62.8) 
16 (37.2) 
 
 
7.41  
(1.40)*** a 
 
 
Mammography exemplar 
 
Mammography 
exemplar: 
Not Present 
Present 
 
258 (74.6) 
88 (25.4) 
 
212 (63.9) 
120 (36.1) 
1.66 (0.38)* 
 
 
Mammogram-detected cancer 
 
Mammogram-detected 
cancer: 
Not Present 
Present 
 
510 (87.3) 
74 (12.7) 
 
82 (87.2) 
12 (12.8) 
1.01 (0.29) 
 
 
False-positive mammogram 
 
False-positive 
mammogram: 
Not Present 
Present 
 
 
538 (95.2) 
27 (4.8) 
 
 
101 (89.4) 
12 (10.6) 
 
2.37 (1.05) † 
 
 
Lump or breast cancer detected without 
mammography 
 
Lump or breast cancer 
detected without 
mammography: 
 
 
529 (93.6) 
 
 
99 (87.6) 
 
 
2.1 (0.95) 
36 
Not Present 
Present 
36 (6.4) 14 (12.4) 
 
 
Normal mammogram 
 
Normal mammogram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Present 
Present 
574 (97.6) 
14 (2.4) 
89 (98.9) 
1 (1.1) 
0.46 (0.49) 
 
Note. aStata warns that this standard error may be unreliable because of small numbers. 
This estimate is based on only one article that included an exemplar who chose not to 
have a mammogram. 
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Discussion 
 This chapter addresses Objective 1 of the dissertation, which is to describe the 
prevalence, content, and representativeness of mammography exemplars in comments on 
online news about mammography.  This analysis provides insight into mammography 
newspaper coverage from 2009 to 2014, mammography-related comments generated by 
readers of online news, and the presence and characteristics of exemplars in reader 
comments.   
RQ1 pertained to the media environment surrounding mammography coverage 
from 2009 to 2014.  This analysis shows that the majority of the discussion of the 2009 
USPSTF recommendations in The New York Times took place immediately following 
their announcement, meaning that prior analyses (Squiers et al., 2011) using media 
coverage from November 2009 through January 2010 are likely to have accurately 
captured coverage of that particular event. Overall, mammography coverage waned in the 
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years following 2009 but increased again in 2014 with the release of a new 
mammography study, introduction of a new screening method (tomosynthesis or “3-D” 
mammography), and increased attention to issues associated with breast density.  Articles 
typically mentioned important sources or stakeholders relevant to mammography, and 
since a large portion of articles related to mammography in the study period were related 
to the USPSTF recommendations, they were often a cited source of information.  The 
American Cancer Society and, less often, the American College of Radiology were 
typically included as sources who opposed the change in guidelines.  The National 
Cancer Institute and Susan G. Komen for the Cure were only occasionally mentioned in 
mammography articles.   
The valence with regard to mammography across articles was mostly balanced 
(54%), though there were slightly more articles that were more cautious toward 
mammography than enthusiastic (28% vs. 18%).  This differs from other analyses of 
news controversy, such as coverage of the NIH mammography recommendations studied 
by Schwartz and Woloshin (2002) and coverage of the 2009 USPSTF recommendations 
studied by Squiers et al. (2011), which showed that media coverage tended to be more 
favorable toward mammography or unsupportive of recommendations against 
mammography.  This difference is likely due to the vastly different nature of the present 
content analysis as compared to prior analyses of short-term coverage of mammography 
controversies, including differences in time frames and differences in sources.  Because 
of the limited nature of the content analysis of coverage presented here, the main 
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emphasis should be on comments in response to the news coverage as opposed to the 
coverage itself.    
RQ2 and RQ3 dealt with the general nature of online reader commentary on 
mammography news stories and the presence of exemplars.  Of the comments included in 
the analysis, almost a third included a breast cancer exemplar and a 31% included at least 
one mammography exemplar.4  This is similar to the prevalence of mammography 
exemplars found in Twitter comments analyzed by Lyles, Lόpez, Pasick, and Sarkar 
(2013).  Overall, the valence was almost evenly split among those who were more 
enthusiastic, neutral, or cautious toward mammography. On closer examination, however, 
it appears that valence varied widely across comments and was related to the presence 
and type of exemplars included.  Comments with breast cancer exemplars and 
mammography exemplars were generally more enthusiastic about mammography than 
those without, which may mean that those in favor of mammography used personal 
stories of experiences with breast cancer to support their point while those who were 
cautious about mammography were less likely to include personal examples.  However, 
further analysis of the relationship between valence and the presence of different types of 
mammography exemplars provides a more nuanced understanding.  When comment 
authors included an exemplar in which a mammogram detected breast cancer, this was 
more likely to occur in the context of a comment that was enthusiastic toward 
                                                 
4 There were 120 comments that included both a breast cancer exemplar and a 
mammography exemplar, so while there is overlap, these categories do not represent the 
exact same set of comments. 
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mammography, but when the comment included an experience with a false-positive 
mammogram result, the valence was much more likely to be cautious (negative).  
Comments that included an exemplar whose breast lump or breast cancer was detected 
without a mammogram were much more likely to be neutral toward mammography than 
comments that included other types of exemplars.  
RQ3 also asked how representative mammography exemplars in comments are of 
actual mammography outcomes.  Even using estimates of mammography outcomes for 
women between the ages of 60 and 69, for whom mammograms are most effective and 
result in the least amount of harm in the form of false positives and overdiagnosis, the 
balance of mammography results represented in the comments is highly skewed.  
Research estimates predict that, for 10,000 women 60 years of age who are screened 
every year for 10 years, 438 (4.4%) will be diagnosed with invasive breast cancer or 
ductal carcinoma in situ (including those diagnosed with and without mammography), 
4970 (49.7%) will experience at least one false-positive result but no cancer, and the rest 
will have mammograms with normal results (Pace & Keating, 2014).  When these figures 
are contrasted with the distribution of mammography exemplars presented in Table 2.3, 
one can see that exemplars reporting mammogram-detected cancer and even exemplars 
reporting breast cancer detected without a mammogram are vastly overrepresented 
(45.6% and 24.0%, respectively), while exemplars that describe false-positive 
mammogram results or a history of normal mammograms are drastically 
underrepresented (17.5% and 7.6%, respectively).  This finding raises concerns that an 
overrepresentation of mammogram-detected cancers and an under-representation of false-
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positive mammogram results in comments could lead to skewed risk perceptions and 
mammography intentions in those exposed to these comments.  Future research should 
examine the effects of exemplar type and balance on comment readers.    
Finally, this analysis also provides insight into the relationship between the 
presence of exemplars in articles about mammography and exemplars in comments 
appearing with those articles (RQ4).  The data show that articles with mammography 
exemplars are more likely to have comments that also have mammography exemplars.  
Further, articles with false positive exemplars are more likely to have comments with 
false positive exemplars, and articles with exemplars who chose not to have a 
mammogram are more likely to have comments with exemplars who report choosing not 
to have a mammogram.  By looking specifically at the presence of exemplars and not the 
overall frame of the article, this adds to research by Holton, Lee, and Coleman (2014), 
who found that episodically framed health articles were not more likely to have 
episodically framed comments, and by Suran, Holton, and Coleman (2014), who did not 
find an association between an article being about cancer and the frame of the comments 
(i.e., articles about cancer were not more or less likely to have episodic comments).  One 
possible explanation for the relationship between exemplars in the article and exemplars 
in the comments is the need for readers to connect with others who have had a similar 
experience as a way of affirming their own experience, particularly when they 
experienced an underrepresented outcome (e.g., a false positive) or they have made a 
decision that goes against norms (e.g., choosing not to have a mammogram).    Future 
research should examine possible explanations for the association between 
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mammography exemplars in articles and mammography exemplars in comments (and the 
absence of this association for breast cancer exemplars), as one cannot rule out the 
possibility of a third variable that explains the association.  
 Due to the limited purpose for which it was designed, this content analysis has 
several characteristics that may restrict generalizability of the results to other sources, 
populations, or health topics.  First, the choice of The New York Times as the source for 
articles and associated comments may limit the generalizability of findings to other 
sources of online news and commentary.  Despite its wide readership, the Times is not a 
national newspaper and readers of The New York Times are more educated and more 
liberal than readers of other news sources such as USA Today, local daily newspapers, or 
television news (The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2012).  This may 
also mean that the comments generated vary in significant ways from comments that 
would be produced by readers of other online news sources.  The analysis is further 
limited because it includes only newspapers and newspaper-associated blogs, which may 
not be representative of the full range of information about mammography to which 
people are exposed (such as through social media), and thus may not capture the full 
media environment surrounding mammography over the past five years.  Finally, because 
this analysis focused specifically on mammography, the findings are not generalizable to 
news coverage of other screening procedures or health topics.  Because breast cancer 
advocates are vocal supporters of mammograms (Murphy, 2010), the prevalence and type 
of exemplars in comments on mammography news coverage may be different than they 
would be for news coverage of other screening tests or health issues.   
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 Despite the limitations, this analysis provides important insights and materials 
needed to develop further research in this area.  Specifically, understanding the 
prevalence, type, and lack of representativeness of mammography exemplars present in 
comments is necessary for researchers interested in investigating the effects of these 
comments on readers.  Knowing that exemplars present in comments are not 
representative of actual mammography outcomes may also have implications for news 
organizations or others who allow comments on online content and have the power to 
highlight certain comments (as The New York Times can by designating comments as 
“NYT Picks.”)  They may choose to consider the representativeness of a particular 
exemplar before promoting it so as to improve the representativeness of exemplars, 
which have been shown to have effects on risk perceptions.   
Conclusions 
 In summary, this content analysis of news coverage of mammography in The New 
York Times and its news blogs from 2009 to 2014 provides an overview of article and 
comment valence and content, with a particularly detailed look at the presence, type, and 
representativeness of exemplars in articles and comments.  Across the five-year period 
studied, the plurality of news articles published appeared in the months following the 
release of the controversial 2009 USPSTF breast cancer screening recommendations.  
The majority of news article were balanced or neutral toward mammography; of articles 
that were not neutral, slightly more stories were critical of mammography than wholly 
supportive.  The valence of all comments toward mammography was also balanced 
overall, with almost equal numbers being enthusiastic, neutral, and cautious toward 
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mammography.  However, results showed that valence varied significantly by exemplar 
type: comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars were more favorable 
toward mammography than comments with false-positive exemplars.  Analyses also 
showed that the composition of mammography exemplar types was not representative of 
actual mammography outcomes, vastly overrepresenting mammogram-detected cancers 
and underrepresenting false positives and normal mammograms.  The data also showed a 
positive relationship between the presence of exemplars in articles and the existence of 
exemplars in comments on news articles.   
This enhanced understanding of the type and distribution of comments appearing 
in online news commentary has informed the design of my future research on the effects 
of comments on readers.  Specifically, comments collected from this analysis will serve 
as stimuli for Study 2, which will examine the effect of comments with different types of 
exemplars on readers’ mammography intentions and risk perceptions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY ON READERS 
The change in mammography recommendations in 2009 by the U.S. Preventive 
Services Task Force (USPSTF) triggered a wave of media coverage on mammography 
screening (Squiers et al., 2011).  Celebrity diagnoses, new studies on the risks and 
benefits of mammography, a controversial decision by Susan G. Komen for the Cure to 
cease funding Planned Parenthood, and revised breast cancer screening recommendations 
from the American Cancer Society have kept mammography in the news over the last 
five years (see Study 1).  Though there is a wide body of research examining the effects 
of online news on media consumers, the user-generated comments that often appear 
alongside online news articles are a relatively recent addition to news media and, as a 
result, are less well studied.  The inclusion of user comments following news stories has 
become standard practice for many online news sources (Weber, 2014), and an estimated 
25% of Internet users have commented on an online news story (Purcell, Rainie, 
Mitchell, Rosenstiel, & Olmstead, 2010).  Of particular interest are the different types of 
user-generated comments that may appear, particularly comments that include 
exemplars—commenters describing their individual experiences.  As shown in Study 1, 
readers frequently share personal experiences related to the news topic in the comment 
section of articles on mammography, and many of these exemplars had narrative 
qualities.  This phenomenon is not limited to news stories about mammography, 
however.  For example, Len-Rios, Bhandari, and Medvedeva (2014) found that 42% of 
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comments on articles about breastfeeding included personal experiences, as well, 
suggesting that this phenomenon may be widespread.   
In the research proposed here, exemplars are broadly defined as “illustrative 
individual cases,” following an early definition by Brosius and Bathelt (1994, p. 48), and 
are thought to increase vividness and interest and be easily understood by message 
recipients (Brosius & Bathelt).  Some scholars make distinctions between exemplars and 
anecdotes, narratives, and testimonials (e.g., Slater & Rouner, 1996), but other authors 
have equated the four concepts (e.g., Braverman, 2008).5  Though equating exemplars, 
anecdotal evidence, narratives, and testimonials is an oversimplification, thinking of them 
as related message types allows communication scholars to draw on a wide body of 
literature to make predictions about their effects.  Despite the presence of a well-
developed line of research on the effects of exemplars in news coverage (see Zillmann, 
1999; Zillmann, 2002; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000), the effect of exemplars in user-
                                                 
5 Exemplars have been defined as “illustrative individual cases” (Brosius & Bathelt, 
1994, p. 48), “case descriptions,” “case presentations” (Zillmann, 1999, p. 70), or 
example cases that share the characteristics of a wider group of events (Zillmann, 2002).  
Anecdotes have been referred to as “examples,” as a type of evidence to be contrasted 
with statistical evidence (Hoeken & Hustinx, 2009, p. 492), or as “brief narrative[s]” 
(Slater & Rouner, 1996, p. 213).  Narratives are perhaps the most well-studied of the four 
concepts, but researchers realize there is not a universally accepted definition of a 
narrative.  Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) propose the following definition for use in the 
study of narratives in the health communication context: “A narrative is any cohesive and 
coherent story with an identifiable beginning, middle, and end that provides information 
about scene, characters, and conflict; raises unanswered questions or unresolved conflict; 
and provides resolution” (p. 778).  Finally, testimonials are the most loosely defined of 
the four concepts and are hard to distinguish from exemplars or narratives.  According to 
Braverman (2008), they “may include a personal story, a description of an individual 
experience or a personal opinion” (p. 666). 
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generated comments on readers is not well understood.  Most research to date on the 
effects of comments focuses on the effects of comment valence (e.g., Lee, 2012; Lee & 
Jang, 2010), incivility (e.g., Anderson, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Ladwig, 2014), or 
argument strength (e.g., Lee, 2014), while research on the effect of exemplars, narratives, 
testimonials, or anecdotes is lacking.   To my knowledge, only one unpublished study has 
examined the effects of “story-oriented” news comments, finding that story-oriented 
comments had a stronger effect on opinions about the health topic of the article than fact-
oriented comments (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013).  Further 
research is needed to understand what effects, if any, exemplars appearing in comments 
on stories about mammography may have on their readers’ breast cancer risk perceptions 
and mammography intentions.  This research examines the effects of mammography 
exemplars appearing in user-generated online news comments on young female readers’ 
breast cancer risk perceptions, positive mammogram and false positive risk perceptions, 
and intentions to be screened for breast cancer.  Findings will further understanding of 
mechanisms underlying the persuasive effects of exemplars and narratives on cancer-
related risk perceptions and behavior, and they may have implications for news and 
public health organizations that allow online comments.  
Introduction and Literature Review 
Effects of Media Coverage of Breast Cancer and Mammography 
 Prior research demonstrates that media coverage of breast cancer and 
mammography can have powerful effects on audiences.  These effects range from 
cognitive effects such as increased knowledge and confusion (Squiers et al., 2011) to 
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changes in behavior, including increased information seeking (Niederdeppe, Frosch, & 
Hornik, 2008) and even increased screening (Yanovitzky & Blitz, 2000).  Prior studies 
include research on effects of general media coverage related to cancer as well as effects 
of coverage of specific news events related to breast cancer and mammography, 
including celebrity breast cancer cases and coverage of the 2009 USPSTF breast cancer 
screening recommendations.  
 The effects of media coverage of breast cancer and mammography on cognitive 
outcomes suggest that news coverage of a cancer-related topic influences public 
knowledge of that issue.  For example, using a content analysis of media coverage and 
survey data, Stryker, Moriarty, and Jensen (2008) found that when cancer prevention 
behaviors were covered heavily in the news, self-reported attention to news stories 
predicted knowledge of these modifiable cancer risk factors.  In addition to general 
effects of cancer-related news coverage on cognitive outcomes, there is also limited 
research on outcomes of media coverage of mammography.  Squiers et al. (2011) 
conducted a content analysis of news stories and social media posts and a web-based 
survey following the release of the 2009 USPSTF breast cancer screening guidelines.  
They found that women who reported paying more attention to the new recommendations 
and those with higher levels of education were more likely to correctly identify the new 
mammography guidelines.  Despite some improvements in knowledge associated with 
exposure to the guidelines, 40% of women ages 40-49 (the group most affected by the 
change in recommendations) reported being confused by the guidelines.  Stryker et al. 
acknowledge that cancer-related information can sometimes be complex, and gaining 
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understanding may require a basic level of scientific literacy on the part of the audience.  
This may explain why, in some cases (e.g., Squiers et al., 2011), increased media 
attention can increase confusion, even when it leads to increased knowledge for some 
groups. 
 In addition to effects on cognitive outcomes such as knowledge and confusion, 
media coverage of cancer, in general, and of the 2009 change in mammography 
guidelines have been shown to have effects on information seeking.  Through a content 
analysis of cancer media coverage and use of data from the Health Information National 
Trends Survey (HINTS), Niederdeppe, Frosch, and Hornik (2008) demonstrated that 
increases in cancer news coverage are positively associated with cancer information 
seeking.  However, effects were moderated by attention to health news and family history 
of cancer, suggesting that effects of cancer-related media coverage on behavior depend, 
in part, on individual differences.  Weeks, Friedenberg, Southwell, and Slater (2012) 
provide evidence that the effects of media coverage may also depend on the nature of the 
coverage.  In an analysis of mammography coverage in 2008 and following the 2009 
USPSTF recommendations, Weeks et al. demonstrated that television coverage of 
mammograms predicted online searches for mammography information, and that this 
relationship was particularly strong during coverage of the guidelines controversy in 
2009. 
 Though information seeking is a demonstrated behavioral outcome of media 
coverage of cancer and mammograms, it is perhaps more interesting to examine the 
effects of media coverage on actual screening behavior.  Jones, Denham, and Springston 
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(2006) provide some evidence that there is an association between media consumed and 
mammography behavior at the individual level.  In a survey of middle-aged women, they 
found a positive association between reported exposure to news magazine articles about 
breast cancer and mammography behavior.  Jones et al. did not, however, attempt to 
control for other variables that could explain both the higher media exposure and the 
mammography behavior other than the presence of a family member with breast cancer.  
In contrast, Yanovitzky and Blitz (2000) used time series analysis of national survey data 
in conjunction with a content analysis of mammography-related media coverage to 
examine the relationship between media coverage and mammography behavior at the 
population level.  They found a significant relationship between prior month level of 
national mammography media coverage and current month level of mammography 
screening for women over the age of 40 during the study period, which provides evidence 
for a causal order between media coverage and screening.   
Finally, several cases have also demonstrated the powerful effects that media 
coverage of celebrity breast cancer cases can have on breast cancer screening behaviors.  
Early examples include the effects of media coverage following breast cancer diagnosis 
announcements by former first ladies Betty Ford (Fink et al., 1978) and Nancy Reagan 
(Lane, Polednak, & Burg, 1989) on breast cancer screening; both appeared to contribute 
to increases in screening.  In more recent years, an Australian study documented that 
media coverage of singer Kylie Minogue’s breast cancer diagnosis was linked to 
increases in mammography appointments made in the weeks following the news 
coverage (Chapman, McLeod, Wakefield, & Holding, 2005). These effects were 
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especially pronounced for young women (Minogue was only 36 years old when 
diagnosed) and those who had never had a mammogram.  Similarly, news coverage of 
actress Angelina Jolie’s decision to have genetic testing for a BRCA1 mutation and 
subsequent prophylactic double mastectomy was linked to a dramatic increase in requests 
for breast cancer-related genetic testing (Evans et al., 2014).  In addition to providing 
evidence of the effects of news coverage of breast cancer-related topics on screening 
behavior, these studies hint at the powerful effects of personal stories in the news on 
news consumers. 
General Effects of News Commentary 
Though the research described above provides insight into the ways in which 
news coverage of breast cancer and mammography related issues affect news consumers, 
it does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the effects of news.  Online news 
stories are often presented together with user-generated comments (Lee, 2012; Weber, 
2014), which have been shown to modify the effects of news article on readers.  The 
body of research outlined below attempts to explain the effects of varying comment 
characteristics, such as valence and civility, on individuals’ attitudes, perceptions of 
public opinion and social norms, and perceptions of risk. 
 First, comments on online news articles have been shown to have effects on 
readers’ attitudes and positive and negative thoughts about the topic in the news article.  
In an online experiment, Lee (2014) tested the effects of argument strength (strong vs. 
weak) on attitude toward the subject of the news article (graduation qualification exams) 
and positive and negative thoughts about the topic provided in a thought-listing exercise.  
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Lee found that comments with strong arguments were likely to produce more positive 
thoughts and marginally more favorable attitudes than comments with weak arguments, 
and weak arguments in the comments led to more negative thoughts reported.  Hsueh, 
Yogeeswaran, and Malinen (2015) also examined the effect of comments on attitudes 
using an online experiment that manipulated whether comments on an article about 
scholarships for Asian students were prejudiced or unprejudiced toward Asian students.  
They found that participants in the prejudiced comment condition had less positive 
attitudes toward Asians than participants in the unprejudiced comments condition across 
multiple measures of attitude.  These changes in attitude also appeared to translate into 
subtle changes in behavior—participants had a chance to leave their own comments, and 
those who had been exposed to prejudiced comments left comments that were judged to 
be more prejudiced than were comments left by participants in the unprejudiced 
condition. 
 Though Hsueh et al. (2015) did not measure perceived norms, they argue that 
comments can be used to convey a social norm, which then influences attitudes and 
behavior.  Indeed, further research on the effects of user-generated comments responding 
to online news articles has demonstrated that comments affect perceived norms and 
perceptions of the opinion climate surrounding a particular topic.  In an online 
experiment, Lee and Jang (2010) found that the presence of user-generated comments 
following an online news story had a significant effect on participants’ perceptions of 
public opinion about the two issues addressed in the news articles (animal testing and 
regulation of television content).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, participants who read 
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comments discrepant with the slant of the news article perceived public opinion to be 
more discrepant with the tone of the article than did participants who saw no user-
generated comments following the story.  This effect was especially pronounced for 
participants high in need for cognition (NFC), who may have attended to the comments 
more carefully than those with lower NFC, suggesting NFC as a potential moderator of 
the effect of comments on readers.  Similarly, Lee (2012) conducted an online 
experiment in which participants read a news article with comments that were either 
congruent or incongruent with their opinion, which was measured before the experiment.  
Again, readers used comments to gauge public opinion on the issue; participants who 
read comments that were consistent with their opinion saw the public as being on their 
side, while those who saw comments that were inconsistent with their opinion perceived 
the public to be on the opposite side of the debate.  Perhaps more interestingly, comments 
enhanced perceptions of media bias for some participants.  For participants with a high 
level of ego involvement, comments congenial with their opinion made the actual news 
story appear more congenial, while comments hostile to their position led to perceptions 
that the news story was biased against their position.   
In addition to effects of comments on attitudes and perception of public opinion, 
at least one study has shown that user-generated comments on news articles can affect 
risk perceptions.  Anderson et al. (2014) conducted an online experiment in which they 
manipulated the civility of comments on an online news blog post about nanotechnology.  
Because incivility in comments has been linked to negative affect and negative attitudes, 
Anderson et al. expected that incivility would also be associated with increased risk 
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perceptions.  While this main effect was not present, findings revealed an interaction 
between civility of comments and pre-existing levels of support for nanotechnology.  For 
those who had low levels of support for nanotechnology prior to the experiment, uncivil 
comments led to higher risk perceptions of nanotechnology than for those who had high 
pre-existing levels of support and also saw uncivil comments.  Though this study 
examines comments on science news, findings may translate to the health news domain. 
Each of the studies mentioned above provides evidence that comments affect 
readers, but prior research is limited in the outcomes and comment characteristics 
examined.   Particularly, research on behavioral outcomes and risk perceptions is rare, 
with Hsueh et al. (2015) being one of the only to examine behavioral outcomes and 
Anderson et al. (2014) being one of the few to examine risk perceptions.  Further, the 
comment characteristics examined are mostly limited to valence and civility.  Despite the 
fact that much is known about the persuasive effects of narratives and exemplars in the 
domain of health communication (see Green, 2006, and Zillmann, 2006, respectively), 
prior studies on the effects of narratives or exemplars in online news article comments are 
almost nonexistent.  As mentioned previously, only one study has examined the effects of 
story-oriented online news comments on readers (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & Zikmund-
Fisher, 2013), and this study remains unpublished.  Witteman et al. performed an online 
experiment that presented a news article on the topic of home birth, followed by either no 
comments or comments that varied according to a 2 (comment valence: positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (comment type: fact-oriented vs. story-oriented) between-subjects factorial 
design.  They measured opinion toward home birth and likelihood of planning a home 
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birth and recommending it to others.  Valence of comments affected opinion in the 
expected direction; more favorable comments led to more positive opinions.  Witteman et 
al. demonstrated that this effect was moderated by the presence of narrativity, such that 
narrative comments enhanced the effects of valence.  Though these studies provide some 
insights, further research is needed to determine the effect of user-generated comments 
that include exemplars on readers’ risk perceptions and behaviors, especially when 
comments deal with controversial health topics and could have an influence on 
consequential health behaviors such as breast cancer screening. 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Effect of Exemplars on Behavioral Intentions 
 The literature in this area provides reason to believe that individual experiences 
shared in comments on news articles can have an effect on behavioral intentions.  First, I 
proposed that different types of exemplars would affect behavioral intentions 
differentially, essentially pushing intentions in different directions, due to different 
valence.  The predicted effects of valence are straightforward: the majority of comments 
that include an exemplar in which the mammogram detects cancer (hereafter referred to 
as “mammogram-detected cancer exemplars”) are pro-mammogram and are expected to 
have a positive effect on mammography intentions, while the majority of comments that 
include false-positive exemplars are more cautious toward mammograms and are 
expected to have negative effects on mammography intentions. This is summarized in the 
following hypotheses: 
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H1a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when 
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to increased 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years 
H1b: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when 
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to decreased 
intentions to wait until age 50 to begin screening. 
However, I also predicted that comments with exemplars would lead to greater 
changes in intentions than comments without exemplars.  In the case of Witteman et al. 
(2013), part of the effect of comments on outcomes was driven by valence, but the effects 
of valence were made stronger by the presence of narrativity.  In addition to the work by 
Witteman et al., a large body of research suggests that narrative information can have a 
greater effect on behavioral intentions than can non-narrative information.  For example, 
a meta-analysis by Zebregs, van den Putte, Neijens, and de Graaf (2015) suggests that 
narrative evidence has a stronger influence on behavioral intentions than statistical 
evidence.  Based on this research, I proposed that comments that included mammography 
exemplars would lead to greater changes in mammography intention than comments 
without exemplars—regardless of the direction of the change—such that the following 
would be true: 
H2a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars will lead to 
higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and lower 
intentions to wait until age 50 when compared to mammogram-detected 
cancer comments without exemplars. 
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H2b: Comments with false-positive exemplars will lead to lower intentions to 
have a mammogram in the next two years and higher intentions to wait until 
age 50 when compared to false-positive comments without exemplars. 
A synthesis of how exemplars can be used to promote health outlines some of the 
mechanisms of action through which exemplars may have effects on health behaviors 
(Zillmann, 2006).  Mechanisms through which exemplars and narratives may affect 
health behaviors and predictors of health behaviors include the following: creating 
transportation into a text, which has been shown to increase behavioral intentions and 
may also lead to attitude change through decreased counter-arguing; shifting perceived 
norms; and providing models for behavior change, which has been shown to increase 
self-efficacy for behavior change.  The Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010) proposes that attitudes, perceived norms, and self-efficacy are direct 
predictors of behavioral intention, providing multiple pathways through which comments 
with mammography exemplars may have an effect on mammography intentions. 
Green (2006) offers multiple theoretical mechanisms through which transporting 
narratives may be particularly persuasive in a cancer-related communication context, 
including through effects on attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy.  Given the many possible 
pathways of effect, one would expect that greater transportation would lead to greater 
changes in behavior intentions.  In fact, Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, and Cappella 
(2012) found this to be the case.  In an online experiment, the presence of exemplars in 
news stories increased reader engagement (a combination of narrative transportation, 
perceived similarity, and empathy).  They found that engagement mediated the 
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relationship between the presence of exemplars and intentions to quit smoking, such that 
increased engagement led to greater increases in behavioral intentions.  I expect the same 
to be true of exemplars present in user-generated comments: 
H3: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to 
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on 
mammography intentions will be mediated by narrative transportation. 
Additionally, Green (2006) describes two primary ways in which narratives may 
affect attitudes: through changes in affectively-based attitudes and in cognitively-based 
attitudes.  In the particular case of  “mammogram-detected cancer exemplars.” these 
mammography narratives may result in affective shifts that create positive attitudes 
toward mammography (e.g., relief that an exemplar’s cancer was caught early may 
translate to increases in the perceived utility of mammograms and a desire to obtain one 
for peace of mind).  Additionally, because narratives have been shown to decrease 
counter-arguing, mammogram-detected cancer exemplars may also change cognitively-
based attitudes about mammography by decreasing counter-arguing about the possibility 
of experiencing risks associated with mammography.  Similarly, I expected that false-
positive exemplars would increase negative affect toward mammograms by highlighting 
the anxiety and suffering of exemplars who experienced unnecessary additional testing 
and lead to more negative affectively-based attitudes toward mammograms.  False-
positive exemplars may also decrease counter-arguing about the benefits of 
mammography, resulting in more negative cognitively-based attitudes toward 
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mammography.  Based on expected effects on intentions through attitudes, I proposed the 
following: 
H4: The effects of comments with exemplars (compared to comments that 
are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography 
intentions will be mediated by attitudes toward mammography. 
Another possible mechanism through which exemplars in comments may affect 
behavioral intentions is through comments’ effects on perceived social norms.  
Individuals are motivated to observe norms (in this case, through reading about others’ 
experiences) so that they can hold accurate beliefs and gain social acceptance (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004).  Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) propose that shared personal experience 
narratives can shape perceived social norms related to a health behavior and that this is 
particularly true when message recipients identify with the person sharing the personal 
story.  Further, in the domain of user-generated comments research, comments have been 
hypothesized to establish social norms that influence the attitudes and behaviors of 
comment readers (Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, & Malinen, 2015).  Taken together, this suggests 
that comments in which authors share personal mammography experiences will influence 
readers’ perceived social norms related to mammography screening behavior as follows: 
H5: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to 
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on 
mammography intentions will be mediated by perceived mammography 
norms. 
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Finally, comments with exemplars may change behavioral intentions by providing 
models for behavior change.  Green (2006) explains that characters in narratives can 
model the “costs and benefits of different courses of action” (p. S166), providing the 
reader with vicarious experience.  According to Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1977; 
Bandura, 1986), vicarious experience obtained by observing others can increase self-
efficacy for a particular behavior.  This suggests that comments containing 
mammography exemplars, and thus models of women who have obtained mammograms, 
can increase self-efficacy to obtain a mammogram and mammography intentions: 
H6: Effects of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars 
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack 
exemplars) on mammography intentions will be mediated by self-efficacy to 
obtain a mammogram. 
Effect of Exemplars on Risk Perceptions 
Exemplars in comments on mammography news articles may also have effects on 
risk perceptions.  Zillmann (2006) discusses two heuristics that explain why exemplars 
may shape beliefs about perceived health risks: the quantification heuristic and the 
availability heuristic.  The quantification heuristic predicts that readers who encounter 
exemplars will use the distribution of exemplar outcomes to estimate the actual 
distribution of that outcome in the population.  This heuristic suggests that readers who 
see multiple mammogram-detected cancer exemplars will believe that this outcome is 
more likely than a false-positive outcome, and that the reverse would also be true.  
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) availability heuristic predicts that people will make 
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judgments based on the exemplars that are most salient at the time of the judgment.  
Therefore, frequent and recent exposure to exemplars with a mammogram-detected 
cancer or false positive may heighten a reader’s perceived risk for that outcome by 
influencing the ease with which readers can retrieve examples of women who have 
experienced these mammography outcomes.  Given the mechanisms outlined by 
Zillmann, I predicted that the presence of exemplars in comments would increase 
perceived risk for breast cancer, positive mammograms, and false-positive mammogram 
results in the following ways: 
H7a: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived breast cancer risk 
when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected cancer comments 
without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the same valence and 
topic).  
H7b: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived risk of a positive 
mammogram when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected 
cancer comments without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the 
same valence and topic). 
H7c: The presence of comments with false-positive exemplars will increase 
perceived risk of experiencing a false-positive when compared to the 
presence of false-positive comments without exemplars (i.e. nonexemplar 
comments of the same valence and topic).  
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In addition to working via the heuristics mentioned above, comments with 
exemplars may also shape risk perceptions through their effects on affect—negative 
affect, in particular. As discussed earlier in this chapter, most exemplar comments can be 
considered narratives or testimonials, and one of the recognized advantages of using 
narratives for cancer communication is the ability of narratives to evoke emotion (Green, 
2006).  Indeed, breast cancer narratives have been shown to bring about more emotion, 
both negative and positive, than non-narrative information (McQueen & Kreuter, 2010).  
Research has also shown a relationship between negative affect and risk.  For example, 
Johnson and Tversky (1983) proposed that bad moods induced by having participants 
read brief newspaper stories increased general risk perceptions.  In the cancer domain, 
worry has been linked to breast cancer risk perceptions (Lipkus et al., 2000).   
Dunlop, Wakefield, and Kashima (2008) outline a theory of the effect of 
narratives on risk through the mechanism of negative emotion.  In particular, Dunlop et 
al. argue that testimonial messages arouse negative self-referent emotions, which are 
particularly effective in changing perceptions of personal susceptibility to a disease.  A 
study in the breast cancer realm provides further support for negative affect as a 
mediator; McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, and Alcaraz (2011) demonstrate that the effect of 
breast cancer survivor stories on increased risk perceptions was mediated by negative 
affect.  Based on the expected role of negative affect as a mediator of the relationship 
between exemplars and risk perception, I propose the following hypotheses: 
H8a: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars 
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack 
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exemplars) on perceived risk of breast cancer will be mediated by changes in 
negative affect.  
H8b: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars 
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack 
exemplars) on perceived risk of having a positive mammogram will be 
mediated by changes in negative affect.  
H8c: The effects of false-positive mammogram exemplars (compared to 
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on 
perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram will be mediated by 
changes in negative affect.  
Exemplars, Risk Perceptions, and Intentions 
In addition to viewing risk perception as an outcome affected by exemplars, I 
wanted to examine it as a potential mediator of the effect of exemplars on mammography 
intentions.  As outlined above, compared to comments without exemplars, comments 
with exemplars are expected to increase perceived risk of breast cancer, positive 
mammograms, and false-positive mammograms, depending on the type of exemplar 
presented.  These changes in perceived risk are then expected to alter mammography 
intentions.   
Some theories of behavior change or behavioral prediction acknowledge the role 
of perceived risk in predicting health behaviors.  The Health Belief Model (Becker, 1974; 
Rosenstock, 1974) includes perceived susceptibility and perceived severity as essential 
components preceding desirable health behaviors. The Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein 
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& Ajzen, 2010) proposes that risk perception is a more distal predictor of behavior, 
having its effect on intention through effects on attitudes, norms, and perceived 
behavioral control.  Additional research demonstrates the link between risk perception 
and health behavior in a number of contexts, including vaccination (Brewer et al., 2007) 
and mammography (Katapodi, Lee, Facione, & Dodd, 2004).     
To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies demonstrating that an effect of 
narratives or exemplars on mammography is mediated by risk perceptions, but there are 
several instances in the literature in which risk perceptions have been found to mediate 
the relationship between the presence of exemplars and other behavioral intentions.  Prior 
research shows that narratives about adverse vaccine events led to increased perceived 
risk of experiencing an adverse event (Betsch, Ulshofer, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2011), 
which then led to decreased vaccination intentions.  Similarly, when compared to 
statistical evidence, the use of personal testimonials increased perceived risk of 
contracting the hepatitis B virus and intentions to get vaccinated, and the effect of 
testimonials on intention was mediated by risk perceptions (de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008).  
Thus, in addition to the mediators of the exemplar–intention relationship I proposed in 
Hypotheses 3 through 6, I also predicted the following: 
H9: The effects of exemplars (compared to comments that are of the same 
valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography intentions will be 
mediated by risk perceptions. 
These hypotheses outline the ways in which mammography exemplars found in 
user-generated comments on online news articles were expected to have effects on both 
64 
mammography intentions and risk perceptions related to breast cancer and 
mammography. This research tested these effects and proposed mechanisms by using an 
experimental design that manipulated the presence and type of exemplars in user-
generated comments and measured changes in the outcome variables and proposed 
mediators. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EFFECTS OF MAMMOGRAPHY EXEMPLARS IN ONLINE NEWS 
COMMENTARY ON BREAST CANCER RISK PERCEPTIONS AND SCREENING 
INTENTIONS: METHODOLOGY 
 Study 2 consisted of an experiment examining the effects of different types of 
comments on intentions, risk perceptions, and potential mediators.  The following section 
outlines the experimental methodology. 
Experimental Methodology 
 The main experiment assessed the effect of comments with exemplars, 
specifically false-positive mammogram exemplars and mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplars, on mammography intentions, breast cancer risk perceptions, positive 
mammogram risk perceptions, and false-positive mammogram risk perceptions.  Because 
Study 1 demonstrated that a large majority of comments with false-positive exemplars 
were cautious toward mammography, only false-positive exemplars with this valence 
were tested.  Similarly, because comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars 
were almost exclusively enthusiastic toward mammography, only mammogram-detected 
cancer exemplars of this valence were included in Study 2. 
Participants 
This research received approval from the Institutional Review Board at the 
University of Pennsylvania.  I purchased from Survey Sampling International (SSI) 
access to a sample of women in the United States between the ages of 38 and 48 (N = 
1,108).  Potential participants received an email invitation from SSI with a link to the 
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online study and received compensation from SSI for their time.  SSI compensates 
participants with points that can be redeemed for cash or other rewards. 
Participant characteristics by condition are presented in Table 4.1.  The average 
age of participants was 42.8 years.  Participants were more well-educated than the 
general population when compared to U.S. Census estimates of people 35 to 54 years old 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2014a): 38.6% of participants had at least some college or technical 
school education (compared to 27.2% of the general population), and 39.8% had a 
college degree or higher educational attainment (compared to 33.9% of the general 
population).  The sample was ethnically and racially diverse and similar to the ethnic and 
racial composition of U.S. women ages 38 to 48, with 7.4% of women identifying 
themselves as being of Hispanic, Latina, or Spanish origin (vs. 12.3% in the U.S. 
population); 85.6% identifying at White (vs. 81.1%); 10.0% identifying as Black or 
African American (vs. 12.5%); 2.9% identifying as American Indian or Alaska Native 
(vs. 1.6%); 3.1% identifying as Asian (vs. 5.9%); and 1.0% identifying as Native 
Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander (vs. 0.3%; population figures derived from U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2014b).  Roughly 15% of participants reported a family history of breast 
cancer, and 64% reported having had a prior mammogram.  Chi-square analyses did not 
show significant differences across condition for any of these characteristics. 
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Table 4.1 
Participant Characteristics 
 Condition  
 NoInfo No 
Comm 
FPNoEx BCNoEx FPEx BCEx FPEx 
Rem 
BCExRem Total 
n 156 140 160 116 133 143 128 132 1,108 
Participant age, 
M (SD) 
43.0 (3.3) 42.9 (3.1) 42.6 
(3.4) 
42.6 
(3.1) 
42.8 
(2.9) 
43.0 (3.2) 42.8 
(3.0) 
42.6 (3.1) 42.8 
(3.1) 
Education, %:          
Less than 
high school 
3.2 2.9 1.3 2.6 0.8 2.8 2.3 2.3 2.3 
High school 
graduate or 
GED 
21.8 20.0 16.9 24.1 21.8 14.0 16.4 20.5 19.3 
Some 
college or 
technical 
school 
35.9 37.9 37.5 30.2 39.1 47.6 42.2 37.9 38.6 
College 
graduate or 
beyond 
39.1 39.3 44.4 43.1 38.4 35.7 39.1 39.4 39.8 
Ethnicity:          
Hispanic, 
Latino/a, 
Spanish 
origin, % 
5.8 3.6 10.0 8.6 7.5 7.0 9.4 7.6 7.4 
Race, %: a          
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White 82.7 87.9 86.3 81.0 89.5 87.4 87.5 81.8 85.6 
Black or 
African 
American 
14.7 10.0 11.3 12.9 6.0 9.1 6.3 9.1 10.0 
American 
Indian or 
Alaska 
Native 
4.5 3.6 1.9 2.6 1.5 3.5 2.3 3.0 2.9 
Asian 0.0 2.1 2.5 4.3 3.0 3.5 4.7 5.3 3.1 
Native 
Hawaiian or 
Other 
Pacific 
Islander 
1.3 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 3.1 1.5 1.0 
Family history 
of breast cancer, 
% 
13.5 10.8 17.5 16,4 15.8 12.6 15.6 16.7 14.8 
Have had at 
least one 
mammogram, 
% 
64.7 59.0 68.1 67.2 65.4 66.4 64.8 59.1 64.4 
Comment 
reading time ≥ 
half the median 
N/A N/A 63.1 59.5 62.4 67.1 62.5 63.4 63.2 
Used mobile 
device to 
respond to 
survey 
52.6 58.6 52.5 43.1 57.9 52.5 56.3 53.0 53.4 
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Note. N = 1,108.  Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = 
false-positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, 
FPEx = false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, 
FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments with exemplars removed.  Drop-out rates did not vary by condition, and chi-square tests showed no significant 
difference across conditions for any of these participant characteristics. 
 
a Participants were allowed to choose multiple races, so percentages may not add to 100. 
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Sample power 
Because communication interventions typically lead to small effects (Snyder & 
Hamilton, 2002), this study was powered to detect small- to medium-sized differences 
between conditions.  According to Cohen (1992), a standardized mean difference of .20 is 
considered a small effect size, and .50 is considered a medium effect size.  Power 
calculations showed that a sample size of 130 participants per condition would provide 
80% power to detect a standardized mean difference of .35.  
Measures 
The full questionnaire is available in Appendix C.  Participants were first asked 
their sex, age, personal breast cancer history, and whether they had tested positive for a 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 genetic mutation to determine eligibility.  Only women between the 
ages of 38 and 48 who had no history of breast cancer and no known genetic mutation 
(and thus an average risk of breast cancer) were allowed to continue.  Eligible 
participants then answered items regarding family breast cancer history and 
mammography history before being assigned to experimental condition.  The post-test 
consisted of measures of the primary dependent variables (mammography intentions and 
risk perceptions), proposed mediators of the relationship between exposure to 
mammography exemplars and the dependent variables, demographic variables, and 
variables needed to calculate objective breast cancer risk using the Gail model (Gail & 
Costantino, 2001).   
Mammography intentions.  Mammography intentions were measured using two 
items: “I intend to have a mammogram in the next two years,” and “I intend to wait until 
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age 50 to have a mammogram.”  Participants rated their level of agreement on a seven-
point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  The distribution of 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years was left-skewed (skewness = -
1.13) and slightly peaked (kurtosis = 3.05).  The distribution of intentions to wait until 
age 50 to have a mammogram was right-skewed (skewness = 1.18) and slightly peaked 
(kurtosis = 3.34).  These two intention measures were negatively correlated (r = -.47, p < 
.001). 
Perceived risk of breast cancer.  The survey measured perceived breast cancer 
risk in four different ways using modified versions of measures reported by Schapira, 
Davids, McAuliffe, and Nattinger (2004): five-year risk as a frequency, lifetime risk as a 
frequency, five-year risk as a percentage, and lifetime risk as a percentage.  Schapira et 
al. demonstrated that risk perceptions varied when measured in different ways, so using 
these four measures allowed me to examine how the effect of exemplars may 
differentially affect types of risk perceptions.  Five-year risk as a frequency was 
measured using the following item: “Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women 
exactly like you.  How many of you will get breast cancer in the next five years?  Please 
pick any number between 0 and 100.” The measure of lifetime risk as a frequency posed 
the same question, but asked participants “How many of you will get breast cancer in 
your lifetime?”  Five-year breast cancer risk as a percentage was measured using the 
following item: “What do you think your personal risk or chance is of getting breast 
cancer in the next five years?  Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%.  For example, 0% 
means ‘no risk or chance of getting breast cancer’ and 100% means ‘completely certain 
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to get breast cancer.’”  Lifetimes risk as a percentage was measured in a similar way, 
substituting the phrase “in your lifetime” for “in the next five years.” All four measures 
of breast cancer risk were right-skewed (skewness ranged from 0.59 to 1.15) and slightly 
kurtotic (kurtosis ranged from 2.78 to 3.70).  Correlations among measures of perceived 
risk of having breast cancer are reported in Table 4.2.  Perceptions vary widely based on 
how risk is measured (Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, and Nattinger, 2004; Gurmankin 
Levy, Shea, Williams, Quistberg, & Armstrong, 2006), so these four measures were not 
combined into a scale but rather used individually as dependent variables.  Using these 
measures individually is consistent with how similar measures are used in the breast 
cancer literature (e.g., Gibbons & Groarke, 2015).6   
 
Table 4.2 
Correlations among Measures of Breast Cancer Risk 
 Five-year risk, 
frequency 
Lifetime risk, 
frequency 
Five-year risk, 
percentage 
Lifetime risk, 
percentage 
Five-year risk, 
frequency 
1.00    
Lifetime risk, 
frequency 
0.74*** 1.00   
Five-year risk, 
percentage 
0.57*** 0.56*** 1.00  
Lifetime risk, 
percentage 
0.50*** 0.57*** 0.86*** 1.00 
***p<.001 
 
                                                 
6 Results presented in Chapter 6 demonstrate that the conclusions drawn from this data do 
not change, even if measures are combined into a scale (see footnote 13). 
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Perceived risk of positive mammogram. I also adapted the items from Schapira 
et al. (2004) to measure perceived risk of having a mammogram-detected breast cancer 
and risk of having a false-positive mammogram result as a frequency and as a percentage.  
To measure the risk of having a positive mammogram, participants were asked to 
“Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you.  If you all had a 
mammogram today, how many of you would have a mammogram that finds cancer?”  
Answers were recorded on a sliding scale that ranged from 0 to 100.  They were then 
asked, “If you had a mammogram today, what do you think your personal risk or chance 
is of having a mammogram that finds cancer?”  The sliding scale ranged from 0% to 
100%, where 0% meant no risk or chance of having a mammogram that finds cancer and 
100% meant completely certain to have a mammogram that finds cancer.  These two 
measures were significantly correlated (r = .70, p < .001). 
Perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram result.  Before 
answering items regarding the risk of having a false-positive mammogram result, 
participants first read the definition of a false-positive: “A ‘false positive’ happens when 
a woman has a mammogram that leads to more screening, tests, or biopsies but then finds 
out she does not have breast cancer.”   Following the structure of risk items developed by 
Schapira et al. (2004), participants were asked to “Picture yourself in a room with 99 
women exactly like you.  If all of you have a mammogram in the next two years, how 
many of you will have a false positive (the need for extra testing that later shows you 
don’t have cancer)?”  Answers were recorded on a sliding scale from 0 to 100.  The 
percentage item read “If you have a mammogram in the next two years, what do you 
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think your personal risk or chance is of having a false positive (the need for extra testing 
that later shows you don’t have cancer)?”  Participants were instructed to answer on a 
scale from 0% to 100% where 0% means no risk or chance of having a false positive and 
100% means completely certain to have a false positive.  These two measures were 
significantly correlated (r = .78, p < .001).  
 Narrative transportation.  Proposed mediators of the effect of exemplars on 
intention included transportation, perceived mammography norms, self-efficacy to obtain 
a mammogram, and attitudes toward mammography.  Narrative transportation was 
measured using a subset of the original transportation scale developed by Green and 
Brock (2000), adapted for this experimental context and, in one case, to remove the need 
for reverse-coding.  These items included “I was mentally involved in the comments 
while reading them,” “The comments affected me emotionally,” “The comments are 
relevant to my everyday life,” and “After finishing the comments, I found it hard to put 
them out of my mind.”  These four items capture major dimensions of cognitive attention 
and emotional involvement and were scored on a seven point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much).  The original 15-item scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .76.  Subsets of items 
have been used successfully by Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, and Cappella (2012), and 
by Appel, Gnambs, Richter, and Green (2015) and have been shown to have adequate 
reliability.  However, using factor-analysis, Kim et al. found that reverse-scored items in 
the transportation scale loaded on a separate factor from the other items in the scale, 
which may have been an artifact of their negative wording.  Thus, I chose to adapt a 
reverse-scored item from the original Green and Brock scale to eliminate the need for 
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reverse-scoring (i.e., “I found it hard to put them out of my mind” instead of “I found it 
easy to put them out of my mind.”).  Cronbach’s alpha for the scale in the present 
research was .83, and participant scores on the scale were approximately normally 
distributed (skewness = -0.17, kurtosis = 2.5). 
 
Additional proposed mediators of the effect of exemplars on mammography 
intentions included behavioral predictors outlined by the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 
2000): attitudes, perceived norms, and self-efficacy.   
Attitude toward mammography. The survey measured participant attitudes 
toward “having a mammogram in the next two years” and “waiting until age 50 to have a 
mammogram.”  These two attitudes were each measured using a set of three semantic 
differential items on a 7-point scale (extremely/ quite/ slightly/ neutral/ slightly/ quite/ 
extremely) with the following endpoints: useless/useful, harmful/harmless, bad/good.  In 
prior research on mammography attitudes (Seitz et al., 2015), a scale composed of these 
three items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .87.  The three items measuring attitude toward 
having a mammogram in the next two years had a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 in the present 
data.  These three items were averaged to form a scale, which was left-skewed (skewness 
= -0.80) with a large peak at 7.  The three items measuring attitude toward waiting until 
age 50 to have a mammogram had a Cronbach’s alpha of .90.  The three items averaged 
to form a scale that was right-skewed (skewness = 0.36).  Distribution was bimodal, with 
a large peak at 1 (extremely useless, harmful, or bad) and a second peak at 4 (neutral). 
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Perceived mammography norms.  Perceived norms related to mammography 
were measured using items adapted from Fishbein and Ajzen (2009) to assess perceived 
descriptive and injunctive norms for both having a mammogram in the next two years 
and postponing a mammogram until age 50.  Participants were asked to rate their level of 
agreement, on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with the following 
statements: “Most people who are important to me think I should have a mammogram in 
the next two years” (injunctive for having mammogram), “Most people who are 
important to me think I should wait until age 50 to have a mammogram” (injunctive for 
postponing mammogram), “Most women like me will have a mammogram in the next 
two years” (descriptive for having mammogram), and “Most women like me will wait 
until age 50 to have a mammogram” (descriptive for postponing mammogram).  
Measures of norms related to having a mammogram in the next two years were left-
skewed (injunctive: skewness = -0.43; descriptive: skewness = -0.49).  The pattern was 
reversed for norms related to waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram, with both 
measures being right-skewed (injunctive: skewness = 0.47; descriptive: skewness = 0.21).  
Kurtosis measures ranged from 2.71 to 2.39.  Correlations among the four measures are 
reported in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 
Correlation among Measures of Mammography Norms 
 Injunctive for 
having 
mammogram 
Injunctive for 
postponing 
mammogram 
Descriptive for 
having 
mammogram 
Descriptive for 
postponing 
mammogram 
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Injunctive for 
having 
mammogram 
1.00    
Injunctive for 
postponing 
mammogram 
-0.35*** 1.00   
Descriptive for 
having 
mammogram 
0.50*** -0.18*** 1.00  
Descriptive for 
postponing 
mammogram 
-0.26*** 0.52*** -0.30*** 1.00 
***p < .001 
Self-efficacy to obtain a mammogram.  Self-efficacy was measured using items 
and scales adapted from Bandura (2006).  These two items asked participants to rate 
“how certain you are that you could have a mammogram in the next two years if you 
wanted to” and “how certain you are that you could wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram if you wanted to” using a scale from 1 (could not do at all) to 11 (highly 
certain I could).  Self-efficacy to have a mammogram in the next two years was left-
skewed (skewness = -0.80) and kurtotic (kurtosis = 2.42).  Overall distribution for self-
efficacy to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram had peaks at 1, 6, and 11 (skewness = 
0.28, kurtosis = 1.77). 
Affect.  Affect was measured using the 20-item Positive Affect Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and five additional items taken 
from the expanded version of the PANAS, the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994).  
Together, these 25 items included a 10-item negative affect scale and a 10-item positive 
affect scale.  The scales and additional items also allow for measurement of individual 
affective states, including fear, anger, guilt, sadness, joviality (happiness), self-assurance, 
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attentiveness, serenity, and surprise.  Three additional affective items were added to the 
scale to allow for measurement of hope, pride, and worry.  Negative affect was proposed 
to be the main mediator of effects of exemplars on risk perceptions.  The negative affect 
scale averaged responses to the following emotions: afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, 
irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed, upset, and distressed.  The scale had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.93 and was right-skewed (skewness = 1.26) and kurtotic (kurtosis = 4.06). 
Demographic and breast cancer risk factors.  Demographic variables, 
including ethnicity (of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin/not of Hispanic, Latino, or 
Spanish origin), race (White/Black or African American/American Indian or Alaska 
native/Asian/Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander), and education (less than high 
school/high school graduate or GED/some college or technical school/college graduate or 
beyond) were also recorded.  In the analyses that appear in following chapters, education 
has been recoded so that it can be treated as a continuous variable (less than high school 
= 10 years, high school graduate or GED = 12 years, some college or technical school = 
14 years, college graduate or beyond = 16 years).  Participants also answered questions 
about breast cancer risk factors (identified by Gail & Costantino, 2001), including age at 
first live birth of a child, age of menarche, and history of breast biopsy.   
Potential moderators.  Although no moderators of effects of comments on 
mammography intentions or risk perceptions were hypothesized, the variables measured 
allow for the examination of potential moderating effects.  Moderating variables of 
interest include those that might increase participants’ ability or motivation to attend to 
the experimental manipulation, as ability and motivation have been shown to influence 
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processes of persuasive information (Elaboration Likelihood Model; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1981, 1986a, 1986b).  The primary variable in this research that captures participants’ 
ability to process the messages is education level (described above).  In this case, 
education also serves as a proxy for numeracy and health literacy, which are distinct from 
but highly correlated with education (see Baker, 2016 for more information about 
numeracy and health literacy).  In my prior research, numeracy has served as an 
important moderator of effects of numeric risk-based interventions on accuracy of risk 
perceptions (Seitz et al., 2015).  There are also variables that could affect participants’ 
motivation to attend to messages.  Because motivation increases with increasing message 
relevance (Briñol & Petty, 2006), variables affecting relevance may serve as moderators. 
Variables related to relevance include family history of breast cancer (recoded as a 
dichotomous variable: no family history/one or more first-degree relatives have had 
breast cancer) and having had at least one prior mammogram (dichotomous: yes/no).  
Among study participants, 14.8% had a family history of breast cancer, and 64.4% had 
had at least one prior mammogram.  Summary statistics for each of these variables by 
condition are presented in Table 4.1.   
I was also interested in variables that might affect the success of the intervention, 
such as time spent on the comment page (which was the main experimental 
manipulation) of the survey and whether or not participants accessed the survey using a 
mobile phone (because the small screen might make reading text more difficult).  
Because average reading time varied across comment conditions due to differing lengths 
of comments used, I created a dichotomous reading time variable to separate participants 
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who spent less than half of the median reading time for their condition on the comment 
page from those who spent at least half of the median reading time or higher on the 
comment page.  I was also able to use survey metadata on the screen size of the device on 
which the participant viewed the survey to construct a dichotomous variable capturing 
whether or not the survey was taken on a mobile phone.  In the study sample, 63.3% had 
a reading time that was at least half of the median reading time for their condition, and 
53.4% completed the survey on a mobile phone.  Summary statistics for each of these 
variables by condition are presented in Table 4.1.   
Research Design 
This research utilized Qualtrics, a web-based survey platform, to execute a 
between-subjects experimental design embedded within a survey.  After giving informed 
consent, participants completed the screening items and measures of breast cancer and 
mammography history.  Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the following 
conditions, shown in Table 4.4: 1) no information control (NoInfo), 2) no comments 
control (NoComm), 3) false-positive comments without exemplars (FPNoEx), 4) 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars (BCNoEx, 5) false-
positive comments with exemplars (FPEx), 6) mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments with exemplars (BCEx), 7) false positive comments with exemplars removed 
(FPExRem), or 8) mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars 
removed (BCExRem). In the NoInfo condition, participants moved directly to the post-
test. In the NoComm condition, participants viewed a balanced composite news story 
about mammography before completing the post-test.  In the remaining conditions, 
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participants viewed the same balanced news story followed by a series of four reader 
comments (varying by condition) before completing the post-test. The post-test included 
measures of mammography intentions, perceived breast cancer risk, perceived risk of 
having a false-positive mammogram result, and perceived risk of having a positive 
mammogram, followed by measures of the proposed mediators, demographic variables 
and breast cancer risk factors, and an opportunity for open-ended feedback. Participants 
were fully debriefed after completing the survey. 
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Table 4.4 
Experimental Conditions 
Controls User-generated  
nonexemplar comments 
User-generated  
exemplar comments 
Artificially created/edited 
nonexemplar comments 
NoInfo: 
No info 
control (no 
article, no 
comments) 
NoComm: 
No 
comments 
control 
(article, no 
comments)  
FPNoEx: 
Article + 3 
user-
generated 
false-positive 
comments 
without 
exemplars + 
1 neutral 
comment 
BCNoEx: 
Article + 3 
user-
generated 
mammo-
detected 
cancer 
comments 
without 
exemplars + 
1 neutral 
comment  
FPEx: Article 
+ 3 user-
generated 
false-positive 
comments 
with 
exemplars + 
1 neutral 
comment  
BCEx:: 
Article + 3 
user-
generated 
mammo-
detected 
cancer 
comments 
with 
exemplars + 
1 neutral 
comment 
FPExRem: 
Article + 3 
false-positive 
comments 
(from FPEx) 
rewritten to 
remove 
exemplars but 
preserve 
content +1 
neutral 
comment  
BCExRem: 
Article + 3 
mammo-
detected 
cancer 
comments 
(from BCEx) 
rewritten to 
remove 
exemplars but 
preserve 
content + 1 
neutral 
comment 
Note. In conditions with comments, the neutral comments were pulled from a single pool of neutral user-generated comments 
about mammography that did not contain exemplars and were only minimally edited.    
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Experimental manipulation. The article and comments used for the study were 
taken from materials gathered in Study 1, which included mammography articles and 
associated reader comments published on NYTimes.com from November 2009 through 
December 2014.  The article used was an edited version of an article on the revised 
USPSTF guidelines that was published in the New York Times in November 2009.  The 
original article was altered to neutralize the title, reduce the overall length, balance the 
length of arguments for and against beginning mammograms at 50, remove quotations 
and exemplars, and update the guidelines to reflect recommendations at the time of the 
experiment (see stimulus article in Appendix D).  The arguments for beginning 
mammograms at age 50 included minimizing the risks of false positives and 
overdiagnosis (137 words), and the arguments against waiting until age 50 included 
benefits of early detection and reduction in cancer deaths (136 words).     
The comments used as experimental stimuli were also drawn from the content 
analysis and were minimally edited only when editing was needed to remove formatting, 
a reference to another commenter, a reference to something in the original article that was 
not present in the stimulus article, or, for the FPExRem and BCExRem conditions, to 
remove exemplars.  Prior to the experiment, I constructed 20 sets of randomly selected 
and randomly ordered comments for each condition with comments (a sample set of 
comments for each condition is presented in Appendix D and the full comment pools are 
available in Appendix E).  To construct sets of comments with the content and valence 
needed for each condition, as outlined in Table 4.1, comments were randomly drawn 
from seven pools of comments with 15 comments in each pool: neutral comments with 
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no exemplars, user-generated false positive comments without exemplars, user-generated 
mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars, user-generated false positive 
comments with exemplars, user-generated mammogram-detected cancer comments with 
exemplars, false positive comments that were rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve 
content, length, and reading level, and mammogram-detected cancer comments that were 
rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve content, length, and reading level.  The 
inclusion of neutral comments in conditions with comments was designed to help mask 
the purpose of the study, while the use of random sampling from large pools of comments 
was designed to minimize case-category confounding and provide built-in experimental 
replication (as recommended by O’Keefe, 2015). 
The experimental design employs two different ways of operationalizing 
nonexemplar comments.  Including user-generated comments that did not originally 
include individual case examples in the FPNoEx and BCNoEx conditions helps increase 
the ecological validity of the experiment by providing a means of generalizing findings to 
currently existing nonexemplar comments.  However, these comments differ from 
exemplar comments in the information they contain (despite attempts to select comments 
that are generally about false positives and mammogram-detected breast cancer).  They 
may also differ from exemplar comments in other ways that are not experimentally 
controlled.  To provide nonexemplar comparison conditions that convey the same 
information as the exemplar conditions, the FPExRem and BCExRem conditions use 
comments from the FPEx and BCEx conditions, respectively, that have been edited to 
remove references to exemplars.  References to individual exemplars were replaced with 
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phrases such as “some women.”  Across all of these conditions, efforts were made to 
construct sets of comments that were similar in length, reading level, and content. 
Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics were used to examine demographic characteristics, breast 
cancer history, and mammography history across conditions.  The effects of condition on 
risk perception and mammography intentions were examined using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression.  Moderating effects were examined using factorial analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and OLS regression.  When needed to compare sets of conditions or 
individual conditions, Wald tests were used following the regression analyses.  The 
mediation hypotheses were tested using OLS regression with bootstrapping to create a 
bias-corrected 95% confidence interval for indirect effects.   
  
 
86 
CHAPTER 5 
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY ON MAMMOGRAPHY 
INTENTIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results from an online experiment to examine the effects 
of online news commentary on mammography intentions, including the effects of 
comments on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and intentions to 
wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.  It also presents results of analyses investigating 
mechanisms of action underlying effects of comments on mammography intentions.  
Further detail about the hypotheses outlined below can be found in Chapter 3. 
Hypotheses 
 Prior research on the effects of online commentary (Lee, 2012; Lee & Jang, 2010; 
Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013) suggests that the valence of 
comments will have an influence on outcomes; comments that are favorable toward the 
target behavior will produce more favorable outcomes, whether they are opinions, 
perceptions of public opinion, perceived message effectiveness, or intentions. Because 
the mammogram-detected cancer exemplar comments used in the study were all 
favorable toward mammography and comments with false-positive exemplars were all 
unfavorable toward mammography, I made the following predictions:   
H1a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when 
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to increased 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years. 
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H1b: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars, when 
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars, will lead to decreased 
intentions to wait until age 50 to begin screening. 
I also made predictions about the effects of the presence of exemplars in 
comments.  Based primarily on research by Witteman et al. (2013) and Zebregs, van den 
Putte, Neijens, and de Graaf (2015) suggesting that narrative information has a stronger 
influence that non-narrative information, I predicted that comments with exemplars 
would lead to greater changes in intentions than comments without exemplars: 
H2a: Comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars will lead to 
higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and lower 
intentions to wait until age 50 when compared to mammogram-detected 
cancer comments without exemplars. 
H2b: Comments with false-positive exemplars will lead to lower intentions to 
have a mammogram in the next two years and higher intentions to wait until 
age 50 when compared to false-positive comments without exemplars. 
I proposed that exemplars would affect health behaviors and predictors of health 
behaviors by creating transportation into a text, which has been shown to increase 
behavioral intentions; changing attitudes; shifting perceived norms; and providing 
models, which has been shown to increase self-efficacy for behavior change.  The latter 
three constructs—attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy—have been consistently shown to 
predict behavioral intentions as part of the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010).   
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First, exemplars were expected to create more narrative engagement and 
transportation than nonexemplar messages (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella, 
2012).  Green (2006) suggests that messages that produce greater transportation will have 
a stronger effect on behavioral intentions.  This led to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to 
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on 
mammography intentions will be mediated by narrative transportation. 
 The effects of exemplars on intentions were also expected to be mediated by a 
change in attitudes.  Green (2006) proposed that narratives may create larger changes in 
affectively-based and cognitively-based attitudes than non-narrative information.  
Therefore, I expected that exemplars would create changes in attitudes toward 
mammography that would then shape mammography intentions, based on predictions 
from the Integrative Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and Reasoned Action Model 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010): 
H4: The effects of comments with exemplars (compared to comments that 
are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography 
intentions will be mediated by attitudes toward mammography. 
I also proposed that exemplars may have effects on intentions through their 
effects on perceived norms.  Hinyard and Kreuter (2007) highlight the potential of 
narrative to influence health behavior changes through its effects on shaping social 
norms, and Hsueh, Yogeeswaran, and Malinen (2015) demonstrated that user-generated 
comments can influence perceived social norms. Norms are then expected to predict 
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behavioral intentions based on the Integrative Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and 
Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010): 
H5: Effects of comments with mammography exemplars (compared to 
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on 
mammography intentions will be mediated by perceived mammography 
norms. 
 Exemplars were also expected to affect mammography intentions through their 
effects on self-efficacy.  Narratives provide models of behavior change and vicarious 
experience for the reader (Green, 2006).  Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1977; 
Bandura, 1986) recognizes the role of behavioral modeling and vicarious experience in 
increasing self-efficacy, and self-efficacy is one of the key predictors of behavior change 
included in the Integrative Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).  Because comments with 
mammogram-detected cancer exemplars provided models of women who had obtained 
mammograms, I expected the following: 
H6: Effects of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars 
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack 
exemplars) on mammography intentions will be mediated by self-efficacy to 
obtain a mammogram. 
Methods 
 This study used an experiment embedded in an online survey to examine the 
effects of mammography news commentary on readers.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of eight conditions (see Table 4.1), with conditions varying on the 
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presence or type of comments displayed.  These conditions are further described in 
Chapter 4. 
Participants 
 Survey Sampling International recruited women in the United States between the 
ages of 38 and 48 years to participate in the study (N = 1,108) who had no history of 
breast cancer or genetic mutations related to breast cancer.  Full participant 
characteristics are available in Chapter 4. 
Measures 
The focal dependent variables of interest in this chapter are intention to have a 
mammogram in the next two years and intention to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram.  Measures are described in detail in Chapter 4 and the full questionnaire is 
available in Appendix C. 
Research Design, Stimuli, and Procedure 
See Chapter 4 for full details of the experimental design, procedure, and stimuli. 
Analytic Approach 
  Main effects. To examine the effects of condition on each of the intention 
measures, I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the NoComm condition 
as the comparison condition.  I then followed each regression with Wald tests to test 
individual hypotheses and to examine the main effects of presence of exemplars and 
valence/topic.  To address Hypothesis 1a, I used intentions to have a mammogram in the 
next two years as the dependent variable and used Wald tests to compare FPEx and 
BCEx.  Hypothesis 1b was tested similarly, using intentions to wait until age 50 to have a 
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mammogram as the dependent variable.  Hypothesis 2a and 2b were tested in the same 
way: for H2a, Wald tests compared BCNoEx with BCEx and BCEx with BCExRem for 
both intention measures, and for H2b, Wald tests compared FPNoEx with FPEx and 
FPEx with FPExRem for both intention measures. 
 Moderation.  I explored the moderating effects of participant education, family 
history of breast cancer, history of prior mammogram, survey reading time (dichotomous: 
less than one half of the mean reading time for respective condition vs. greater than or 
equal to one half of the mean time), and use of a mobile phone to answer the survey on 
the relationship between condition and mammography intentions using factorial ANOVA 
and OLS regression.  
Mediation models.  The mediation hypotheses tested in this chapter, Hypotheses 
3, 4, 5, and 6, involved comparing an exemplar condition to a nonexemplar condition of 
the same topic and valence (i.e., FPEx vs. FPNoEx, FPEx vs. FPExRem, BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx, and BCEx vs. BCExRem.  In each of these comparisons, a dummy variable 
was created for condition such that the condition with exemplars was coded as “1” and 
the nonexemplar condition was coded as “0.”  Mediator and outcome variables were 
interval or ratio.  Hypotheses 3, 4, and 6 involved testing a simple mediation model as 
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The mediator (M) and the dependent variable (Y) varied based 
on the hypothesis being tested.  Because injunctive and descriptive norms were measured 
separately but both expected to mediate the effects of exemplars on intentions, 
Hypothesis 5 was tested using the parallel multiple mediation model shown in Figure 5.2.  
All models were tested using PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 2016) with SPSS version 22.  
 
92 
I used bootstrapping to create bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for indirect effects 
as recommended by Hayes (2009, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Simple mediation model.  The effect of exemplars on the dependent variables 
of interest (either mammography intentions or risk perceptions, depending on the 
hypothesis being tested) are proposed to be at least partially mediated (proposed 
mediators vary by hypothesis). 
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Figure 5.2.   Parallel multiple mediator model. The effect of exemplars on the dependent 
variables of interest (either intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years or 
intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram) are proposed to be at least partially 
mediated by injunctive norms and descriptive norms for each behavior. 
Results 
Study Flow 
 Of 3,800 potential participants invited, 1,527 began the survey.  Two hundred and 
twelve were excluded because they did not meet eligibility criteria: 17 were male, 63 
were outside of the study age range, 113 reported a history of breast cancer, and 19 
reported having tested positive for a BRCA1 or BRCA2 genetic mutation.  An additional 
48 dropped out of the survey before being assigned to an experimental condition.  The 
remaining 1,267 participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions: 169 to 
NoInfo (156 completed the survey), 157 to NoComm (140 completed), 180 to FPNoEx 
(160 completed), 140 to BCNoEx (116 completed), 154 to FPEx (133 completed), 160 to 
BCEx (143 completed), 153 to FPExRem (128 completed), and 154 to BCExRem (132 
completed).  The final number of participants was 1,108.  There were no significant 
differences in drop-out rates across condition, X2 (7, N = 1,267) = 10.2, p = .176.   
Mobile Phone Use 
After data collection, I discovered that, despite being asked not to, approximately 
half of the participants completed the survey using mobile phones.  As shown in Table 
4.1, use of mobile phones to complete the survey did not vary across condition, Χ2 (7, n = 
1,108) = 8.14, p = .320.  Table 5.1 shows participant characteristics by mobile phone use. 
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Mobile use was significantly higher for participants with low levels of education, Χ2 (3, n 
= 1,108) = 8.99, p = .029, and significantly lower for participants who were Asian, Χ2 (1, 
n = 1,108) = 4.64, p = .031. Use of mobile phones was associated with a greater 
likelihood of having a reading time for the experimental manipulation that was less than 
half the median time for one’s condition, Χ2 (7, n = 1,108) = 8.99, p = .003.  Of 12 tests 
of the use of mobile phones to take the survey as a moderator of the effects of condition 
on intentions, none were significant. 
 
Table 5.1 
Participant Characteristics by Mobile Phone Use 
 Did not use mobile 
phone 
Used mobile phone Total 
Total % 46.6 53.4 100 
Age, M (SD) 42.9 (3.1) 42.7 (3.2) 42.8 (3.1) 
Education, %:a    
Less than high 
school 
1.4 3.0 2.3 
High school 
graduate or 
GED 
17.4 21.0 19.3 
Some college or 
technical school 
37.6 39.5 38.6 
College 
graduate or 
beyond 
43.6 36.5 39.8 
Ethnicity:    
Hispanic, 
Latino/a, 
Spanish origin, 
% 
6.4 8.3 7.4 
Race, %: a    
White 86.6 84.6 85.6 
 
95 
Black or 
African 
American 
9.1 10.8 10.0 
American 
Indian or Alaska 
Native 
2.5 3.2 2.9 
Asianb 4.3 2.0 3.1 
Native 
Hawaiian or 
Other Pacific 
Islander 
0.4 1.5 1.0 
Family history of 
breast cancer, % 
14.3 15.2 14.8 
Have had at least 
one mammogram, 
% 
64.7 64.1 64.4 
 
Note. N = 1,108.  Participants could choose multiple races, so percentages may not add to 
100. 
a Significant difference between groups, X2 (3, n = 1,108) = 8.99, p = .029 
b Significant difference between groups, Χ2 (1, n = 1,108) = 4.64, p = .031  
Effects of Comments on Mammography Intentions 
 Means for all intention measures are presented in Table 5.2.  Table 5.3 
summarizes results of analyses testing individual hypotheses included in this chapter.   
All conditions compared to no comment control.  Mean intentions to have a 
mammogram in the next two years by condition are reported in Figure 5.3.  The overall F 
test for the OLS regression comparing each condition to the NoInfo condition was 
significant, F (7, 1100) = 3.17, p = .0025.  Compared to the NoComm condition, 
participants in NoInfo, BCNoEx and BCEx reported significantly higher intentions to 
have a mammogram in the next two years (p < .001, p = .030, and p = .004, respectively).   
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Table 5.2 
Mean Intentions, by Condition 
 Condition  
Variable NoInfo 
NoCom
m FPNoEx BCNoEx FPEx BCEx 
FPExRe
m 
BCExRe
m 
Overall F 
test for 
regression, 
F (df) 
n 156 140 160 116 133 143 128 132  
Intention to have 
mammogram in 
the next 2 years, 
M 
5.85*** 5.04 5.47 5.60* 5.20 5.70** 5.15 5.43 
F (7, 1100) 
= 3.17** 
 
Intention to wait 
until age 50 to 
have 
mammogram, M 
2.03* 2.46 2.38 2.14 2.54 2.08 2.48 2.21 
F (7, 1100) 
= 2.08* 
 
Note. N = 1,108.  Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = false-
positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false 
positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars 
removed.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to compare all conditions to the NoComm condition, the condition in 
which participants received the stimulus news story but no comments.  Means that are significantly different from the mean of the 
NoComm condition are marked with an asterisk. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001  
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Table 5.3 
Summary of Analyses Testing Main Effect Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Outcome Variable Conditions 
Compared 
Wald test 
result 
Conclusion 
H1a Intention to have 
mammogram in the 
next two years 
FPEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1100) 
= 5.27, p = 
.02 
FPEx < BCEx, 
H1a supported 
H1b Intention to wait until 
age 50 to have a 
mammogram 
FPEx vs. 
BCEx  
F (1, 1100) 
= 5.43, p = 
.02 
FPEx > BCEx, 
H1b supported 
H2a Intention to have 
mammogram in the 
next two years 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx  
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.16, p = 
.69 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H2a 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
F (1, 1100) 
= 1.43, p = 
.23 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H2a 
Intention to wait until 
age 50 to have a 
mammogram 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx  
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.08, p = 
.78 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H2a 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
F (1, 1100) 
= 1.43, p = 
.23 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H2a 
H2b Intention to have 
mammogram in the 
next two years 
FPNoEx vs. 
FPEx  
F (1, 1100) 
= 1.50, p = 
.22 
FPNoEx ≈ 
FPEx, No 
support for H2b 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem  
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.05, p = 
.82 
FPEx ≈ 
FPExRem, No 
support for H2b 
Intention to wait until 
age 50 to have a 
mammogram 
FPNoEx vs. 
FPEx  
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.69, p = 
.41 
FPNoEx ≈ 
FPEx, No 
support for H2b 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem  
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.07, p = 
.79 
FPEx ≈ 
FPExRem, No 
support for H2b 
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Note. Conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, 
BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = 
false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, 
and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars removed.   
 
 
  
Figure 5.3. Mean participant intention to have a mammogram in the next two years, by 
condition.  Error bars indicate ±SE. 
 
Figure 5.4 shows mean intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.   
The overall F test for the OLS regression comparing all conditions to the NoComm 
condition was again significant, F (7, 1100) = 2.08, p = .04, but only the NoInfo condition 
was significantly different from NoComm (p = .03).  BCEx was marginally significantly 
lower than NoComm (p = .054). 
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Figure 5.4. Mean participant intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, by 
condition.  Error bars indicate ±SE. 
 
Effect of comment valence/topic on mammography intentions.  Hypothesis 1a 
predicted that comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars (BCEx), when 
compared to comments with false-positive exemplars (FPEx), would lead to increased 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years.  Following the regression 
comparing each condition to the NoComm condition, a planned contrast (Wald test) 
showed that intention to have a mammogram in the next two years was significantly 
higher in BCEx than in FPEx, F (1, 1100) = 5.27, p = .02, providing support for H1a (see 
Table 5.4).  A factorial ANOVA was conducted to examine whether there was an 
interaction between condition (BCEx vs. FPEx) and mammography history (no prior 
mammogram vs. at least one mammogram).  This interaction was significant, (F (1, 227) 
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= 6.49, p = .01, such that the hypothesized effect of condition on mammography intention 
appeared only for women who had had a mammogram (see Figure 5.5).   
  
Figure 5.5. Representation of the effect of FPEx condition (vs. BCEx condition) on 
intention to have a mammogram in the next two years as moderated by history of prior 
mammogram. 
An exploratory Wald test comparing combined conditions FPNoEx, FPEx, and 
FPExRem to combined conditions BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem on intention to have a 
mammogram in the next two years showed that the mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments (BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem) had significantly higher intentions, F (1, 
1100) = 5.08, p = .02.  Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two years in 
each control condition and each group of conditions (grouped by topic/valence) is shown 
in Figure 5.6.  Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two years in the 
NoInfocontrol condition is significantly higher than in the NoComm control condition 
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(F(1,1100) = 12.69, p < .001) and in the combined false-positive mammogram conditions 
(F(1,1100) = 11.60, p < .001).  Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two 
years is also higher in the combined grouping of all mammogram-detected breast cancer 
conditions than in the NoComm control (F(1,1100) = 7.05, p = .008) and the combined 
false-positive mammogram conditions (F(1,1100) = 5.08, p = .024).    
 
Figure 5.6. Mean intention to have a mammogram in the next two years across control 
conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence.  Error bars indicate ± SE.  Means 
sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other (F test, p<.05). 
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H1b (see Table 5.4).  However, an ANOVA showed that there was a significant 
interaction between condition (BCEx vs. FPEx) and education (recoded to be a continuous 
variable), F (1, 272) = 5.15, p = .02; mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars did 
lead to lower intentions to wait until age 50 for the most highly educated women in the 
sample, but the effect appears to be reversed for women with the lowest level of education 
(see Figure 5.7).7   
  
Figure 5.7. Representation of the effect of FPEx condition (vs. BCEx condition) on 
intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram as moderated by education. 
 
An exploratory contrast (using a Wald test) showed that when FPNoEx, FPEx, and 
FPExRem were combined and compared to combined conditions BCNoEx, BCEx, and 
                                                 
7 Note that 39.8% of the sample had at least a college degree, while only 2.3% had less 
than a high school degree, so estimates may be unstable for low levels of education. 
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BCExRem on intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, mammogram-detected 
cancer comments (BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem) had significantly lower intentions, F 
(1, 1100) = 7.74, p = .006.  Again, there was a significant moderating effect of education.  
A factorial ANOVA conducted to examine the interaction between comment topic (all FP 
conditions vs. all BC conditions) and education (recoded to be a continuous measure) was 
significant, F (1, 808) = 4.38, p = .04, such that higher education led to a positive effect of 
false-positive comments on intentions to wait until age 50, which diminished for women 
at lower levels of education (see Figure 5.8).  Mean intention to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram for control conditions compared to comment conditions combined by 
topic/valence are presented in Figure 5.9.  In addition to the significant difference between 
all false positive conditions and all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions noted 
above, mean intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram in the NoInfo control 
condition is significantly lower than in the NoComm control condition (F(1,1100) = 4.98, 
p = .026) and in the combined false-positive mammogram conditions (F(1,1100) = 8.66, p 
= .003).  
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Figure 5.8.  Representation of the effect of all false-positive conditions (vs. all 
mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions) on intention to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram as moderated by education. 
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Figure 5.9. Mean intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram across control 
conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence.  Error bars indicate ± SE.  Means 
sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other (F test, p<.05). 
 
Effect of presence of exemplars on mammography intentions. Following the 
OLS regressions for each of the intention measures, I used Wald tests to examine the 
effects of exemplars on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and 
intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.  Hypothesis 2a predicted that 
comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars would lead to higher intentions to 
have a mammogram in the next two years and lower intentions to wait until age 50 when 
compared to mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars.  To test this 
hypothesis, I compared BCNoEx to BCEx and BCEx to BCExRem for both of the 
intention measures.  None of the four tests were significant (see Table 5.4), so there was 
no support for H2a.  However, there was a moderation effect such that the predicted effect 
of BCEx vs. BCNoEx emerged for women with a history of a prior mammogram (see 
Figure 5.10); a factorial ANOVA conducted to test the interaction of condition (BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx) and history of a prior mammogram (no prior mammogram vs. at least one 
mammogram) showed that the interaction was significant, F (1, 255) = 5.54, p = .02. 
Hypothesis 2b predicted that comments with false-positive exemplars would lead to lower 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and higher intentions to wait until 
age 50 when compared to false-positive comments without exemplars.  To test this 
 
106 
hypothesis, I compared FPNoEx to FPEx and FPEx to FPExRem for both intention items.  
None of the four tests were significant (see Table 5.4), so H2b was also not supported. 
  
Figure 5.10. Representation of the effect of BCEx condition (vs. BCNoEx condition) on 
intention to have a mammogram in the next two years as moderated by history of prior 
mammogram. 
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mammogram in the next two years or intention to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram.   
Mediators of Effects of Comments on Mammography Intentions 
Hypotheses 3 through 6 predicted that effects of exemplars on mammography 
intentions would be mediated by narrative transportation, mammography attitudes, 
mammography norms, and self-efficacy.  Despite the lack of direct effects of exemplars 
on intentions, analyses of possible indirect effects were still necessary and valuable 
because, as Hayes (2013) points out, indirect effects can be present in the absence of direct 
effects.  Thus, the results of formal tests of indirect effects for each proposed mediator of 
the effects of condition on mammography intentions are presented in the sections that 
follow.  The mean values of each proposed mediator by condition are presented in Table 
5.4.  Detailed tables summarizing the results of analyses of each mediator are presented in 
Appendix F. 
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Table 5.4 
Mediator Means and Standard Deviations, by Condition 
 Condition 
Mediator NoInfo NoComm FPNoEx BCNoEx FPNoEx BCEx FPExRem BCExRem 
n 156 140 160 116 133 143 128 132 
Narrative transportation, 
M (SD) 
N/A N/A 4.31 (1.33) 4.39 (1.36) 4.31 (1.49) 4.54 (1.42) 4.29 (1.58) 4.29 (1.40) 
Attitude toward having 
mammogram in next two 
years, M (SD) 
5.67 (1.81) 5.30 (1.80) 5.41 (1.64) 5.46 (1.71) 5.33 (1.57) 5.54 (1.60) 4.88 (1.83) 5.28 (1.57) 
Attitude toward waiting 
until age 50 to have a 
mammogram, M (SD) 
3.19 (1.83) 3.52 (1.65) 3.46 (1.69) 3.25 (1.88) 3.46 (1.73) 3.02 (1.70) 3.35 (1.59) 3.33 (1.77) 
Injunctive norm for 
having mammogram in 
two years, M (SD) 
5.06 (1.71) 4.58 (1.72) 4.84 (1.81) 4.97 (1.78) 4.87 (1.64) 4.89 (1.73) 4.52 (1.73) 4.76 (1.64) 
Injunctive norm for 
waiting until age 50 to 
have a mammogram, M 
(SD) 
2.69 (1.60) 2.77 (1.53) 2.71 (1.53) 2.76 (1.72) 2.71 (1.48) 2.54 (1.41) 2.93 (1.55) 2.69 (1.48) 
Descriptive norm for 
having mammogram in 
two years, M (SD) 
5.00 (1.45) 4.84 (1.49) 4.89 (1.64) 4.91 (1.50) 4.66 (1.60) 4.87 (1.45) 4.95 (1.46) 4.89 (1.51) 
Descriptive norm for 
waiting until age 50 to 
have a mammogram, M 
(SD) 
3.63 (1.57) 3.45 (1.55) 3.30 (1.62) 3.05 (1.52) 3.30 (1.60) 3.46 (1.58) 3.23 (1.41) 3.27 (1.56) 
Self-efficacy to have a 
mammogram in the next 
two years, M (SD) 
8.89 (2.88) 8.11 (3.19) 8.50 (2.86) 8.57 (3.08) 8.95 (2.50) 8.80 (2.92) 7.83 (3.23) 8.30 (2.80) 
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Self-efficacy to wait 
until age 50 to have a 
mammogram, M (SD) 
5.52 (3.70) 5.39 (3.48) 6.14 (3.50) 4.78 (3.61) 5.74 (3.62) 5.20 (3.75) 5.03 (3.49) 5.62 (3.48) 
 
Note. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = false-positive 
comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-positive 
comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars removed.  The 
narrative transportation scale was an average of four items from Green and Brock (2000) measured on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much).  Each attitude scale was created by averaging three semantic differential items on a 7-point scale from 1 to 7, 
where 1 was the negative end of the scale. Norms were measured by having participants rate their agreement with each norm on a 
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  Each self-efficacy item (adapted from Bandura, 2006) was measured using a scale 
from 1 (could not do at all) to 11 (highly certain I could).   
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Narrative transportation.  In the mammography-detected breast cancer 
conditions, increased narrative transportation was associated with increased intentions to 
have a mammogram in the next two years (b = 0.187 for BCEx and BCNoEx, and b = 
0.217 for BCEx and BCExRem) and decreased intention to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram (b = -0.211 for BCEx and BCNoEx, and b = -0.205 for BCEx and 
BCExRem; see Tables F1 and F2).  However, because exemplars had no effect on 
transportation, bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals constructed using 10,000 
bootstrap samples included zero for all of the indirect effects through transportation that 
were tested.  Thus, there is no evidence that effects of exemplars on mammography 
intentions are mediated by transportation in this experiment and no support for H3. 
Attitude.  When compared to FPExRem, FPEx led to a more positive attitude 
toward having a mammogram in the next two years (a = 0.453)8, and more positive 
attitude led to higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years (b = 0.561).  
A bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of FPEx vs. 
FPExRem on intention through attitude (ab = 0.254) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples 
was above zero (0.026, 0.521), providing evidence of mediation and partial support for 
H4.  The path between condition and attitude was not significant in the other models 
tested (see Table F3).  However, paths between attitudes and intentions were significant 
in all of the models, with more positive attitudes toward having a mammogram in the 
next two years consistently related to greater intentions to have a mammogram in the next 
                                                 
8 a and b refer to path coefficients in Figure 5.1. 
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two years.  Similarly, a more positive attitude toward delaying mammography was 
significantly related to increased intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram 
(see Table F4), but there was no evidence that effects of exemplars on intentions to wait 
until age 50 to have a mammogram are mediated by attitude. 
Mammography norms.  Exemplar conditions did not significantly change 
injunctive or descriptive norms toward having a mammogram in the next two years; 
however, stronger perceived injunctive norms related to having a mammogram in the 
next two years were associated with significantly higher intentions to have a 
mammogram in the next two years.  Additionally, in the two instances in which 
exemplars were compared to conditions in which exemplars were removed (FPEx vs. 
FPExRem and BCEx vs. BCExRem), descriptive norms were also significantly positively 
related to mammography intentions (f = 0.178 and f = 0.278, respectively, see Table F5)9.  
Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals constructed using 10,000 bootstrap samples 
included zero for all of the indirect effects tested, thus there was no evidence that effects 
of exemplars on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years were mediated 
by norms related to having a mammogram in the next two years. 
There was one instance in which exemplars had an effect on norms related to 
waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram; when BCEx was compared with BCNoEx, 
the presence of exemplars led to a significant increase in descriptive norms (d = 0.409, 
see Table F6).  However, in all cases, both injunctive norms and descriptive norms were 
                                                 
9 Path coefficients for models including norms refer to paths identified in Figure 5.2. 
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significantly and positively related to intentions to wait until age 50 to have a 
mammogram. Bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals constructed using 10,000 
bootstrap samples included zero for all but one of the indirect effects tested.  When BCEx 
was compared with BCNoEx, the indirect effect of exemplars on intentions to wait until 
age 50 to have a mammogram through descriptive norms (ab = 0.079) was above zero 
(95% CI [0.008, 0.190]).  Thus, H5 was only partially supported. 
Self-efficacy.  There were no significant effects of exemplars on self-efficacy.  
However, higher self-efficacy was significantly associated with higher mammography 
intentions both when BCEx was compared to BCNoEx (b = 0.099) and when BCEx was 
compared with BCExRem (b = 0.229; see Table F7).  Bias-corrected bootstrap 95% 
confidence intervals for the indirect effects of exemplars on intentions through self-
efficacy included zero, thus there is no evidence that effects of exemplars on intentions to 
have a mammogram in the next two years are mediated by self-efficacy and no support 
for H6.   
 Exploratory analyses of mediators of effects of topic/valence on intentions.  In 
addition to the mediation analyses necessitated by Hypotheses 3 through 6, I also 
undertook exploratory analyses to investigate the mechanisms behind the effects of 
comment topic and valence on mammography intentions.  I tested transportation, 
attitudes, norms, self-efficacy, and negative affect as possible mediators of these effects.  
Only attitude toward waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram was a mediator of these 
effects.  As shown in Table 5.5, BCEx (as compared to FPEx) made attitudes toward 
waiting more negative, which led to an increase in intentions to have a mammogram in 
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the next two years (because attitudes toward waiting are negatively related to intentions 
to screen).  Because attitudes toward waiting are positively associated with intentions to 
wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, there was also a significant indirect effect of 
BCEx on intention to wait to have a mammogram through attitudes toward waiting.  
Finally, when all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions (BCEx, BCNoEx, and 
BCExRem) are combined and compared to all false positive conditions (FPEx, FPNoEx, 
and FPExRem), the effect of breast cancer conditions on intention to have a mammogram 
in the next two years is mediated by attitudes toward waiting; breast cancer conditions 
lead to more negative attitudes toward waiting, which are negatively related to intentions 
to screen in the next two years. 
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Table 5.5 
Mediating Effects of Attitude toward Waiting until Age 50 to Have a Mammogram 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (attitude), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(attitude) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect effect 
of X on Y 
through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. FPEx  
attitude toward 
waiting 
3.460 
(0.149)*** 
-0.438 (0.207)* __ __ 0.016 
4.46 (1, 271), 
p = .036 
 
Attitude toward 
waiting  intention 
to have mammogram;  
BCEx vs. FPEx   
intention to have 
mammogram 
6.277 
(0.259)*** 
__ 
-0.308 
(0.061)*** 
0.334 (0.210) 0.102 
15.25 (2, 
270), p < .001 
0.135 (0.019, 
0.299) 
BCEx vs. FPEx  
attitude toward 
waiting 
3.460 
(0.149)*** 
-0.438 (0.207)* __ __ 0.016 
4.46 (1, 271), 
p = .036 
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Note. Conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast 
cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected 
breast cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
   
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Attitude toward 
waiting  intention 
to wait;  BCEx vs. 
FPEx   intention to 
wait 
1.253 
(0.225)*** 
__ 
0.369 
(0.053)*** 
-0.269 (0.183) 0.167 
26.99 (2, 
270), p < .001 
-0.162 (-0.351,  
-0.018) 
All BC vs. all FP  
attitude toward 
waiting 
3.427 
(0.084)*** 
-0.232 (0.121) __ __ 0.005 
3.62 (1, 802), 
p = .057 
 
Attitude toward 
waiting  intention 
to have mammogram;  
All BC vs. all FP   
intention to have 
mammogram 
6.183 
(0.158)*** 
__ 
-0.260 
(0.038)*** 
0.238 (0.131) 0.062 
26.34 (2, 
801), p < .001 
0.060 (0.002, 
0.137) 
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Discussion 
This study assesses the effects of valence and the presence of exemplars in online 
mammography news commentary on young women.  In particular, it examines the effects 
of comments on mammography intentions, including intentions to have a mammogram in 
the next two years and intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.  It also 
investigates possible mechanisms of these effects, including moderating effects of 
participant education and history of prior mammogram and mediating effects of 
transportation, attitude, norms, and self-efficacy. The results of tests of hypotheses 
related to the main effects of comments, results of tests of mediation effects, and 
incidental findings are discussed below.     
Effects of Comment Topic 
Results showed that participants in conditions with comments about 
mammogram-detected breast cancer (when BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem were treated 
collectively) reported higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years than 
participants in conditions with comments about false-positive mammograms (FPNoEx, 
FPEx, and FPExRem, collectively).  Participants in BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem also 
reported significantly lower intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.  
Additionally, participants in BCEx had significantly higher intentions to have a 
mammogram in the next two years and significantly lower intentions to wait until age 50 
than participants in FPEx, providing support for H1a and H1b, respectively. 
Because all mammogram-detected cancer comments used in the experiment were 
pro-mammogram and all false-positive mammogram comments were cautious toward 
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mammography, the effects of valence and topic are intertwined, meaning that these 
effects were due to differences in comment valence, differences in content, or a 
combination of the two.  One explanation for the differing effects of mammogram-
detected cancer comments and false positive comments on mammography intentions is 
their differing valence toward mammography: women who read pro-mammogram 
comments were more likely to intend to have mammograms than women who read 
comments that were cautious toward mammograms.  This effect is supported by prior 
literature, which has found effects of comment valence on various outcomes, including 
perceived effectiveness of the message accompanied by the comments (Walther, 
DeAndrea, Kim, & Anthony, 2010), opinions (Lee & Jang, 2010; Witteman, Fagerlin, 
Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013) and behavioral intentions (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & 
Zikmund-Fisher, 2013).   
Effect of Exemplars in Comments 
Though there were significant effects of comment valence and topic, there were 
no main effects of the presence of exemplars on mammography intentions.  This was true 
regardless of whether exemplar and nonexemplar conditions were compared collectively 
or individually.  Thus, H2a and H2b were not supported.   One possibility for why I saw 
an effect of comment topic but not an effect of exemplars could be that, while the effect 
of topic or valence is immediate, the effect of exemplars emerges only over time.  
Specifically, Zillmann (2002) proposes that, because “concrete events” (p. 29) are 
retained more easily than abstract information, and exemplars are presumably more 
concrete than similar information without exemplars, exemplars will continue to “exert 
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unopposed influence on judgment” (p. 29).  Though the effects of the experimental 
manipulation in all conditions is expected to decay over time, one might expect the effect 
of the exemplar conditions to fade more slowly such that a “sleeper effect” emerges 
(Zillmann, 2002, p. 29).  This could be explored in future research. 
The failure to find effects of exemplars could also be due, in part, to failure of 
participants to read the comments thoroughly leading to a lack of sufficient exposure to 
the manipulation.  For example, in conditions with comments, median time spent on the 
comment page ranged from a low of 29 seconds for Condition 8 (cancer exemplars 
removed) to a high of 57 seconds for Condition 5 (false-positive exemplars).  The 
average set of comments in Condition 8 was 398 words, and the average set of comments 
in Condition 5 was 584 words.  Typical reading speeds in experimental studies involving 
reading on computer screens (Knoblauch, Arditi, & Szlyk, 1991) and smartphones (Na, 
Choi, & Suk, 2016) are roughly 300 words per minute.  At these speeds, it should take 
readers an average of 80 seconds to read the comments in Condition 8 and an average of 
117 seconds to read the comments in Condition 5. Since the average observed times were 
lower than predicted, it is plausible that some participants skimmed comments rather than 
reading them thoroughly.  To investigate this possibility, I included a dichotomous 
reading time variable as a possible moderator of effects of condition on intention.  In 
eight tests including an interaction term between condition and the reading time variable 
(comparing each exemplar condition to each of its corresponding nonexemplar condition 
for both measures of intention), no significant interaction effects emerged.  When FPEx 
was compared to FPNoEx, the standardized coefficient of the interaction effect was 
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largest, at -0.21, and approached significance (p = .063).  While this could mean that 
reading time was not a factor in the absence of effects of exemplars, it is also possible 
that the study did not have enough power to detect moderation effects.  
Effect of Presence of Comments 
Similar to findings from Shi, Messaris, and Cappella (2014) that the presence of 
any comments (positive or negative) detracted from the perceived effectiveness of the 
message, in the present research, the presence of any comments may have had harmful 
effects on readers by altering the effects of the news article.  An incidental finding of my 
research is that, compared to the NoInfo condition, the NoComm condition led to 
decreased intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years.  Conditions in which 
participants viewed the news story and a set of comments generally increased intentions 
to have a mammogram in the next two years.  For women in this experiment, choosing to 
delay mammography until age 50 is consistent with current USPSTF recommendations 
outlined in the stimulus news article, thus lowering intentions to have a mammogram in 
the next two years could be considered a desirable outcome. 
Moderation of Effects 
Three of the effects of condition on intention were moderated by education level: 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years, FPEx vs. 
BCEx on intention to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, and all false positive 
conditions vs. all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions on intention to wait 
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until age 50.10  In each of these cases, the expected effects appeared for the most highly 
educated participants but weakened with lower levels of education.  This is suggestive of 
an effect of participant ability to attend to and process the text presented in the 
experimental manipulation. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 
1986a, 1986b) proposes that those who are motivated and able to process a persuasive 
message are more likely to do so through the central route, which produces more 
enduring persuasive effects than processing through the peripheral route.  Participants 
with higher levels of education may have been both more motivated to attend to messages 
(due to higher need for cognition) and more capable of processing messages, leading to 
stronger effects of exemplars.   
Similarly, the effect of exemplars (BCEx vs. FPEx and BCEx vs. BCNoEx) on 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years was strengthened among women 
with a history of prior mammography.11  This is indicative of an effect of higher 
motivation to process the experimental manipulation.  Women who had previously made 
the decision to have a mammogram may also have a higher risk for breast cancer, higher 
levels of breast cancer worry, or greater interest in health issues in general that would 
also motivate them to pay attention to messages about mammography.  This is also 
                                                 
10 Three out of 12 (or 25% of) tests examining the interaction between conditions (or sets 
of conditions) and education were significant, which is greater than the percentage 
expected by chance with an alpha level of .05. 
11 Two out of 12 (or 16.7% of) tests examining the interaction between conditions and 
mammography history were significant, which is greater than the percentage expected by 
chance with an alpha level of .05. 
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consistent with effects proposed in the Elaboration Likelihood Model, and higher levels 
of motivation likely led to stronger effects of exemplars. 
Mediation of Effects 
The results presented in this chapter also show that there is little to no support for 
the proposed mediators of the effects of exemplars on mammography intentions (H3, H4, 
H5, and H6).  Attitude toward having a mammogram in the next two years successfully 
mediated one relationship between exemplars and intentions, and mammography norms 
mediated another.  There was no evidence of indirect effects of exemplars on 
mammography intentions through narrative transportation (proposed in H3) or self-
efficacy (proposed in H6).  Though exemplars often failed to have the predicted effects 
on proposed mediators, those mediator variables were often significantly associated with 
the outcome of interest.  There was evidence that, for mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplar conditions, increased narrative transportation was associated with an increase in 
intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years and a decrease in intentions to 
wait until age 50 to have a mammogram.  There was also evidence that attitudes, 
perceived norms, and self-efficacy were significantly related to behavioral intention, as 
predicted by the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000).   
The lack of hypothesized mediation effects is contrary to prior literature on 
exemplars, which suggests that they have their effects through changes in narrative 
transportation (Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella, 2012), attitudes (Green, 
2006), norms (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007), and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977; Bandura, 
1986).  The lack of mediation effects might be expected, however, since there was little 
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evidence that exemplar conditions changed mammography intentions (when compared to 
nonexemplar conditions).  In addition to a lack of effects of exemplar conditions on 
intentions, exemplars also failed to have an effect on the proposed mediators: narrative 
transportation, attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy.  Because narrative transportation is 
typically associated with becoming immersed in a longer narratives—narratives in some 
previous research have spanned several pages (e.g. Green & Brock, 2000)—it is possible 
that the comments were not long enough to create a sense of transportation. Other 
research that found the effect of exemplars on intention was mediated by engagement 
(Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella, 2012) embedded exemplars in the text of a 
longer news article.  Further, Green (2006) describes ways in which transportation can 
lead to changes in attitude, norms, and efficacy, so the failure to find effects on these 
variables may be partially due to the lack of effects on transportation. 
Though the predicted mediation paths were not present, I also conducted 
mediation analyses in an attempt to understand the main effects of comments on 
mammography intentions that did exist. The effect of BCEx vs. FPEx was mediated by 
attitude toward waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram, and the effect of all 
mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions (BCEx, BCNoEx, and BCExRem 
combined) vs. all false positive conditions (FPEx, FPNoEx, and FPExRem combined) 
was mediated by attitude toward waiting until age 50.  It is possible that this attitude was 
malleable because participants did not have a pre-existing attitude toward waiting until 
age 50, whereas attitudes toward having a mammogram in the next two years were likely 
well-formed and influenced by numerous social and cognitive factors. Future research 
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should examine the interplay between effects of attitudes toward having a mammogram 
and attitudes toward waiting on intentions, especially in the context of attitudinal 
ambivalence--“a psychological state in which a person holds mixed feelings (positive and 
negative) towards some psychological object” (Gardner, 1987,p. 241).  This mediation 
pathway also suggests a possible avenue for messaging related to mammography 
decision-making, in that those hoping to change intentions should target not only 
attitudes toward having a mammogram but also attitudes toward waiting to have a 
mammogram. 
Limitations 
 Although this research has many strengths and exciting implications, it also has a 
number of conceptual and methodological limitations.  
First, though the choices made in designing conditions and selecting the 
experimental stimuli offer advantages over prior work in this area, they also present 
limitations.  Most importantly, the decision to use comments in the mammogram-
detected breast cancer conditions that were all pro-mammogram and comments in the 
false-positive mammogram conditions that were cautious toward mammography means 
that valence and content are conflated and their effects cannot be teased apart in this 
experiment.  Originally, this decision was made to produce a cleaner and simpler 
experimental design.  In retrospect, it could have been advantageous to select comments 
for each set of conditions that proportionally represented the valences of comments on 
their respective topic.  Another option would have been to introduce a valence factor and 
include additional conditions such that the experimental factors of valence, topic, and 
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presence of exemplars were fully crossed.  An additional conceptual limitation that may 
have limited my ability to find effects is my operationalization of an exemplar as a 
mention of an individual in a comment.  Definitions of exemplar vary widely, and one 
conceptualization refers to exemplars as “short quotations…from concerned or interested 
people that illustrate a particular problem or a particular view” (Brosius, 1999, p. 213).  
Using this definition, all comments could be considered exemplars, which could mean 
that they are all expected to have stronger effects than nonexemplar text (i.e., parts of the 
article without exemplars).      
This research also has limitations that are related to the methodology.  One of 
these limitations is that, while participants were asked not to use mobile phones to 
complete the survey, based on survey metadata, it appears that approximately 50% 
accessed the survey from a small mobile device.  Allowing participants to be exposed to 
the content on a mobile phone may simulate real conditions in which people are exposed 
to media content and user-generated comments, thus increasing external validity.  
However, it raises concerns about participants’ exposure to the manipulation and ability 
to complete measures, which were not all optimized for mobile phones.  Though few 
moderation effects of mobile phone use were found, this may have weakened effects or 
introduced additional error (i.e., “noise”) making it more difficult to find effects.  Related 
to this issue is the finding that many participants spent only a short amount of time on the 
comment page, which was the primary experimental manipulation.  Though some effects 
of comments were observed (e.g., effects of topic on intention and risk perceptions) and 
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no significant moderating effect of the reading time variable was found, it is possible that 
the brevity of exposure may have contributed to a lack of effects of exemplars.      
This research also possesses limitations related to generalizability.  One of the 
strengths of this study is that it takes place in an online context, as exposure to online 
news commentary would.  However, other aspects of the setting, including the layout of 
the stimulus article and comments, were simplified for the experiment and findings may 
not be representative of results of exposure to all online news and commentary.  
Similarly, the findings are limited because of the experimental stimuli. I only used one 
article, so the effect of comments used with this particular article may differ from effects 
of comments with other articles.  Additionally, though one of the strengths of the study is 
that the stimulus comments were real comments found on mammography articles from 
The New York Times, I could not use all of the coded comments because some would not 
make sense with the article.  This may limit generalizability to other types of comments 
that were not used or to comments and articles found in other media outlets. Additionally, 
this experiment included only false-positive comments that were cautious toward 
mammography and mammogram-detected breast cancer comments that were pro-
mammography for experimental simplicity.  This means one can generalize findings to 
most but not all false positive comments and mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments.  Finally, the population used in this experiment was selected because women 
between the ages of 40 and 50 years old are the ones who have been affected by changes 
in mammography guidelines and, according to guidelines from the USPSTF (2016), have 
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an individual decision to make about when to begin screening.  These findings cannot 
necessarily be extended to other populations. 
Implications 
 This research on the effects of user-generated commentary on online 
mammography news has valuable implications.  First, findings suggest that the topic of 
user-generated mammography comments may have an effect on mammography 
intentions, with those about mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars leading to 
higher intentions to screen in the next two years than when the story was presented along 
with comments about false positives or with no comments at all.  Because having a 
mammogram between age 40 and 50 is not universally recommended, exposure to these 
comments may nudge women to screen, putting them at risk for excess false positives 
and unnecessary procedures.  The findings suggest that producers of online news and 
managers of news websites and any others on which user comments are allowed should 
be aware that comments can have harmful effects on readers and may detract from the 
effects of the main message.   
 Though the hypothesized mediation pathways were not significant, mediation 
analyses provided insight into why exemplars did not produce the predicted effects on 
mammography intentions and further understanding of perceived risk and theories of 
behavioral prediction in the mammography context.  Because attitudes, norms, and self-
efficacy reliably predicted behavioral intentions, this research offers additional support 
for the validity of applying the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000) and Reasoned Action 
Model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) to mammography behavior.    
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EFFECTS OF ONLINE NEWS COMMENTARY ON RISK PERCEPTIONS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents results from an online experiment to examine the effects of 
online news commentary on women’s risk perceptions.  Results include the effects of 
comments on perceived five-year and lifetime risks of developing breast cancer, 
perceived risk of having a positive mammogram, and perceived risk of having a false-
positive mammogram result.  It also presents results of analyses investigating 
mechanisms of action underlying effects of comments on risk perceptions.  Further detail 
about the hypotheses outlined below can be found in Chapter 3. 
Hypotheses 
I made multiple predictions about the effects of comments with exemplars on risk 
perceptions related to breast cancer and mammography.  Based on the quantification 
heuristic and the availability heuristic (Zillmann, 2006), I predicted that comments with 
exemplars would alter risk perceptions by prompting readers to rely on those examples 
when estimating their own risk for breast cancer, a positive mammogram, or a false-
positive mammogram result: 
H7a: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived breast cancer risk 
when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected cancer comments 
without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the same valence and 
topic).  
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H7b: The presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplars will be associated with increased perceived risk of a positive 
mammogram when compared to the presence of mammogram-detected 
cancer comments without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the 
same valence and topic). 
H7c: The presence of comments with false positive exemplars will increase 
perceived risk of experiencing a false positive when compared to the presence 
of false positive comments without exemplars (i.e. nonexemplar comments of 
the same valence and topic). 
Exemplars were also expected to affect perceived risk of breast cancer, perceived risk of 
having a positive mammogram, or perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram, 
depending on experimental condition.  These effects were expected to be at least partially 
mediated by the effects of exemplars on affect.  Dunlop, Wakefield, and Kashima (2008) 
have outlined a theory in which testimonial messages increase negative emotions, which 
then increase perceived susceptibility to a disease.  In a demonstration of this effect, 
McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, and Alcaraz (2011) found that the effect of breast cancer 
survivor stories on increased breast cancer risk perceptions was mediated by negative 
affect.  Thus, I predicted the following: 
H8a: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars 
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack 
exemplars) on perceived risk of breast cancer will be mediated by changes in 
negative affect.  
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H8b: The effects of mammogram-detected breast cancer exemplars 
(compared to comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack 
exemplars) on perceived risk of having a positive mammogram will be 
mediated by changes in negative affect.  
H8c: The effects of false-positive mammogram exemplars (compared to 
comments that are of the same valence and topic but lack exemplars) on 
perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram will be mediated by 
changes in negative affect.  
 Finally, I proposed that exemplars would alter mammography intentions through 
their effects on risk perceptions.  Though there is not much evidence for this mediation 
pathway between exemplars and mammography behavior, it has been demonstrated for 
other health behaviors.  Betsch, Ulshofer, Renkewitz, and Betsch (2011) found that the 
relationship between narratives about adverse vaccine events and vaccination intentions 
was mediated by perceived risk of experiencing an adverse event.  Similarly, de Wit, Das, 
and Vet (2008) found that the effect of personal testimonials on intention to get 
vaccinated for hepatitis B was mediated by perceived risk of contracting the hepatitis B 
virus. I hypothesized that this effect would also exist in the present research: 
H9: The effects of exemplars (compared to comments that are of the same 
valence and topic but lack exemplars) on mammography intentions will be 
mediated by risk perceptions. 
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Methods 
 This study used an experiment embedded in an online survey to examine the 
effects of mammography news commentary on readers.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of eight conditions (see Table 4.1), with conditions varying on the 
presence or type of comments displayed.  These conditions are further described in 
Chapter 4. 
Participants 
 Survey Sampling International recruited women in the United States between the 
ages of 38 and 48 years to participate in the study (N = 1,108) who no history of breast 
cancer or genetic mutations related to breast cancer.  Full participant characteristics are 
available in Chapter 4. 
Measures 
The focal dependent variables of interest in this chapter are perceived risk of 
having breast cancer (5-year and lifetime risk, measured as both a percentage and a 
frequency out of 100), perceived risk of having a positive mammogram (measured as a 
percentage and a frequency out of 100), and perceived risk of having a false-positive 
mammogram (measured as a percentage and a frequency out of 100).  Detailed 
descriptions of measures used are available in Chapter 4, and the full questionnaire is 
available in Appendix C. 
Research Design, Stimuli, and Procedure 
See Chapter 4 for full details of the experimental design, procedure, and stimuli. 
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Analytic Approach 
 Main effects.  To examine the effects of condition on each of the dependent 
measures of risk perception, I used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with the 
NoComm condition as the comparison condition.  I then followed each regression with 
Wald tests to test individual hypotheses and to examine the main effects of presence of 
exemplars and valence/topic.  To test Hypothesis 7a, I used a separate OLS regression for 
each of the four measures of breast cancer risk perception, each time following the 
regressions with Wald tests to compare BCNoEx with BCEx and BCEx with BCExRem.  
I used OLS regression to test Hypothesis 7b, using the two measures of perceived risk of 
having a positive mammogram and using Wald tests to contrast BCNoEx with BCEx and 
BCEx with BCExRem.  Finally, I also used OLS regression to test Hypothesis 7c with 
two measures of perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram and used Wald 
tests to contrast FPNoEx to FPEx and FPEx to FPExRem. 
Moderation.  I explored the moderating effects of participant education, family 
history of breast cancer, history of prior mammogram, survey response time 
(dichotomous: less than one half of the mean response time for respective condition vs. 
greater than or equal to one half of the mean time), and use of a mobile phone to answer 
the survey on the relationship between condition and perceived risk measures using 
factorial ANOVA and OLS regression.  
Mediation models.  The mediation hypotheses tested in this chapter, Hypotheses 
8 and 9, involved comparing an exemplar condition to a nonexemplar condition of the 
same topic and valence (i.e., FPEx vs. FPNoEx, FPEx vs. FPExRem, BCEx vs. BCNoEx, 
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and BCEx vs. BCExRem.  In each of these comparisons, a dummy variable was created 
for condition such that the condition with exemplars was coded as “1” and the 
nonexemplar condition was coded as “0.”  Mediator and outcome variables were interval 
or ratio.  Hypotheses 8 and 9 involved testing a simple mediation model as illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. The mediator (M) and the dependent variable (Y) varied based on the 
hypothesis being tested.  All models were tested using PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 
2016) with SPSS version 22.  I used bootstrapping to create bias-corrected 95% 
confidence intervals for indirect effects as recommended by Hayes (2009, 2013). 
Results 
Mobile Phone Use 
Participant characteristics by mobile phone use are summarized in Chapter 5.  
Most tests of the use of mobile phones to take the survey as a moderator of the effects of 
condition on outcome variables were not significant.  However, taking the survey on a 
mobile phone significantly moderated the effect of BCEx vs. BCNoEx on perceived five-
year risk of breast cancer such that the BCNoEx condition increased perceived risk for 
mobile users and decreased perceived risk for non-mobile users (i.e., the interaction term 
in a 2x2 ANOVA was significant, F(1, 255) = 5.79, p = .017; see Figure 6.1).  It also 
moderated the effect of topic/valence on perceived risk of experiencing a false positive, 
such that topic/valence had little effect for those who completed the survey on a mobile 
phone (the interaction was significant, F(1, 807) = 3.99, p = .046).  For those who did not 
use a mobile phone, comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer led to lower 
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perceived risk of a false positive than did comments about false-positive mammograms 
(see Figure 6.2).12 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Use of mobile phone to answer survey as a moderator of effect of BCNoEx 
condition (vs. BCEx) on perceived risk of a false positive. 
                                                 
12 Two out of 24 (or 8.3% of) tests of the interaction between using a mobile phone and 
condition were significant, which is only slightly higher than the percentage expected by 
chance with an alpha level of .05. 
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Figure 6.2. Use of mobile phone to answer survey as a moderator of effect of conditions 
with comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer (vs. comments about false 
positives) on perceived risk of a false positive. 
 
Main Effects of Comments on Perceived Risk 
 Means for all measures of perceived risk are presented in Table 6.1.  Table 6.2 
summarizes results of analyses testing Hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c. 
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Table 6.1 
Mean Risk Perceptions, by Condition 
 Condition  
Variable NoInfo 
NoCom
m FPNoEx BCNoEx FPEx BCEx 
FPExRe
m 
BCExRe
m 
Overall F 
test for 
regression, 
F (df) 
n 156 140 160 116 133 143 128 132  
Perceived 5-year 
breast cancer 
risk as a 
frequency, M 
29.9** 21.6 25.2 31.4*** 24.8 25.6 24.5 27.6* 
F (7, 1100) 
= 2.78** 
Perceived 
lifetime risk of 
breast cancer as 
a frequency, M 
41.2*** 30.8 32.0 36.9* 31.9 35.8* 30.5 36.2* 
F (7, 1100) 
= 4.17*** 
Perceived 5-year 
risk of breast 
cancer as a 
percentage, M 
25.7* 19.6 20.8 24.3 22.7 23.6 23.8 25.6* 
F (7, 1094) 
= 1.39 
Perceived 
lifetime risk of 
breast cancer as 
a percentage, M 
32.7** 25.2 26.4 29.9 29.2 29.1 28.4 30.6* 
F (7, 1095) 
= 1.48 
Perceived risk of 
experiencing a 
25.1* 19.4 20.9 23.2 23.5 20.7 23.4 24.0* 
F (7, 1098) 
= 1.39 
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positive 
mammogram as 
a frequency, M 
Perceived Risk 
of Experiencing 
a Positive 
Mammogram as 
a Percentage, M 
23.9* 18.1 19.1 21.3 19.5 17.6 23.4 22.2 
F (7, 1096) 
= 1.68 
Mean perceived 
risk of 
experiencing a 
false-positive 
mammogram as 
a frequency, M 
32.3* 27.3 28.7 29.7 31.1 26.5 35.9** 31.8 
F (7, 1098) 
= 2.59* 
Mean perceived 
risk of 
experiencing a 
false-positive 
mammogram as 
a percentage, M 
31.5 25.9 27.6 27.6 29.2 25.6 35.0** 31.9* 
F (7, 1098) 
= 2.27* 
 
Note. N = 1,108.  Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no comments control, FPNoEx = false-
positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false 
positive comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars 
removed.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to compare all conditions to the NoComm condition, the condition in 
which participants received the stimulus news story but no comments.  Means that are significantly different from the mean of the 
NoComm condition are marked with an asterisk. 
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*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 6.2 
Summary of Analyses Testing Main Effect Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Outcome Variable Conditions 
Compared 
Wald test 
result 
Conclusion 
H7a Perceived 5-year breast 
cancer risk as a 
frequency out of 100 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1100) 
= 4.26, p = 
.04 
BCNoEx > 
BCEx, No 
support for H7a 
(wrong 
direction) 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem 
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.65, p = 
.42 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H7a 
Perceived lifetime risk 
of breast cancer as a 
frequency out of 100 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.14, p = 
.71 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H7a 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem 
F (1, 1100) 
= 0.02, p = 
.89 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H7a 
Perceived 5-year breast 
cancer risk as a 
percentage 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1094) 
= 0.06, p = 
.81 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H7a 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem 
F (1, 1094) 
= 0.53, p = 
.47 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H7a 
Perceived lifetime risk 
of breast cancer as a 
percentage 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1095) 
= 0.07, p = 
.79 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H7a 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem 
F (1, 1095) 
= 0.27, p = 
.61 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H7a 
H7b Perceived risk of 
having a positive 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1098) 
= 1.03, p = 
.31 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H7b 
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mammogram as a 
frequency out of 100 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem 
F (1, 1098) 
= 2.07, p = 
.15 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H7b 
Perceived risk of 
having a positive 
mammogram as a 
percentage 
BCNoEx vs. 
BCEx 
F (1, 1096) 
= 2.16, p = 
.14 
BCNoEx ≈ 
BCEx, No 
support for H7b 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem 
F (1, 1096) 
= 3.36, p = 
.07 
BCEx ≈ 
BCExRem, No 
support for H7b 
H7c Perceived risk of 
having a false-positive 
mammogram as a 
frequency out of 100 
FPNoEx vs. 
FPEx 
F (1, 1098) 
= 0.83, p = 
.36 
FPNoEx ≈ 
FPEx, No 
support for H7c 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
F (1, 1098) 
= 3.09, p = 
.08 
FPEx ≈ 
FPExRem, No 
support for H7c 
Perceived risk of 
having a false-positive 
mammogram as a 
percentage 
FPNoEx vs. 
FPEx 
F (1, 1098) 
= 0.31, p = 
.58 
FPNoEx ≈ 
FPEx, No 
support for H7c 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
F (1, 1098) 
= 3.32, p = 
.07 
FPEx ≈ 
FPExRem, No 
support for H7c 
 
Note. Conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, 
BCNoEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = 
false-positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars 
removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with 
exemplars removed.   
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I used OLS regression to examine the effects of condition on each of the four 
measures of perceived risk of breast cancer.13  Hypothesis 7a predicted that the presence 
of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars would be associated with 
increased perceived breast cancer risk when compared to the presence of mammogram-
detected cancer comments without exemplars (i.e., nonexemplar comments of the same 
valence and topic). 
Perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer as a frequency.  Mean perceived risk of 
developing breast cancer in the next five years, when risk was measured as a frequency 
out of 100, is shown in Figure 6.3.  The overall F test for the regression was significant 
(F (7, 1100) = 2.78, p = .007), with NoInfo, BCNoEx, and BCExRem being significantly 
higher than NoComm (p = .001, p < .001, and p = .015, respectively).  Planned Wald 
tests following the regression show that perceived risk in BCNoEx was significantly 
higher than in BCEx, F (1, 1100) = 4.26, p = .04, contrary to H7a.  This effect was 
moderated by history of a prior mammogram; such that the difference between BCEx and 
BCNoEx was not significant for women who had had a prior mammogram (the 
interaction between condition and mammography history in an ANOVA was significant, 
F (1, 255) = 4.22, p = .04; see Figure 6.4).  BCEx was not significantly different from 
BCExRem (see Table 6.2).  Hypothesis 7a was not supported for this measure of 
perceived breast cancer risk.   
                                                 
13 I repeated the analyses described below with an aggregated measure of risk that 
combined the four measures of perceived risk of breast cancer. There was no effect of 
exemplars when these measures were combined. 
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Figure 6.3.  Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in the next five years when risk 
was measured as a frequency out of 100, by condition.  Error bars indicate ±SE. 
  
Figure 6.4.  Representation of moderating effect of history of prior mammogram on 
relationship between exemplars and perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer measured as a 
frequency.   
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Exploratory Wald tests show that, collectively, BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem 
had significantly higher perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer as a frequency than 
combined conditions FPNoEx, FPEx, and FPExRem, F (1, 1100) = 4.74, p = .030.  
Means for each combined group of conditions and the control conditions are shown in 
Figure 6.5.  In addition to the significant difference between all false-positive conditions 
and all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions, the NoInfo control condition was 
significantly higher than the NoComm control condition (F(1,1100) = 11.32, p < .001) 
and all false positive conditions combined (F(  1,  1100) = 5.75, p = .017), and all breast 
cancer conditions combined were significantly higher than the NoComm control 
(F(1,1100) = 10.89, p = .001).  When each exemplar condition was compared to the 
combined nonexemplar conditions of the same valence (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and 
BCExRem combined; FPEx vs. FPNoEx and FPExRem combined), there were no 
significant effects of exemplars on perceived 5-year breast cancer risk measured as a 
frequency. 
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Figure 6.5. Mean perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer (measured as a frequency) across 
control conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence.  Error bars indicate ± SE.  
Means sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other (F test, 
p<.05). 
 
Perceived lifetime risk of breast cancer as a frequency.  The mean perceived 
risk of developing breast cancer in one’s lifetime, measured as a frequency out of 100, is 
presented in Figure 6.6.  The pattern is similar to 5-year risk: the overall regression is 
significant, F (7, 1100) = 4.17, p < .001, and NoInfo, BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem 
are significantly higher than NoComm (p < .001, p = .015, p = .043, and p = .027, 
respectively).  Planned Wald tests show that BCEx did not differ significantly from either 
BCNoEx or BCExRem, so Hypothesis 7a was not supported for this measure of 
perceived breast cancer risk (see Table 6.2).   
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Figure 6.6.  Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in one’s lifetime when risk was 
measured as a frequency out of 100, by condition.  Error bars indicate ±SE. 
 
Exploratory analyses again showed that, collectively, BCNoEx, BCEx, and 
BCExRem had significantly higher perceived risk for this measure than FPNoEx, FPEx, 
and FPExRem, F (1, 1100) = 10.24, p = .001.  Means for each set of combined conditions 
and each control group are shown in Figure 6.7.  In addition to the significant difference 
between all mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions and all false-positive 
conditions, mean perceived risk in the all BC conditions was higher than the NoComm 
control (F (1, 1100) = 7.95, p = .005), and the NoInfo control was higher than the 
NoComm control (F (1, 1100) = 17.46, p < .001), all FP conditions combined (F (1, 
1100) = 20.30, p < .001), and all BC conditions combined (F (1, 1100) = 5.07, p = .025).  
When each exemplar condition was compared to the combined nonexemplar conditions 
of the same valence (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem combined; FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
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and FPExRem combined), there were no significant effects of exemplars on perceived 
lifetime breast cancer risk measured as a frequency. 
 
Figure 6.7. Mean perceived lifetime risk of breast cancer (measured as a frequency) 
across control conditions and conditions combined by topic/valence.  Error bars indicate 
± SE.  Means sharing the same superscript are not significantly different from each other 
(F test, p<.05). 
Perceived 5-year risk of breast cancer as a percentage.  Figure 6.8 displays 
mean perceived risk of developing breast cancer in the next five years across conditions, 
with risk being measured as a percentage.  The overall regression was not significant, F 
(7, 1094) = 1.39, p = .21.  Planned Wald tests show that BCEx did not differ significantly 
from either BCNoEx or BCExRem, so Hypothesis 7a was not supported for this measure 
of perceived breast cancer risk (see Table 6.2).  However, there was a significant 
moderating effect of prior history of a mammogram, such that the predicted difference 
between BCEx and BCNoEx emerged for women who had had a mammogram (the 
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interaction between condition and mammography history in an ANOVA was significant, 
F (1, 255) = 4.91, p = .03; see Figure 6.9).  There was also a moderating effect of family 
history of breast cancer; for women with a family history, BCEx led to higher perceived 
risk than BCExRem (in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition and family history 
was significant, F (1, 270) = 10.74, p = .001; see Figure 6.10).  Finally, there was a 
moderating effect of education on the relationship between exemplars and risk 
perceptions, such that BCExRem led to lower perceived risk that BCEx for the most 
highly educated but higher perceived risk for participants with lower levels of education 
(in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition and education recoded as a continuous 
measure was significant, F (1, 270) = 5.59, p = .02; see Figure 6.11).  Exploratory 
analyses showed that there were no significant differences when all mammogram-
detected breast cancer comment conditions were compared to conditions with false-
positive mammogram comments or when exemplar conditions were compared to 
corresponding combined nonexemplar conditions (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem 
combined; FPEx vs. FPNoEx and FPExRem combined). Thus, there were not effects of 
topic or presence of exemplars.  
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Figure 6.8.  Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in the next five years when risk 
was measured as a percentage, by condition.  Error bars indicate ±SE. 
 
  
Figure 6.9. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCNoEx) on perceived 5-year risk 
of developing breast cancer, as moderated by prior history of mammogram. 
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Figure 6.10. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived 5-year 
risk of developing breast cancer, as moderated by family history of breast cancer. 
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Figure 6.11.  Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived 5-year 
risk of developing breast cancer, as moderated by education.  Note that 39.8% of the 
sample had at least a college degree, while only 2.3% had less than a high school degree, 
so estimates may be unstable for low levels of education. 
 
Perceived lifetime risk of breast cancer as a percentage.  Mean perceived 
lifetime breast cancer risk, measured as a percentage, is presented in Figure 6.12.  The 
overall regression was not significant, F (7, 1095) = 1.48, p = .17.  BCEx did not differ 
significantly from either BCNoEx or BCExRem, so Hypothesis 7a was not supported for 
this measure of perceived breast cancer risk (see Table 6.2).  However, there was a 
significant moderating effect of family history of breast cancer; as with perceived 5-year 
risk, for women with a family history, BCEx led to higher perceived risk than BCExRem 
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(in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition and family history of breast cancer was 
significant, F (1, 270) = 6.49, p = .01; see Figure 6.13).  Exploratory analyses showed 
that there were no significant differences when all mammogram-detected breast cancer 
comment conditions were compared to conditions with false-positive mammogram 
comments or when exemplar conditions were compared to corresponding combined 
nonexemplar conditions (BCEx vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem combined; FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx and FPExRem combined).  Thus, there was no evidence of an effect of topic or 
presence of exemplars. 
 
 
Figure 6.12.  Mean perceived risk of having breast cancer in one’s lifetime when risk was 
measured as a percentage, by condition.  Error bars indicate ±SE. 
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Figure 6.13.  Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived lifetime 
risk of developing breast cancer, as moderated by family history of breast cancer. 
 
Perceived risk of positive mammogram.  Perceived risk of experiencing a 
positive mammogram was measured both as a frequency out of 100 and as a percentage, 
and the means are presented in Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15, respectively.14  Hypothesis 
7b predicted that the presence of comments with mammogram-detected cancer exemplars 
would be associated with increased perceived risk of a positive mammogram when 
compared to the presence of mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars.   
 
                                                 
14 I repeated the analyses with a combined measure of risk of a positive mammogram, but 
the pattern of results is the same as for the individual measures. 
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Figure 6.14. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a positive mammogram, measured as a 
frequency out of 100, by condition. 
 
Figure 6.15. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a positive mammogram, measured as a 
percentage, by condition. 
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When perceived risk of experiencing a positive mammogram was measured as a 
frequency, the overall regression comparing each condition to NoComm was not 
significant, F (7, 1098) = 1.39, p = .21.  Planned contrasts (using Wald tests) show that 
BCEx did not differ significantly from BCNoEx or BCExRem (see Table 6.2).  However, 
there was a significant moderating effect of family history of breast cancer, such that the 
expected effect did appear for women with a family history (in a factorial ANOVA, the 
interaction between condition (BCEx vs. BCExRem) and family history (no family 
history of breast cancer vs. at least one first degree relative with breast cancer) was 
significant, F (1, 270) = 4.66, p = .03; see Figure 6.16).  There was also a moderating 
effect of education, and the predicted effect was only present for the most highly 
educated; in an ANOVA, the interaction between condition (BCNoEx vs. BCEx) and 
education, recoded as a continuous variable, was significant, F (1, 254) = 4.55, p = .03.  
As levels of education decreased, BCNoEx led to higher levels of perceived risk than 
BCEx (see Figure 6.17).   
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Figure 6.16. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCExRem) on perceived risk of 
having a positive mammogram, as moderated by family history of breast cancer. 
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Figure 6.17. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCNoEx) on perceived risk of 
having a positive mammogram, as moderated by level of education. 
When perceived risk of having a positive mammogram was measured as a 
percentage, the overall regression was not significant, F (7, 1096) = 1.68, p = .11, and 
planned contrasts show that BCEx did not differ significantly from BCNoEx or 
BCExRem (see Table 6.2).  Hypothesis 7b was not supported.  However, there was an 
unexpected moderating effect of history of prior mammogram; in a factorial ANOVA, 
the interaction between condition (BCEx vs. BCNoEx) and history of mammogram was 
significant, F (1, 254) = 5.86, p = .02.  There was no substantial difference between the 
BCEx and BCNoEx condition for women with a prior mammogram, but, for women who 
had not had a prior mammogram, the BCNoEx condition led to higher perceived risk of a 
positive mammogram (see Figure 6.18). 
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Figure 6.18. Representation of the effect of BCEx (vs. BCNoEx) on perceived risk of 
having a positive mammogram, as moderated by history of prior mammogram. 
Exploratory analyses showed that there were no significant differences when all 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comment conditions were compared to conditions 
with false-positive mammogram comments or when the mammogram-detected cancer 
exemplar condition was compared to combined cancer nonexemplar conditions (BCEx 
vs. BCNoEx and BCExRem combined).  Thus, there were no effects of topic or presence 
of exemplars on this measure of perceived risk. 
 Perceived risk of a false-positive mammogram.  Like the other risk constructs, 
perceived risk of having a false-positive mammogram was measured as both a frequency 
out of 100 and a percentage.15  Means by condition when risk was measured as a 
frequency are presented in Figure 6.19.  Means by condition when risk was measured as a 
percentage are presented in Figure 6.20.  Hypothesis 7c predicted that the presence of 
comments with false-positive exemplars would increase perceived risk of experiencing a 
false-positive when compared to the presence of false-positive comments without 
exemplars.   
                                                 
15 I repeated these analyses using a combined measure of risk of a false positive, but there 
was still no significant effect of exemplars on perceived risk. 
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Figure 6.19. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a false-positive mammogram, 
measured as a frequency out of 100, by condition. 
 
 
Figure 6.20. Mean perceived risk of experiencing a false-positive mammogram, 
measured as a percentage, by condition. 
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When perceived risk of having a false positive was measured as a frequency out 
of 100, the regression was significant, F (7, 1098) = 2.59, p = .01, and NoInfo and 
FPExRem had significantly higher average perceived risks than NoComm (p = .048 and 
p = .001, respectively).  Planned Wald tests show that FPEx was not significantly 
different from FPNoEx or FPExRem (see Table 6.2).  However, for participants with a 
higher reading time (compared to those with a reading time that was less than half the 
median time for participants in their condition), the FPExRem condition led to higher 
perceived risk of a false positive than the FPEx condition.  In a factorial ANOVA, the 
interaction between condition [FPEx vs. FPExRem] and a dichotomous measure of 
reading time was significant, F (1, 257), = 6.16, p = .01; see Figure G1 in Appendix G.  
When perceived risk of a false positive was measured as a percentage, the regression was 
significant, F (7, 1098) = 2.59, p = .01, and FPExRem and BCExRem had significantly 
higher average perceived risks than NoComm (p =.003 and p = .035).  Again, FPEx was 
not significantly different from FPNoEx or FPExRem (see Table 6.2), but there was 
again a moderating effect of reading time. In a factorial ANOVA, the interaction between 
condition [FPEx vs. FPExRem] and a dichotomous measure of reading time was 
significant, F (1, 257) = 4.47, p = .04; see Figure G2 in Appendix G.  Hypothesis 7c was 
not supported for either measure of perceived risk of a false-positive mammogram. 
Exploratory analyses showed that there were no significant differences when all 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comment conditions were compared to conditions 
with false-positive mammogram comments or when both false-positive nonexemplar 
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conditions were compared to the false-positive exemplar condition (FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
and FPExRem combined) for either measure of perceived risk of a false-positive 
mammogram.   
Mediators of Effects of Comments on Perceived Risk 
 I used mediation analysis to test Hypotheses 8a, 8b, 8c, and 9.  A summary of the 
results of formal tests of indirect effects for each proposed mediator are presented in the 
sections that follow.  Full details of these results are available in Appendix F.  
Negative affect.  Negative affect was the primary proposed mediator of effects of 
exemplars on risk perceptions.  Negative affect by condition is shown in Figure 6.21; 
FPEx was the only individual condition to lead to a significant increase in negative affect.  
However, when all false positive comment conditions (FPNoEx, FPEx, and FPExRem) 
were combined and all breast cancer comment conditions (BCNoEx, BCEx, and 
BCExRem) were combined, each set led to significantly higher negative affect than the 
NoComm condition (see Figure 6.22).  There was no significant effect of exemplars on 
negative affect (regardless of whether each exemplar condition was compared to its 
corresponding individual nonexemplar conditions or combined nonexemplar conditions) 
or of comment topic/valence on negative affect.  Though greater negative affect was 
consistently significantly associated with an increase in perceived risk of breast cancer 
(path coefficients in mediation models ranged from 4.38 [p = .006] to 12.28 [p < .001]), 
regardless of how risk was measured, there was no effect of condition on perceived risk 
of breast cancer and no indirect effects through negative affect (see Tables F8 through 
F11).  Greater negative affect was also significantly associated with an increase in 
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perceived risk of a positive mammogram (path coefficients in mediation models ranged 
from 5.93 to 10.26, both p < .001; see Tables F12 and F13) and perceived risk of having 
a false-positive mammogram (path coefficients in mediation models ranged from 2.48 
[not significant] to 7.85 [p < .001]; see Tables F14 and F15).  However, as with perceived 
risk of breast cancer, there were no indirect effects of exemplars on positive mammogram 
or false-positive mammogram risk perceptions through negative affect.  Due to the lack 
of indirect effects, there was no support for H8a, H8b, or H8c.  
 
  
Figure 6.21.  Mean negative affect, by condition.  Negative affect was measured using 
the 10-item negative affect scale from the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  Responses for each item ranged from 1 to 5 
(very slightly or not at all/a little/moderately/quite a bit/extremely) and the ten items were 
averaged to form the scale. 
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Figure 6.22.  Mean negative affect, by control conditions and conditions combined by 
topic/valence.  Negative affect was measured using the 10-item negative affect scale from 
the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988).  Responses for each item ranged from 1 to 5 (very slightly or not at all/a 
little/moderately/quite a bit/extremely) and the ten items were averaged to form the scale.  
Groups that share a superscript are not significantly different from each other (p < .05). 
 
 Perceived risk as a mediator.  I also conducted a mediation analyses using OLS 
path analysis to test the role of perceived risk of breast cancer as a mediator of the effect 
of exemplars on intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years.  Although 
perceived risk of breast cancer (measured as a percentage) was consistently significantly 
related to increased intentions to have a mammogram in the next two years (see Tables 
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F18 and F19), there were no consistent effects of exemplars on risk (regardless of how 
risk was measured).  There were also no significant indirect effects of exemplars on 
intentions through risk perceptions, thus H9 was not supported.  
 Exploratory analyses.  In addition to the hypothesis-driven mediation analyses 
reported above, I also performed exploratory mediation analyses to attempt to explain the 
effect of comment topic/valence on risk perceptions.  Of the variables tested (including 
narrative transportation, attitudes, norms, self-efficacy, and affect), none significantly 
mediated the effects. 
Discussion 
 This study investigates the impact of mammography news commentary on risk 
perceptions, including perceived risk of contracting breast cancer, perceived risk of 
having a positive mammogram, and perceived risk of having a false-positive 
mammogram.  It also investigates the mechanisms underlying these effects, including 
moderating effects of education, family history of breast cancer, history of prior 
mammogram, and time spent with the experimental manipulation and mediating effects 
of negative affect. 
Effects of Comment Topic 
Though there was no evidence of a positive effect of presence of exemplars on 
perceived risk, I did observe an effect of comment topic on breast cancer risk perceptions 
that was not hypothesized.  For both five-year breast cancer risk measured as a frequency 
and lifetime breast cancer risk measured as a frequency, BCNoEx, BCEx, and BCExRem  
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had significantly higher perceived risk of breast cancer than FPNoEx, FPEx, and 
FPExRem.   
While the effects of comment topic (false-positive mammograms vs. 
mammogram-detected cancer) on mammography intention reported in Chapter 5 were 
predicted and may be explained by the difference in valence, the effects of topic on risk 
perceptions reported in this chapter were unexpected and not as easily explained by 
valence.  Instead, I propose that the effects of topic on risk perceptions were due to their 
differences in content and might be explained by the availability heuristic (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982).  According to Tversky and Kahneman, “a person is said to employ the 
availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with 
which instances or associations could be brought to mind" (1982, p. 164).  It is plausible 
that those who read comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer had higher 
breast cancer risk perceptions than those who read about false positives because they 
could more easily recall instances of others discussing having been diagnosed with breast 
cancer.  Comments about mammogram-detected cancer may have also been more 
accessible due to being more believable, familiar, or higher in perceived argument 
strength than false-positive comments.  These possible mechanisms of action should be 
explored through future research. 
Effect of Exemplars in Comments 
Results of tests of hypotheses 7a, 7b, and 7c (main effects of exemplars on risk 
perceptions) are presented in Table 6.2.   In this experiment, there is no evidence that 
exemplars increase breast cancer risk perceptions, thus H7a was not supported.  In fact, 
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there was one test that showed exemplars decreased risk perceptions, contrary to my 
hypothesis; when perceived risk of developing breast cancer in the next five years was 
measured as a frequency, the mammogram-detected cancer comments condition with 
exemplars led to a lower perceived risk than the condition without exemplars. There is 
also no evidence that the presence of exemplars affects perceived risk of have a positive 
mammogram or perceived risk of having a false positive, meaning there is also no 
support for H7b and H7c, respectively.    
Despite my prediction that exemplar comments would increase risk perceptions 
over nonexemplar comments because of the availability heuristic, availability may also 
actually explain why the predicted differences between exemplar and nonexemplar 
conditions did not emerge for risk perceptions.  Sometimes, FPExRem and BCExRem 
even appeared to have higher means when compared to FPEx and BCEx, respectively, 
though the differences never reached significance.  In the FPExRem and BCExRem 
conditions, exemplars were removed from comments by replacing mentions of individual 
women with “women” or “some women.”  It is possible that, though FPExRem and 
BCExRem did not technically contain exemplars according to my relatively narrow 
operational definition, the comments in these conditions conveyed the idea that many 
other women were experiencing false positives (FPExRem) or mammogram-detected 
breast cancer (BCExRem).  Future research should examine how effects differ with 
definitions of exemplars that are more or less inclusive.  It should also be noted that much 
of the work on exemplars (e.g., Zillmann, 2006) contrasts exemplars with numeric base-
rates and not merely with statements lacking exemplars, as I have.  While this 
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experimental decision was made in an attempt to isolate effects of exemplars, the choice 
of comparison condition may have contributed to the lack of effects.   
As mentioned in Chapter 5, there are several additional reasons why exemplars 
may have failed to produce the predicted effects.  First, participants spent very little time 
reading the experimentally manipulated comments.16  Due to the low average time spent 
on the page of the survey that displayed the experimental manipulation, exposure to the 
manipulation may have been insufficient to produce effects on the constructs of interest.  
Though moderation analyses did not show a significant moderation effect of reading 
time, the study may not have enough power to detect moderation effects.  Finally, it is 
possible that effects of exemplars will only emerge over time, producing a sleeper effect. 
Effect of Presence of Comments 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, these findings are consistent with prior research (Shi, 
Messaris, & Cappella, 2014) that found that the presence of any comments (positive or 
negative) detracts from the perceived effectiveness of the message.  Indeed, the presence 
of any comments may have had harmful effects on readers in the present research by 
altering the effects of the news article.  Compared to the NoInfo condition, the NoComm 
condition to decreased breast cancer risk perceptions.  Conditions in which participants 
                                                 
16 As described in Chapter 5, in conditions with comments, median time spent on the 
comment page ranged from a low of 29 seconds for BCExRem to a high of 57 seconds 
for FPEx.  The average set of comments in BCExRem was 398 words, and the average 
set of comments in FPEx was 584 words.  Typical reading speeds in experimental studies 
involving reading on computer screens (Knoblauch, Arditi, & Szlyk, 1991) and 
smartphones (Na, Choi, & Suk, 2016) are roughly 300 words per minute.  At these 
speeds, it should take readers an average of 80 seconds to read the comments in 
BCExRem and an average of 117 seconds to read the comments in FPEx. 
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viewed the news story and a set of comments generally increased breast cancer risk 
perceptions.  Because participants who read the article but no comments had the lowest 
perceived breast cancer risk and women tend to overestimate their breast cancer risk 
(Hoffman et al., 2010), these women (in the NoComm condition) most likely also had the 
most accurate risk perceptions.17  This would mean that any comments (but 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments, in particular) further inflated 
overestimates of risk. 
Moderation of Effects 
Additionally, I found several moderation effects that were not hypothesized.  
First, a participant’s family history of breast cancer moderates the effect of exemplar 
conditions on risk perceptions.18  For women with a family history (approximately 15% 
of the sample), the BCEx condition led to higher perceived 5-year and lifetime risk of 
breast cancer compared to the BCExRem condition.  The pattern was reversed for women 
without a family history.  Similarly, for women with a family history of breast cancer, the 
BCEx condition led to increases in perceived risk of a positive mammogram over the 
BCExRem condition.  Again, the pattern was reversed for women without a family 
history.  There was also a moderating effect of history of a prior mammogram; effects of 
                                                 
17 Based on current incidence rates (National Cancer Institute, 2015), the national average 
lifetime risk of breast cancer is 12.5%, but the average estimate from women in NoComm 
was 25.2%.  Though this is still an overestimate (especially since women at the highest 
risk of developing breast cancer were excluded from the study), it is lower than average 
estimates in any other condition. 
18 Three out of 16 (or 18.8%) of tests examining the interaction between conditions and 
family history of breast cancer were significant, which is greater than the percentage 
expected by chance with an alpha level of .05. 
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exemplar conditions on risk perceptions were closer to the predicted effects for women 
with a history of prior mammography.19  Education also had a moderating effect on the 
relationship between exemplar conditions and risk perceptions.  The expected effects of 
exemplars on breast cancer risk perceptions emerged for the most highly educated 
participants when BCEx was compared to BCExRem for five-year risk of breast cancer 
measured as a percentage.  An additional two marginally significant interactions showed 
the same pattern of results. A similar pattern emerged when the dependent variable was 
perceived risk of a positive mammogram; only one test of the interaction was significant, 
but the remaining three were in the same direction.20 
As is Chapter 5, the moderation effects by family history of breast cancer, history 
of prior mammography, and education are consistent with predictions of the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a, 1986b).  The fact that 
expected effects of exemplars (BCEx > BCNoEx and BCEx > BCExRem) on risk 
perceptions emerged for the most highly educated participants is indicative of an effect of 
greater ability to process the experimental messages.  The observed moderation effects of 
family history of breast cancer and history of a prior mammogram are consistent with the 
expected effects of greater motivation to attend to messages.  As predicted by the ELM, 
                                                 
19 Three out of 24 (or 12.5%) of tests examining the interaction between conditions and 
history of a prior mammogram were significant, which is greater than the percentage 
expected by chance with an alpha level of .05. 
20 Across all 24 tests examining the interaction between conditions and education, two (or 
8.3%) were significant.  This is slightly greater than the percentage expected by chance 
with an alpha level of .05.  Given the additional marginally significant results in the same 
direction, this appears to represent a consistent pattern of effects. 
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higher levels of ability and motivation to process messages appear to leader to stronger 
persuasive effects.  The observed moderation effects of reading time on effects of 
exemplars on perceived risk of a false positive are not as clearly explained by this 
framework.  If longer reading time is an indication of higher attention to the experimental 
manipulation, then the FPExRem condition may have conveyed that multiple women had 
experiences with false positives compared to single examples presented in the FPEx 
condition (a possibility mentioned above).  
Mediation of Effects 
This chapter also presented results of mediation tests designed to examine the 
mechanisms underlying effects of comments on risk perceptions.  Though comment 
conditions, in general, led to elevated levels of negative affect, exemplars did not produce 
more negative affect than nonexemplar conditions.  Thus, there was no evidence of 
indirect effects of exemplars on risk perceptions through negative affect (as proposed in 
H8a, H8b, and H8c) due to a lack of effects of exemplar conditions.   However, negative 
affect was consistently related to perceived risk of having breast cancer and risk of 
having a positive mammogram.  The role of negative affect in predicting perceived risk 
of having a false-positive mammogram was not as consistent but was significant when 
FPEx was compared to FPNoEx.  Though the expected path between exemplars, negative 
affect, and perceived risk was not present, the observed effects are of interest.  Compared 
to the NoComm condition, all comment conditions combined resulted in significantly 
elevated levels of negative affect.  In Chapter 5, I proposed that all comments may have 
been viewed as exemplars, which would reduce my ability to detect differences between 
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comment conditions.  Narratives (Green, 2006), testimonials (Dunlop, Wakefield, & 
Kashima, 2008) and breast cancer narratives (McQueen & Kreuter, 2010) are all expected 
to increase negative affect more than nonnarrative text., so my alternate explanation is 
supported by the findings regarding the effects of all comments on negative affect.   
Perceived breast cancer risk was also positively associated with intention in many 
cases, particularly when risk was measured as a percentage. However, there was no 
evidence of indirect effects of exemplars on mammography intentions through perceived 
breast cancer risk (proposed in H9) due to a lack of effects of condition on perceived risk.  
Alternate explanations for the lack of effects on perceived risk are discussed above. 
Limitations 
 As detailed in Chapter 5, the experiment that provided the data for this analysis 
has several important limitations, including limitations related to experimental design, 
data collection, and generalizability.  First, my ability to find effects may have been 
limited by my definition of exemplars and subsequent choice of comparison conditions.  
Though I defined an exemplar as a mention of an individual in a comment, definitions 
vary widely, and one conceptualization refers to exemplars as “short quotations…from 
concerned or interested people that illustrate a particular problem or a particular view” 
(Brosius, 1999, p. 213).  Using this definition, all comments could be considered 
exemplars, which would mean that no differences would be expected between comment 
conditions of the same valence.  This study also has limitations related to data collection 
in an online survey setting that may have reduced the likelihood of finding significant 
effects.  First, because of the online setting, participant attention to the screen, and thus 
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exposure to the experimental stimuli, cannot be guaranteed.  Secondly, use of mobile 
phones may have contributed to low exposure due to the difficulty of reading large 
amounts of text on a small screen.  I estimate that more than 50% of respondents 
accessed the survey from a mobile device, and using a mobile phone to respond did 
produce two moderation effects of condition on perceived risk.  Researchers should 
consider these findings when planning research and attempting to balance generalizability 
of experimental settings and fidelity of experimental treatment.  Finally, this study has 
limitations related to generalizability of measures, stimuli, setting, and population.  
Results cannot be reliably generalized to other measures of the constructs used in this 
study, other exemplar stimuli, settings outside the online experimental context, or 
populations other than women between the ages of 38 and 48 years old. 
An additional methodological issue is related to the measurement of perceived 
risk.  The numeric measurement of perceived susceptibility to breast cancer has been 
shown to be difficult to measure.  For example, Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, and 
Nattinger (2004) found that accuracy of perceived risk varied based on the timeframe 
being measured (five-year vs. lifetime) and the measurement format (percentage vs. 
frequency).  In their research, only 31% of scale users used the scales consistently (i.e., 
provided equivalent estimates on the percentage and frequency scales), and consistency 
was positively associated with numeracy.  The inability of participants to adequately use 
these scales to express perceived risk may also help explain some of the failed effects, 
and results may differ when using other measures of perceived risk (e.g., qualitative 
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measures).  Finally, though I did not measure numeracy, future research could examine 
the possible role of numeracy as a moderator of effects.  
Implications 
 This research has valuable implications related to the effect of comments on risk 
perceptions.  Findings suggest that the topic of comments may shape breast cancer risk 
perceptions, with mammogram-detected cancer comments heightening perceived risk 
more than false positive comments and articles presented without comments.  Because 
women already typically overestimate their breast cancer risk (Hoffman et al., 2010), and 
because risk perceptions may inform screening decisions (Gross, Filardo, Singh, 
Freedman, & Farrell, 2006), heightening breast cancer risk perceptions may not only 
needlessly increase breast cancer worry but also push women to make ill-informed 
screening decisions.  Taken together with the findings presented in Chapter 5, this 
research has implications for those who make decisions about online content related to 
mammography.  It suggests that allowing comments may have harmful effects on readers 
and that comments may alter the effects of the primary content. 
 Though proposed mediation pathways were not significant, this study also 
provides insight into why exemplars did not produce the predicted effects on risk 
perceptions and provides further understanding of the relationship between affect and 
perceived risk.  Specifically, these findings bolster research showing an association 
between negative affect and perceived risk of breast cancer (e.g., Dunlop, Wakefield, & 
Kashima, 2008 and McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, & Alcaraz, 2011).  
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This dissertation examines the prevalence of exemplars in mammography news 
articles and user-generated comments, effects of comments on risk perceptions and 
mammography intentions, and mechanisms through which comments have their effects.  
This chapter includes a discussion of the main findings of each study, the strengths and 
limitations of this research, directions for future research, and conclusions that can be 
drawn from the dissertation as a whole. 
Discussion 
 This dissertation set out to address three primary research objectives related to 
exemplars in user-generated comments that accompany news articles about 
mammography:  
Objective 1: Describe the prevalence, content, and representativeness of 
mammography exemplars in comments on online news about mammography. 
Objective 2: Test the effects of comments with exemplars on risk perceptions and 
mammography intentions. 
Objective 3: Explore the mechanisms of action underlying effects of exemplar 
comments on risk perceptions and mammography intentions. 
Objectives 1, 2 and 3 are directly addressed by the results presented in Chapters 2, 5, and 
6, and the main results from this dissertation can be summarized as follows: 
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 Study 1 found that approximately one-third of comments on news articles about 
mammography included a mammography exemplar.  Of comments including a 
mammography exemplar, 41% included a mammogram-detected breast cancer 
exemplar, 24% included an exemplar in which breast cancer was detected through 
other means, and 19% included a false-positive mammogram exemplar.  Given an 
average population breast cancer rate of 12.5%, exemplars depicting cancer 
diagnoses are overrepresented.  Exemplar type was also related to comment 
valence toward mammography; most comments with false-positive exemplars 
were cautious toward mammography, and most comments with mammogram-
detected breast cancer exemplars were enthusiastic toward mammography.  
Additionally, articles with mammography exemplars were more likely to have 
comments that also included mammography exemplars. 
 In Study 2, when compared to conditions without exemplars, comments with 
exemplars did not produce effects on mammography intentions or risk 
perceptions.  However, there were differences in mammography intentions and 
risk perceptions between the two types of exemplar conditions (mammogram-
detected breast cancer exemplars vs. false-positive mammogram exemplars) and 
between comments of different topic and valence (all mammogram-detected 
breast cancer conditions vs. all false-positive mammogram conditions).  
Compared to comments about false positives, comments about mammogram-
detected breast cancer led to higher intentions to have a mammogram in the next 
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two years, lower intentions to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram, and higher 
breast cancer risk perceptions.   
 The examination of mechanisms of effects of comments demonstrated that most 
predicted mediation pathways did not exist.  This was mostly due to a failure of 
exemplar conditions to produce effects on the proposed mediators.  Though 
exemplars often failed to have the predicted effects on proposed mediators, 
proposed mediators were consistently significantly associated with the outcomes 
of interest (e.g., narrative transportation, attitudes, perceived norms, and self-
efficacy were associated with mammography intentions, and negative affect was 
related to perceived risk of having breast cancer and perceived risk of having a 
positive mammogram).  Exploratory analyses revealed that attitudes toward 
waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram mediated some of the effects of 
comment topic/valence on intentions.  Additionally, exploratory analyses found 
that the predicted effects of exemplars often did emerge for participants high in 
ability and motivation to read the stimulus materials (i.e., those high in education, 
with a family history of breast cancer, or with a history of prior mammograms).   
 
The findings in Study 1 regarding the content of comments on news articles about 
mammography are relatively novel, as the author could find no prior published content 
analyses of comments appearing with mammography news.  There are, however, some 
similarities to findings from related research.  The prevalence of exemplars in comments 
was similar to the prevalence in analyses of comments on other health issues.  For 
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example, Len-Rios, Bhandari, and Medvedeva (2014) found that 42% of comments on 
articles about breastfeeding recommendations discussed personal experiences.  Similarly, 
the prevalence of mammography exemplars in comments, in particular, was comparable 
to the prevalence of mammography exemplars in an analysis of Twitter comments on 
breast cancer screening (Lyles, Lόpez, Pasick, and Sarkar, 2013).  However, findings 
related to the association between exemplars in articles and exemplars in comments are 
contrary to previous related research.  For example, Holton, Lee, and Coleman (2014) 
found no association between episodic framing of general health articles and episodic 
framing of comments, nor did Suran, Holton, and Coleman (2014) find an association 
between an article being about cancer and the frame of the comments (i.e., articles about 
cancer were not more or less likely to have episodic comments).  Overall, Study 1 
contributes to a general understanding of the content of user-generated comments that 
appear with online news articles about mammography by providing further evidence that 
exemplars appear in online comments, describing the prevalence of various types of 
exemplars in these comments, and providing evidence of a correspondence between 
exemplars in articles and exemplars in comments.  Understanding the prevalence, type, 
and lack of representativeness of mammography exemplars present in comments is 
necessary for researchers interested in investigating the effects of these comments on 
readers. 
Study 2 found that the topic of comments—but not the presence of exemplars—
had an effect on intentions and risk perception.  The lack of effects of exemplars on 
mammography intentions and risk perceptions was unexpected.  Alternate explanations 
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for the lack of effects observed in the immediate post-test include lack of participant 
attention to the stimuli, inadequate contrast between exemplar and nonexemplar 
conditions (i.e., a weak manipulation), and the possibility that effects are not immediate 
but will emerge over time (i.e., a “sleeper effect”).  Differences in intention between 
comments about mammogram-detected breast cancer and comments about false positives 
may be due to the different valence of these comments. This effect is supported by prior 
literature, which has found effects of comment valence on various outcomes, including 
perceived effectiveness of the message accompanied by the comments (Walther, 
DeAndrea, Kim, & Anthony, 2010), opinions (Lee & Jang, 2010; Witteman, Fagerlin, 
Exe, & Zikmund-Fisher, 2013) and behavioral intentions (Witteman, Fagerlin, Exe, & 
Zikmund-Fisher, 2013).  The increase in breast cancer risk perceptions seen in 
participants who read about mammogram-detected breast cancer may be due to the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).   Overall, the effects of comments 
may have been harmful to participants by heightening risk perceptions in women who 
already tend to overestimate breast cancer risk (Hoffman et al., 2010). 
Results from Study 2 also showed that very few of the hypothesized mediation 
pathways were supported by the data.  Many of these paths were not significant because 
exemplar conditions (when compared to nonexemplar conditions) failed to have an effect 
on the predicted mediator.  This may have been due to low exposure to the intervention, a 
weak manipulation, a lack of power to detect very small effects, or the short length of 
exemplars used (which may have been too brief to allow for narrative transportation).  
Though the hypothesized mediation pathways were not significant, this study provides 
 
177 
further understanding of perceived risk and theories of behavioral prediction in the 
mammography context.  That is, because attitudes, norms, and self-efficacy reliably 
predicted behavioral intentions, this research offers additional support for the validity of 
applying the Integrative Model (Fishbein, 2000) and Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010) to mammography behavior.  These findings also bolster research showing 
an association between negative affect and perceived risk of breast cancer (see, for 
example, Dunlop, Wakefield, & Kashima, 2008 and McQueen, Kreuter, Kalesan, & 
Alcaraz, 2011).  Additionally, findings from moderation analyses are consistent with the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986a, 1986b) and suggest that 
the proposed effects of exemplars may only exist for those who are motivated and able to 
process them. 
Strengths and Limitations 
 Though these studies have both strengths and limitations, they offer unique 
contributions to the understanding of user-generated comments that appear with online 
news articles about mammography.  One of the strengths of the content analysis 
presented in Study 1 is that it addresses an under-researched area—little was previously 
known about the content of these comments.  It is even more unique it its attempts to 
quantify the presence of exemplars in these comments.  Additionally, it contributes to 
knowledge on the relationship between article features and comment features and 
generates a set of data that can be used to further explore this area.  Finally, this design is 
strengthened by capturing all articles about mammography published in a single source 
over a five-year period (as opposed to a sample of articles published during this time 
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period or all articles appearing around a particular event over a short timespan) and 
taking a stratified sample of comments that allows each article to be represented in the 
data.  This increases confidence that findings will generalize to future media coverage of 
mammography.  
 The experimental design offers a number of strengths that enhance the value of 
this research.  First, the use of an experimental design, rather than an observational 
design, helps to establish causal order in the study of effects of comments on outcome 
variables.  Additionally, because participants were randomly assigned to condition, the 
risk of confounding variables is mitigated.  Further, a between-subjects experimental 
design minimizes fatigue and eliminates cross-over effects associated with within-
subjects designs.  An additional strength of this research is that the stimuli consisted of 
real comments from readers of The New York Times.  Even in the conditions that used 
comments in which exemplars were removed, the majority of the content was user-
generated.  This not only creates a feeling of authenticity for the participant and bolsters 
the credibility of the cover story, but it also increases the external generalizability of the 
findings.  The online experimental context further increases generalizability by testing 
effects in an online environment similar to the one in which readers of online news are 
typically exposed to content.  Finally, the use of multiple sets of comments that were 
randomly selected from large pools of comments and randomly ordered reduces order 
effects and the risk of a case-category confound.  This design also functions as a way to 
build in experimental replication (O’Keefe, 2015), an additional strength. 
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 While many of the strengths of Study 2 stem from the experimental design 
described above, there are additional benefits of the analytical methods used.  Traditional 
mediation analysis approaches suggest that one should not pursue mediation analysis in 
the absence of a direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (in 
this case, if the condition failed to have an effect on intentions or risk perceptions).  
However, Hayes (2009) explains that this approach would fail to detect some intervening 
effects, thus a direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable should 
not be a prerequisite for testing for indirect effects.  Hayes (2009, 2013) further argues 
that the Baron and Kenny (1986) method for testing mediation is low in power and that 
the Sobel (1982, 1986) test, another popular method for testing the significance of an 
indirect effect, is flawed in its reliance on the assumption that the sampling distribution of 
the indirect effect is normal.  In lieu of using these methods, Hayes (2009, 2013) 
recommends the use of bootstrapping to construct a confidence interval for the indirect 
effect as a means of testing that it is significantly different from zero.  By using Hayes’ 
approach of creating 10,000 bootstrapped samples and bias-corrected confidence 
intervals for each indirect effect tested, this research avoids the issues with mediation 
testing identified by Hayes.  
 Despite the general strengths of the methodological approach of these studies, this 
research has limitations related to generalizability, experimental design, and data 
collection.  First, the findings of Study 1 are limited in their generalizability.  Despite the 
wide readership of The New York Times, the Times is not a national newspaper and may 
not be representative of other media outlets.  Additionally, readers of the Times are more 
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educated and more liberal than consumers of other news sources such as USA Today, 
local daily newspapers, or television news (The Pew Research Center for the People & 
the Press, 2012).  Thus, articles published in The New York Times may not be 
representative of articles on mammography found in other media during the time period 
covered by the content analysis, and comments on these articles may differ from 
comments that would be produced by readers of other online news sources.  Finally, 
because the content analysis was limited to newspaper coverage of mammography, the 
results cannot be reliably generalized to other types of media or other health topics.   
 Study 2 also has limitations related to generalizability of results.  Experimental 
findings are primarily limited because of the experimental stimuli used.  I only used one 
article, so the effect of comments used with this particular article may differ from effects 
of comments with other articles.  Additionally, though one of the strengths of the study is 
that the stimulus comments were real comments (or edited versions of real comments) 
found on mammography articles from The New York Times, I could not use all of the 
coded comments because some would not make sense with the article.  This may limit 
generalizability to other types of comments that were not used or to comments and 
articles found in other media outlets. Additionally, this experiment included only false-
positive comments that were cautious toward mammography and mammogram-detected 
breast cancer comments that were pro-mammography for experimental simplicity.  This 
means findings can be generalized to most but not all false positive comments and 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments.  Finally, this study has limitations related 
to generalizability of measures, setting, and population.  Results cannot be reliably 
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generalized to other measures of the constructs used in this study, settings outside the 
online experimental context, or populations other than women between the ages of 38 and 
48 years old. 
 Study 2 is further limited by elements of the experimental design.  First, the 
decision to use comments in the mammogram-detected breast cancer conditions that were 
all pro-mammogram and comments in the false-positive mammogram conditions that 
were cautious toward mammography means that valence and content are conflated and 
their effects cannot be disentangled in this experiment.  This limitation could be 
addressed in future research that adds a valence factor to the experimental design.  The 
operationalization of an exemplar and selection of the comparison conditions are also 
limitations of this design and may have contributed to a lack of effects.  Because 
exemplars were operationalized as a mention of an individual in a comment, exemplar 
comments and nonexemplar comments may have been too similar, resulting in a weak 
manipulation.  Additionally, because much of Zillmann’s work on exemplars compares 
exemplar conditions to conditions with numeric base-rates (e.g., Zillmann, 2006), the 
choice to use nonexemplar comparison conditions that lacked exemplars but did not 
include base-rates may have contributed to the lack of expected effects.  A further 
limitation of the experimental design is that it does not allow this research to address 
whether comments matter due to their form or because of the content they add to the 
article.  Future research should investigate whether the form of comments allows them to 
have effects over and above the effects of the content they contain.  For example, one 
could compare a condition in which participants read an article followed by comments to 
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one in which participants read an article with these same comments embedded in the 
article text.  A difference between these conditions would suggest that the effect of 
comments is not due solely to the content comments provide but to some other feature. 
Finally, Study 2 has limitations related to data collection.  Though allowing 
participants to participate in the experiment via mobile device may have increased 
external validity by simulating real conditions in which people are exposed to media 
content and user-generated comments, it raises concerns about participants’ exposure to 
the manipulation and may have reduced effects.  However, most moderation analyses that 
included use of a mobile phone as a moderator were not significant.  Related to this issue 
is the finding that many participants spent only a short amount of time on the comment 
page, which was the primary experimental manipulation.  Though some effects of 
comments were observed (e.g., effects of topic on intention and risk perceptions) and 
most moderation analyses using response time were not significant, the brevity of 
exposure may have contributed to a lack of effects of exemplars.  Many of these 
limitations can be addressed in future research.   
Directions for Future Research 
 This research provided insight into the content of reader comments on online 
mammography news articles and the effects these comments may have on readers.  While 
the content analysis and experiment answered key research questions, they also raised 
additional questions for future research. 
 Compared to the study of media content produced by news organizations, the 
study of comments appearing with these news articles is a relatively new area and replete 
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with possibilities for additional research.  One potential line of research involves 
developing further understanding of the characteristics of people who write comments on 
news articles and those who read these comments.  Though there is a small amount of 
population-level data that estimates the number of people who have read user-generated 
comments, little is known about the characteristics that separate readers from non-
readers.  Possible differences include differences in need for information, need for 
cognition, desire to connect with others, or other individual characteristics.  Even less is 
known about the motivations behind posting comments and characteristics that may be 
associated with this behavior.  Within the study of why people post comments on news 
stories, there also exists a more specific need to understand what makes individuals more 
likely to include exemplars in their comments.    
An additional potential line of research that emerged from Study 1 involves 
understanding how article characteristics influence comment characteristics.  Particularly, 
future research should examine possible explanations for the association between 
mammography exemplars in articles and mammography exemplars in comments (and the 
absence of this association for breast cancer exemplars).  Additionally, one could use 
automated linguistic analysis to examine how other characteristics of the article, such as 
the use of first-person pronouns or emotion words, affect comment characteristics. 
Study 2 also raised additional questions for future research.  Most importantly, 
future work is needed to separate the effects of comment topic and comment valence 
toward mammography.  This could be done using a 2 (valence toward mammography: 
pro vs. con) by 2 (exemplar: present vs. absent) design with or without a no comment 
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control condition.  This line of research could also be furthered by replicating the 
experiment using different types of nonexemplar conditions as comparison conditions 
(e.g., conditions that use statements with numeric base-rates or conditions in which 
comparable information is presented but not in a comment form or attributed to another 
reader).  Finally, future research should expand efforts to understand mechanisms of 
effect by searching for additional mediators of the effects of comment topic on risk 
perceptions and mammography intentions, such as cognitive availability of breast cancer 
cases.  Additional research should also examine additional potential moderators of effects 
of comments, including need for cognition, health literacy, and numeracy. 
Conclusion 
 User-generated comments on online news articles about mammography often 
include mentions of individuals’ experiences with mammography and breast cancer.  
These comments can have an impact on comment readers’ breast cancer risk perceptions 
and intentions to have or delay a mammogram.  In particular, exposure to user-generated 
comments that are favorable toward mammography and about the topic of mammogram-
detected breast cancer can lead to higher risk perceptions and higher intentions to screen 
than exposure to 1) comments that are cautious toward mammography and about the 
topic of false-positive mammograms and 2) articles presented without comments.  This 
study adds to the body of evidence that suggests that comments appearing with news 
articles have effects on readers.  It suggests that news organizations, health organizations, 
and others who share content online and allow user-generated comments should consider 
the impact of these effects before allowing comments to be posted.  Further research is 
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needed to fully understand the role that the presence of mammography exemplars in 
comments may play in these effects.  
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APPENDIX A 
CONTENT ANALYSIS CODEBOOK 
ARTICLES 
Basic Information and Inclusion Criteria 
[articleID] Article ID number 
[title] Article title, as appearing in search 
[alttitle] Alternate title, if applicable (sometimes web and print versions have different 
titles) 
[date] Article date in MM/DD/YYYY format 
[lexisnexis] Found in LexisNexis search 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[nytimescom] Found in NYTimes.com search 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[type] Article type: 
1. Newspaper article 
2. Blog post 
3. Opinion/Editorial 
4. Magazine 
5. Letter/reader reaction 
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6. Other: death notice, engagement announcement, wedding announcement, 
correction, book review, or other 
[duplicate] Is article a duplicate of an article already coded? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), continue.  If 1 (yes), coding is complete. 
*Note: If duplicate, and one is print and one is web/blog, code the web/blog version. 
[include] Should article be included in database of articles about mammography?  First, 
exclude if article type is coded as 5 or 6.  Include if 
mammogram/mammography/breast cancer screening/breast screening is in the 
title of the article OR at least 50% of paragraphs mention breast cancer 
screening/mammography or are generally about breast cancer 
screening/mammography.  Otherwise, exclude.   
Include article in database?  
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 1 (yes), continue to next item.  If 0 (no), coding is complete. 
[url] Article URL 
[comments] Does online version of article have comments? 
0. No 
1.  Yes 
Article contents 
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[guidelines] Does the article mention guidelines for when women should be screened for 
breast cancer?  This includes even very general mentions of when to begin screening. 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[2009guidelines] Does the article specifically mention the 2009 guidelines issued by the 
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[komen] Does the article mention Susan G. Komen for the Cure? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[nci] Does the article mention the American Cancer Society? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[nci] Does the article mention the National Cancer Institute? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[uspstf] Does the article mention the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
[acr] Does the article mention the American College of Radiology? 
0. No 
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1. Yes 
[articlevalence] Would you consider the overall tone of the article to be… 
1. More enthusiastic toward mammography than cautious 
2. More cautious toward mammography than enthusiastic 
3. Balanced/neutral—neither more enthusiastic nor more cautious 
[artbcexemplars] Does the article mention an individual’s experience with breast cancer 
(a breast cancer exemplar)?  Note: This should be a specific person, not a reference to 
women or a woman in general. 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to artnomammogram.  If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artbcexemplarsnum]  How many breast cancer exemplars are mentioned in the article? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
[artnomammogram] Does the comment include someone who makes a decision to not 
have a mammogram/mammograms (or to delay one)?  This includes those who have had 
a mammogram in the past and but have made a decision to not have another one (or delay 
having another one). Note: This should be a specific person, not a reference to women or 
a woman in general. 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes 
 
190 
If 0 (no), skip to artmammexemplars. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artnomammogramnum] How many individuals who made a decision to not have a 
mammogram/mammograms are included in the article? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
[artmammexemplars] Does the article mention at least one individual’s experience with 
mammography (a mammography exemplar)? (Note: These may be overlap with breast 
cancer exemplars.  For example, an individual in the comment may refer to having had a 
mammogram and having had breast cancer; in that case, both artbcexemplars and 
artmammexemplars would be coded 1.)  Note: This should be a specific person, not a 
reference to women or a woman in general. 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete.  If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artmammexemplarsnum]  How many mammography exemplars/individuals are 
mentioned in the article? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
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[artfalsepositive] Does it include an exemplar with a false-positive mammography 
outcome (includes call-backs for additional screening, referral for further testing, 
biopsy)? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to artcanceroutcome. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artfalsepositivenum] How many exemplars with a false-positive mammography outcome 
are included? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
[artcanceroutcome] Does it include an exemplar with a screening mammogram-detected 
cancer outcome (Note: This should be a screening mammogram, not a diagnostic 
mammogram following development of symptoms or discovery of a lump through other 
means)? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to artnofalsepositive. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artcanceroutcomenum] How many exemplars with a mammogram-detected cancer 
outcome are included? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
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3. 3 or more 
[artnofalsepositive] Does it include an exemplar who had a mammogram and no false 
positive results from the mammogram or cancer? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to artlumporbc. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artnofalsepositivenum] How many exemplars with mammograms and no false positives 
or cancer are included? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
[artlumporbc] Does it include an exemplar who had a lump or breast cancer detected by a 
means other than mammogram (Note: This includes people who discovered a lump and 
went on to have a diagnostic mammogram)? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to artfalsenegative. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artlumporbcnum] How many exemplars with lump or breast cancer detected without a 
mammogram are included? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
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[artfalsenegative] Does it include an exemplar who had a false negative (i.e., breast 
cancer that was missed by a mammogram)?  (Note: All false negatives should also be 
coded as artlumporbc, but the reverse is not necessarily true.) 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[artfalsenegnum] How many false negative exemplars are included? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
End 
 
COMMENTS 
Basic Information 
[maincommentID] Overall comment ID number, each comment in the database receives 
unique number 
[commentarticleID] ArticleID to which comment corresponds 
[commentID] comment ID, comment number within article 
[authorname] Name of author 
[commentdate] Date of comment in MM/DD/YYYY HH:MM format 
[location] Location, if given (not available for all comments) 
[nyttoppick] Marked as an NYT “pick” (not available for all comments) 
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0. No 
1. Yes 
[recommends] number of times comment was “recommended” (not available for all 
comments) 
[commenttext] Text of comment 
[commentlength] Number of words in comment (automatically calculated in Excel) 
Comment Contents 
[includecomment] Is the comment related to mammography/mammograms?  
[Notes to coders:  
 If it mentions mammography or breast cancer screening, it should definitely be 
included.  It does not, however, have to use the word 
“mammogram”/”mammography.” For example, those that refer to the change in 
mammography recommendations should be included (including references to 
recommendations, guidelines, and the USPSTF), even if they don’t use the word 
“mammograms.”  
 Alternate terms: Sometimes, a comment will use the word “screening” and it can 
be inferred that they are talking about breast cancer screening. These should be 
included. Others use the word “testing” or “exam” when referring to 
mammography, and these should be included as well (but be careful to not include 
those that only discuss breast self-exams, MRI, or ultrasounds).   
 Do not include those that only talk about breast cancer without referring to 
mammography.] 
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0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete.  If 1 (yes), continue. 
[commentvalence] Would you consider the overall tone of the comment to be… 
1. More enthusiastic toward mammography than cautious 
2. More cautious toward mammography than enthusiastic 
3. Balanced/neutral—neither more enthusiastic nor more cautious 
[explicitrec] Does the comment make an explicit recommendation regarding 
mammography (e.g., “get a mammogram,” “every woman should get a mammogram,” “I 
advise against routine mammograms,” etc.)? 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes, explicit recommendation for mammography 
2. Yes, explicit recommendation against mammography 
[implicitrec]  Does the comment make an implicit recommendation regarding 
mammography (e.g., “I am going to get a mammogram,” [implicit for] “I am going to 
stop getting mammograms,” [implicit against] “mammograms save lives,” [implicit for] 
“mammograms cause harm,” [implicit against] referring to mammograms as important 
[implicit for], unnecessary [implicit against], or dangerous [implicit against], etc.)? 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes, implicit recommendation for mammography 
2. Yes, implicit recommendation against mammography 
[exemplar] Does the comment have any exemplars (an example case)? 
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0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to fpnoexemplar.  If 1 (yes), continue. 
[bcexemplars] Does the comment mention an individual’s experience with breast cancer 
(a breast cancer exemplar)?  Note: This should be a specific woman, not a reference to 
women or a woman in general. 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to nomammogram.  If 1 (yes), continue. 
[numberbcexemplars]  How many breast cancer exemplars/individuals are mentioned in 
the comment? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
[nomammogram] Does the comment include someone who makes a decision to not have 
a mammogram/mammograms (or to delay one)?  This includes those who have had a 
mammogram in the past and but have made a decision to not have another one (or delay 
having another one). Note: This should be a specific woman, not a reference to women or 
a woman in general. 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to mammexemplars. If 1 (yes), continue. 
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[nomammogrampov] What is the point of view of the person who makes a decision to not 
have a mammogram/mammograms (i.e., if the comment author decides to not have a 
mammogram, code as first-person; if the comment author describes someone else who 
decides not to have a mammogram, code as third-person)? 
1. First-person 
2. Third-person 
[mammexemplars] Does the comment mention at least one individual’s experience with 
mammography (a mammography exemplar)? (Note: These may be overlap with breast 
cancer exemplars.  For example, an individual in the comment may refer to having had a 
mammogram and having had breast cancer; in that case, both bcexemplars and 
mammexemplars would be coded 1.)  Note: This should be a specific woman, not a 
reference to women or a woman in general. 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to the end and coding is complete.  If 1 (yes), continue. 
[numbermammexemplars]  How many mammography exemplars/individuals are 
mentioned in the comment? 
1. 1 
2. 2 
3. 3 or more 
[Note: In the rare case that any of there are multiple narratives of any of the following 
types and they are from different points-of-view, code only the first one mentioned.] 
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[falsepositive] 
Does it include an exemplar with a false-positive mammography outcome (includes call-
backs for additional screening, referral for further testing, biopsy)? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to canceroutcome. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[falsepositivepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar with a false-positive 
mammography outcome? 
1. First-person 
2. Third-person 
[canceroutcome] Does it include an exemplar with a screening mammogram-detected 
cancer outcome (Note: This should be a screening mammogram, not a diagnostic 
mammogram following development of symptoms or discovery of a lump through other 
means)? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to nofalsepositive. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[canceroutcomepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar with a mammogram-
detected cancer outcome? 
1. First-person 
2. Third-person 
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[nofalsepositive] Does it include an exemplar who had a mammogram and no false 
positive results from the mammogram or cancer? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to lumporbc. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[nofalsepositivepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar who had a mammogram 
and no false positives or cancer? 
1. First-person 
2. Third-person 
[lumporbc] Does it include an exemplar who had a lump or breast cancer detected by a 
means other than mammogram (Note: This includes people who discovered a lump and 
went on to have a diagnostic mammogram)? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to falsenegative. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[lumporbcpov] What is the point of view of the exemplar who had a lump or breast 
cancer detected by a means other than mammogram? 
1. First-person 
2. Third-person 
[falsenegative] Does it include an exemplar who had a false negative (i.e., breast cancer 
that was missed by a mammogram)?  (Note: All false negatives should also be coded as 
lumporbc, but the reverse is not necessarily true.) 
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0. No 
1. Yes 
If 0 (no), skip to the end, and coding is complete. If 1 (yes), continue. 
[falsenegativepov] What is the point of view of the exemplar who had a false negative? 
1. First-person 
2. Third-person 
Skip to the end, and coding is complete. 
[fpnonexemplar]  Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the 
concept of false positive mammography results? 
0.   No, or unclear 
1.   Yes 
[mdbcnonexemplar]  Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the 
concept of mammogram-detected breast cancer? 
0.   No, or unclear 
1.   Yes 
[fpnonexemplar]  Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the 
concept of false positive mammography results? 
0. No, or unclear 
1. Yes 
[mdbcnonexemplar]  Does this comment (without exemplars) mention or allude to the 
concept of mammogram-detected breast cancer? 
0. No, or unclear 
 
201 
1. Yes 
END
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APPENDIX B 
ARTICLES INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS 
 
The full list of articles included in the content analysis is included below.  The LexisNexis and New York Times website columns 
indicate whether an article was retrieved in the search using that particular method.  An “N/A” in the “number of comments” column 
indicates that comments were not allowed on that article. 
Table B1 
Article title Publication 
date 
LexisNexis New 
York 
Times 
website 
Article type Number of 
comments 
 Breast Cancer: Who Should Be Screened? 11/3/2009 No Yes blog post 139 
 Quandary With Mammograms: Get a Screening, or Just 
Skip It? 
11/3/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Getting Screened for Breast Cancer 11/16/2009 No Yes blog post 147 
 New Guidelines Suggest Cutback In Mammograms 11/17/2009 Yes Yes news article 631 
 BlogTalk: Breast Cancer Screening, Magazine Covers 11/17/2009 No Yes blog post 16 
 Republicans Say Cancer Screening Guidelines Portend 
Medical Rationing 
11/17/2009 No Yes blog post 54 
 
203 
 New Guidelines on Breast Cancer Draw Opposition 11/17/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Many Doctors to Stay the Course on Breast Exams for 
Now 
11/18/2009 Yes Yes news article 318 
 New Mammogram Advice Finds a Skeptical Audience 11/18/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 G. O. P. Women Attack Mammogram Guidelines 11/18/2009 No Yes blog post N/A 
 Republican Lawmakers Criticize New Cancer 
Guidelines 
11/18/2009 No Yes blog post N/A 
 Breast Cancer Screening Policy Won't Change, U.S. 
Officials Say 
11/19/2009 Yes Yes news article 96 
 Among Clinics, the Mammogram Is Slipping as a 
Popular Offering 
11/19/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Sebelius on Mammograms: Don't Change What You're 
Doing 
11/19/2009 No Yes blog post N/A 
 The Controversy Over Mammograms 11/20/2009 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
152 
 The Uproar Over Mammography 11/20/2009 No Yes blog post 19 
 Addicted to Mammograms 11/20/2009 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
N/A 
 Mammogram Debate Took Group by Surprise 11/20/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Get a Test. No Don't. Repeat 11/22/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Confused? Get the Mammogram 11/23/2009 No Yes blog post 2 
 Behind Cancer Guidelines, Quest for Data 11/23/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Study Questions Safety of Mammograms for Young 
Women at High Risk of Cancer 
12/1/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Senate Blocks Use of New Mammogram Guidelines 12/3/2009 No Yes blog post N/A 
 Mammogram Math 12/13/2009 Yes Yes magazine 
article 
N/A 
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 Gauging the Odds (And the Costs) In Health Screening 12/20/2009 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Mammograms and Severe Dementia 2/15/2010 No Yes blog post 83 
 Women Resolve to Keep Getting Mammograms 2/15/2010 No Yes blog post 80 
 Doctor-Patient Divide On Mammograms 2/16/2010 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 SCREENING: Gaps Found in Breast Cancer Testing 7/20/2010 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Radiation And Risks Are Focus Of Studies 8/24/2010 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 New Treatments Are Challenging Mammogram's Need, 
Study Says 
9/23/2010 Yes Yes news article 75 
 Mammogram Benefit Seen For Women in Their 40s 9/30/2010 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Adding MRIs to Mammograms for High-Risk Women 11/15/2010 No Yes blog post 46 
 A Doctor's Mammogram Mission Turns Personal 12/21/2010 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Audit Finds Long Waits For Mammograms in City 5/5/2011 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 SCREENING: New Threat Rises Between 
Mammograms 
5/10/2011 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Screening: Mammograms Seen Ineffective in Europe 8/2/2011 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 You Have to Gamble on Your Health 10/11/2011 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
N/A 
 Mammogram's Role as Savior Is Tested 10/24/2011 Yes Yes blog post 344 
 More Questions About Mammograms 10/27/2011 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
N/A 
 Mayor to Give $250,000 to Planned Parenthood 2/2/2012 Yes Yes blog post 702 
 A Better Way to Spend Breast Cancer Funds? 2/7/2012 Yes No blog post 59 
 Real Race In Cancer Is Finding Its Cause 2/7/2012 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Fewer Younger Women Are Getting Mammograms 7/2/2012 Yes Yes blog post 42 
 POSTINGS | RECENT ENTRIES FROM OUR 
BLOGS 
7/3/2012 Yes Yes news article N/A 
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 Laws Add Dimension, and Questions, to Breast Cancer 
Screening 
10/25/2012 Yes Yes news article 142 
 Cancer Survivor or Victim of Overdiagnosis? 11/22/2012 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
N/A 
 Ignoring the Science on Mammograms 11/28/2012 Yes Yes blog post 430 
 Stress of Cancer Scare May Last Years 3/22/2013 Yes Yes blog post 25 
 The Problem With Pink 4/28/2013 Yes Yes magazine 
article 
629 
 Behind the Cover Story: Peggy Orenstein on Rethinking 
Her Stance on Mammograms 
4/29/2013 Yes Yes blog post 21 
 Komen Chooses New Leader 6/19/2013 Yes No news article N/A 
 ABC Anchor's On-Air Test Found Breast Cancer 11/12/2013 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Breast Cancer Screenings: What We Still Don't Know 12/30/2013 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
107 
 Vast Study Casts Doubts on Value of Mammograms 2/12/2014 Yes Yes news article 645 
 The Problem With Mammograms 2/12/2014 Yes Yes blog post 7 
 For Women, a More Complicated Choice 2/12/2014 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Why I Never Got Screened 2/15/2014 Yes Yes opinion/editor
ial 
275 
 Flips and Spins in Sochi and on Mammograms 2/16/2014 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Mammography's Limits, Seldom Understood 3/14/2014 Yes Yes blog post 71 
 Look for Cancer, and Find It 4/7/2014 Yes Yes blog post 131 
 Ex-Radiology Tech Filed False Mammogram Results 4/15/2014 No Yes news article N/A 
 Former Ga. Technician Falsified Mammogram Reports 4/27/2014 No Yes news article N/A 
 Universal Mammograms Show We Don't Understand 
Risk 
5/7/2014 No Yes news article 161 
 Dense Breasts May Obscure Mammogram Results 6/16/2014 Yes Yes blog post 134 
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 Mammograms May Cut Breast Cancer Deaths by 28% 6/17/2014 No Yes news article N/A 
 3-D Mammogram Scans May Find More Breast Cancer 6/24/2014 No Yes news article N/A 
 Study Finds 3-D Mammogram Can Improve Cancer 
Detection 
6/25/2014 Yes Yes news article N/A 
 Former Adobe Exec's Start-Up Seeks to Improve the 
Mammogram Experience 
11/3/2014 No Yes news article N/A 
 Retesting Breast Cancer Axioms 11/10/2014 Yes Yes blog post 84 
 Next Steps Uncertain for Women With Dense Breasts 12/8/2014 No Yes news article N/A 
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APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE AND PROGRAMMING INSTRUCTIONS 
[Note: Text appearing in brackets will not be visible to participants.] 
[CONSENT] 
Consent Form 
The University of Pennsylvania is conducting an online research study on women’s ideas 
about mammograms. A mammogram is an x-ray of the breast used to screen for breast 
cancer.    
 
The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete and you will be compensated 
according to your panel’s normal compensation options.   
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at any 
time. There are no known risks but if any of the questions make you feel uncomfortable, 
you may skip that question or leave the survey.  The information you give will be kept 
confidential and will not be linked to your name.  
 
The researcher, a doctoral student at the Annenberg School for Communication, will have 
access to the anonymous data. This research is funded by a fellowship from The Wharton 
School at the University of Pennsylvania. All data will be stored securely at the 
Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.   
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As a reminder, this study is meant to be taken on a computer or iPad.  Please do not try to 
participate in this study from a smart phone.  
 
If you have any questions about the study, you may contact the researcher, Holli Seitz 
(hseitz@asc.upenn.edu). This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of Pennsylvania.  You may contact the IRB at the University of 
Pennsylvania if you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research 
participant (215-898-2614). 
 
If you would like to participate in this short survey, please proceed to the next page. We 
ask that you please complete the survey in one sitting. 
 
If you would not like to participate, please close the browser now. 
 
[SCREENING QUESTIONS] 
[Sex] 
[sex] What is your sex? [force answer] 
1. Male 
2. Female 
[page break] 
[Age] 
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[age] What is your age? [drop-down menu, under 18, ages 18-75 listed individually, over 
75; force answer]  
[If participant is male and/or not between the ages of 38 and 48 (inclusive), exclude and 
send to exclusion text; otherwise, continue to pre-test] 
[High risk of breast cancer] 
[bchistory] Have you ever had or do you currently have breast cancer (including ductal 
carcinoma in situ (DCIS) and lobular carcinoma in situ (LCIS))? 
1. No 
2. Yes 
[brca]  Have you ever tested positive for a breast cancer genetic mutation (BRCA1 or 
BRCA2)? 
1. No 
2. Yes 
3. Don’t know 
[If participant answers yes to either of these questions, send to exclusion text.] 
[page break] 
[Exclusion text]  
Thank you for your willingness to participate.  Unfortunately, you are not eligible for this 
survey.    For more information about breast cancer prevention, screening, and treatment, 
please visit http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/breast.   
[All participants: PRE-TEST] 
[Breast cancer and mammography history] 
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[familyhistory] Have any of your first-degree relatives (mother, sister, or daughter) had 
breast cancer? 
1. No 
2. Yes, one first-degree relative has had breast cancer 
3. Yes, more than one first-degree relative has had breast cancer 
4. Don’t know 
[mammohistory] A mammogram is an x-ray of each breast to look for breast cancer. 
Have you ever had a mammogram? 
1. No 
2. Yes 
[page break] 
[If receiving intervention (all conditions except NoInfo): insert instructions for article] 
[All participants: POST-TEST] 
[Mammography intentions] 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
[mammint] I intend to have a mammogram in the next two years. 
 1. strongly disagree 
 2. disagree 
 3. somewhat disagree 
 4. neither agree nor disagree 
 5. somewhat agree 
 6. agree 
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 7. strongly agree 
[waitint] I intend to wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. 
 1. strongly disagree 
 2. disagree 
 3. somewhat disagree 
 4. neither agree nor disagree 
 5. somewhat agree 
 6. agree 
 7. strongly agree 
[Perceived breast cancer risk; adapted from Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, & 
Nattinger, 2004]  
[5yearfreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you.  How many 
of you will get breast cancer in the next five years?  
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100] 
[lifefreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you.  How many of 
you will get breast cancer in your lifetime?  
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100] 
[page break] 
[5yearpercent] What do you think your personal risk or chance is of getting breast cancer 
in the next five years?   
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Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%.  For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of 
getting breast cancer” and 100% means “completely certain to get breast cancer.”  You 
can pick any number between 0% and 100%. [slider scale from 0% -100%] 
[lifepercent] What do you think your personal risk or chance is of getting breast cancer in 
your lifetime?   
Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%.  For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of 
getting breast cancer” and 100% means “completely certain to get breast cancer.”  You 
can pick any number between 0% and 100%. [slider scale from 0% -100%] 
[Perceived risk of a false-positive mammogram] 
A “false positive” happens when a woman has a mammogram that leads to more 
screening, tests, or biopsies, but then finds out she does not have breast cancer.   
[falseposfreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you.  If all of 
you have a mammogram in the next two years, how many of you will have a false 
positive (the need for extra testing that later shows you don’t have cancer)?  
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100] 
[falsepospercent]  If you have a mammogram in the next two years, what do you think 
your personal risk or chance is of having a false positive (the need for extra testing that 
later shows you don’t have cancer)?  
Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%.  For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of 
having a false positive” and 100% means “completely certain to have a false positive.”  
You can pick any number between 0% and 100%. [drop-down list from 0% -100%] 
[page break] 
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[Perceived risk of a positive mammogram] 
[posmammfreq] Picture yourself in a room with 99 other women exactly like you.  If you 
all had a mammogram today, how many of you would have a mammogram that finds 
cancer? 
Please pick any number between 0 and 100. [slider scale from 0-100] 
[posmammpercent] If you had a mammogram today, what do you think your personal 
risk or chance is of having a mammogram that finds cancer?   
Please answer on a scale of 0% to 100%.  For example, 0% means “no risk or chance of 
having a mammogram that finds cancer” and 100% means “completely certain to have a 
mammogram that finds cancer.”  You can pick any number between 0% and 100%. 
[slider scale from 0% -100%] 
[Transportation; Subset adapted from Green & Brock, 2000; similar subsets used 
by Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman, & Cappella, 2012 and by Appel, Gnambs, 
Richter, & Green, 2015] 
[Only asked of conditions receiving comments] 
When answering the following questions, think about the comments you read that were 
left by other readers. How much do you agree with the following statements? 
[trans1] I was mentally involved in the comments while reading them. 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very 
much 
[trans2] The comments affected me emotionally. 
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Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very 
much 
[trans3] The comments are relevant to my everyday life. 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very 
much 
[trans4] After finishing the comments, I found it hard to put them out of my mind. 
Not at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very 
much 
[page break] 
[Affect; PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), select additional items used 
from the PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994), adapted to use the “moment 
instructions”)] 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now (that is, at the present moment).  
[randomize order in which feelings are presented]  
 Very 
slightly or 
not at all 
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
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Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
Surprised 1 2 3 4 5 
Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
Angry 1 2 3 4 5 
Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
Active 1 2 3 4 5 
Afraid 1 2 3 4 5 
Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
Sad 1 2 3 4 5 
Happy 1 2 3 4 5 
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Calm 1 2 3 4 5 
Worried 1 2 3 4 5 
Hopeful 1 2 3 4 5 
 
[Note: The Negative Affect subscale is created by averaging scores for “afraid,” “scared,” 
“nervous,” “jittery,” “irritable,” “hostile,” “guilty,” “ashamed,” “upset,” and “distressed.”  
The Positive Affect subscale is created by averaging scores for “active,” “alert,” 
“attentive,” “determined,” “enthusiastic,” “excited,” “inspired,” “interested,” “proud,” 
and “strong.” Additional words “angry,” “sad,” “happy,” “calm,” and “surprised” were 
added to provide a way to capture hostility, sadness, joviality, serenity, and surprise sub-
scales, respectively.  “Proud,” “hopeful,” and “worried” were added to provide additional 
measures of affect thought to be related to breast cancer messages.] 
[page break] 
[Perceived mammography norms; adapted from Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010] 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
[injnormmammo] Most people who are important to me think I should have a 
mammogram in the next two years. 
 1. strongly disagree 
 2. disagree 
 3. somewhat disagree 
 4. neither agree nor disagree 
 5. somewhat agree 
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 6. agree 
 7. strongly agree 
[injnormpostpone] Most people who are important to me think I should wait until age 50 
to have a mammogram. 
 1. strongly disagree 
 2. disagree 
 3. somewhat disagree 
 4. neither agree nor disagree 
 5. somewhat agree 
 6. agree 
 7. strongly agree 
[descnormmammo] Most women like me will have a mammogram in the next two years. 
 1. strongly disagree 
 2. disagree 
 3. somewhat disagree 
 4. neither agree nor disagree 
 5. somewhat agree 
 6. agree 
 7. strongly agree 
[descnormpostpone] Most women like me will wait until age 50 to have a mammogram. 
 1. strongly disagree 
 2. disagree 
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 3. somewhat disagree 
 4. neither agree nor disagree 
 5. somewhat agree 
 6. agree 
 7. strongly agree 
[page break]  
[Self-efficacy to have a mammogram; adapted from Bandura, 2006] 
[efficacy] Using the following scale, please rate how certain you are that you could…  
 Could 
not 
do at 
all 
    Moderately 
certain I 
could 
    Highly 
certain 
I 
could 
…have a 
mammogram 
in the next 
two years if 
you wanted 
to. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
… wait until 
age 50 to 
have a 
mammogram 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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if you 
wanted to. 
 
[page break] 
[Attitudes toward mammography] 
Complete the sentence by marking your selection on the following dimensions. 
[attmamm] My having a mammogram in the next two years would be… 
 
Useless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Useful 
 
Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Harmless 
 
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
 
[attwait] My waiting until age 50 to have a mammogram would be… 
 
Useless 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Useful 
 
Harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Harmless 
 
Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good 
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[page break] 
[countarg1]  In the space listed below, list all of the risks of having mammograms that 
you can think of. [open-ended] 
[countarg2]  In the space listed below, list all of the benefits of having mammograms 
that you can think of. [open-ended] 
[page break] 
[Attitude conviction; selected items from Abelson, 1988] 
[conviction] How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 S
tro
n
g
ly
 
d
isag
ree 
D
isag
ree 
S
o
m
ew
h
at 
d
isag
ree 
N
eith
er 
ag
ree n
o
r 
d
isag
ree 
S
o
m
ew
h
at ag
ree 
A
g
ree 
S
tro
n
g
ly
 
ag
ree 
My beliefs 
about 
mammograms 
express the 
real me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I think about 
mammograms 
often. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I hold my 
views about 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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mammograms 
very strongly. 
 
[Demographics] 
[edu] What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 1. less than high school 
 2. high school graduate or GED 
 3. some college or technical school 
 4. college graduate or beyond 
[ethnicity]  Are you of Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish origin? 
1. Yes, of Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish origin 
2. No, not of Hispanic, Latino/a, or Spanish origin 
[race]  What is your race? (One or more categories may be selected.) [make this check all 
that apply] 
1. White 
2. Black or African American 
3. American Indian or Alaska Native 
4. Asian 
5. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
[If race is 4 or 5, continue to subrace.  Otherwise, skip to children.] 
[subrace]  What is your sub-race/ethnicity? 
1. Chinese 
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2. Japanese 
3. Filipino 
4. Hawaiian 
5. Other Pacific Islander 
6. Other Asian-American 
[Breast Cancer Risk Factors] 
Please answer the following questions related to your risk factors for breast cancer. 
[children] What was your age at the time of your first live birth of a child?   
 1. I don’t know 
 2. no live births 
 3. younger than 20 years old 
 4. 20 to 24 years old 
 5. 25 to 29 years old 
 6. 30 years old or older 
[period] What was your age at the time of your first menstrual period?   
 1. I don’t know 
 2. 7 to 11 years old 
 3. 12 to 13 years old 
 4. 14 years old or older 
[biopsy] Have you ever had a breast biopsy? 
1. No 
2. Yes 
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3. Don’t know 
 
[If no or don’t know, skip to comments.  Otherwise, continue.] 
[biopsy2] How many breast biopsies (positive or negative) have you had?  
 1. 1 
 2. more than 1 
[biopsy3] Have you had at least one breast biopsy with atypical hyperplasia?  Atypical 
hyperplasia is a benign (noncancerous) condition in which cells look abnormal under a 
microscope and are increased in number. 
 1. no 
2. yes 
3. I don’t know 
[Open-ended comments] 
[comments] Is there anything else you would like to share with us? (Optional) [text box] 
[Debriefing and “thank you” text] 
Thank you for your time and participation.  This survey was designed to find out what 
effects comments appearing with online news articles have on other readers.  Some 
participants saw an article with comments that may have included personal stories about 
mammography, while others did not.  The news article you may have read was an edited 
version of a news article that originally appeared in the New York Times in 2009.  For 
current information about breast cancer prevention, screening, and treatment, please visit 
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http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/breast.  If you are interested in learning more 
about your personal risk for breast cancer, visit http://www.cancer.gov/bcrisktool/.  
 
If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact Holli Seitz 
(hseitz@asc.upenn.edu). 
 
Click the button below (the arrows) to finalize your survey responses and receive credit 
for completing the survey. 
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APPENDIX D 
SAMPLE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION 
 
[Information in brackets was not visible to participants.] 
 
[Instructions for NoComm:] On the following page, you will view a newspaper article 
about breast cancer screening.  Please read it carefully.  You will then be asked a series of 
questions. 
 
[Instructions for conditions with comments:] On the following pages, you will view a 
newspaper article about breast cancer screening and comments submitted by readers.  
Please read them carefully.  You will then be asked a series of questions. 
 
[Composite News Article] 
[Much of this text is taken from “New Guidelines Suggest Cutback in Mammograms,” 
New York Times, November 17, 2009, http://nyti.ms/1zjqHEM.  It has been edited to 
shorten overall length, balance length given to each side of the argument, remove quotes 
and exemplars, and update guidelines.] 
 
Breast Cancer: Who Should Be Screened? 
According to guidelines released by the United States Preventive Services Task Force 
(USPSTF), an independent expert panel, women at average risk for breast cancer 
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should start regular breast cancer screening at age 50 and have mammograms every 
two years.  But other groups disagree.  The American Cancer Society advises that 
women at average risk for breast cancer start screening annually at age 45, and the 
American College of Radiology has said that it will continue to advise women to start 
having annual mammograms at age 40. 
 
Over all, the USPSTF says, the modest benefit of mammograms – reducing the breast 
cancer death rate by 15 percent – must be weighed against the harms. Though many 
women do not think a screening test can be harmful, medical experts say the risks of 
mammograms are real. A test can trigger unnecessary further tests, like biopsies. And 
mammograms can find cancers that grow so slowly that they would never cause harm 
in a woman’s lifetime, resulting in unnecessary treatment. These harms loom larger for 
women in their 40s, who are more likely to experience them than women 50 and older 
and less likely to have breast cancer, tipping the balance of risks and benefits.  The 
Task Force says that beginning screening at age 50 and only screening every two years 
reduces the risks of unnecessary tests and overtreatment. [137 words for beginning 
mammograms at age 50; 2 main arguments: false positives and overdiagnosis] 
 
Despite the USPSTF recommendations, the American Cancer Society and the 
American College of Radiology both continue to recommend that women begin routine 
annual mammograms before age 50.  The cancer society, in a statement, agreed that 
mammography had risks as well as benefits.  They said that the society’s experts had 
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looked at ‘’virtually all’’ the task force and additional data and concluded that the 
benefits of annual mammograms starting at age 45 outweighed the risks.  These 
benefits include early detection, which may result in easier and less invasive 
treatments.  Benefits also include a small reduction in cancer deaths.  One cancer death 
is prevented for every 1,904 women ages 40 to 49 who are screened for 10 years.  This 
reduction in deaths led the American College of Radiology to recommend that women 
begin annual screening at age 40. [136 words against waiting until age 50: 2 main 
arguments: early detection and reduction in cancer deaths] 
 
Experts agree that different women will weigh the harms and benefits differently.  
Faced with these new guidelines, women are advised to talk to their doctors about their 
screening decisions. 
 
 
 
Sample Comments 
 Each experimental condition that receives comments first viewed the composite 
news article.  The next screen presented a series of four comments, which varied in 
composition.  The sets of comments (samples presented in Table D1) were randomly 
drawn from the appropriate banks of comments and randomly ordered prior to the 
beginning of the experiment. 
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Table D1 
Sample Comments by Condition 
Condition Sample comment set 
FPNoEx DH  6 months ago  
 
I'll bet you ten to one that physicians who own mammography units will be 
slower to adopt the new guidelines than those refer out mammograms. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
R.M.  6 months ago  
 
This attitude of many physicians - to continue with mammograms despite the 
new recommendations - is a good example of a big problem of American 
medicine and why we need health care reform to change the fee-for-service 
system. Because doctors a paid a fee for each service, under the current system 
they will continue to get paid for the mammograms and for the unnecessary 
tests and treatment of patients that will follow false positive tests.  No matter 
that the tests there will be many more false positive tests than true positive tests 
in the age group of women 40-49. In that age group, mammograms are 
inefficient both in terms of promoting health and keeping costs down.  But 
consider what would happen if the payment system were reformed payment so 
that doctors would be paid capitation fees for the care of their patients. In that 
case, they would lose profit by doing unnecessary tests and procedures. In that 
case, doctors would take the time and trouble to explain to their women patients 
40-49 why they should not get mammograms. The result would be that fewer 
women would be harmed by testing false positive and the health care system 
would save a lot of money. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Anon 6 months ago  
 
Dr. Phillip Strax was one of the early proponents of mammography. He 
partnered with HIP in New York City's Research Department in the late 1960's 
and early 1970's to study the impact of early detection via mammography on 
women. Dr. Strax I was led to believe became an advocate due to a personal 
loss to breast cancer in his family. He and HIP tried with all their skills and lots 
of funding from the government to show that mammography extended (often 
described by the emotional term 'saved') the lives of those women in significant 
ways. But as with more recent reports the conclusions at best were inconclusive. 
What all these tests come down to is (A) putting the fear of cancer into so-called 
high risk people and (B) driving people to take tests as a way to increase patient 
and  cash flow. Often we hear about the scientific method and its underlying 
value to distinguish allopathic medicine from all the alternatives including 
wellness, healthy lifestyles and improving the air, water and food we use. 
Americans die at alarming rates due to the very medical care received or suffer 
medical injury that is less consequential or eventually leads to restricted lives 
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and death. Some claim that the number of deaths due to medical care received 
runs between 400,000 and 1,000,000 each and every year. More important than 
misinforming women about mammography, men about PSA and everyone 
about useless, dangerous and expensive testing is the need to start a national 
wellness service that increases wellness, healthy life styles and improved air, 
water and food. Reduce alcoholic behavior and many diseases would be 
reduced or eliminated. Stop smoking and heart, lung and cancer diseases would 
drop significantly. Fix our food and how we use it and diabetes, overweight, 
obesity, cancers, heart diseases and other conditions would drop also. Introduce 
needed supplements and many conditions including arthritis would be less 
common. Now do the difficult thing: THINK about wellness. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
swm  6 months ago  
 
One way to get a great 5 year survival rate is to unnecessarily treat healthy 
women who would have otherwise been just fine had never been told they had 
"cancer." Treating as many patients as we do in the USA, most unnecessarily, 
also gives the impression (falsely) that all breast cancer is curable.  For those 
interested, Lancet Oncology reported in July 2008 that the U S had the highest 
national 5 year breast cancer survival rate. Do you think that maybe, somehow, 
perhaps this had something to do with an agressive screening program? 
 
BCNoEx DH  6 months ago  
 
I am always surprised that breast cancer awareness campaigns, and articles 
always look at screenings, detection, research into technologies and medications 
to "eradicate" the cancer...but they rarely take a strong look at the pollutants in 
our world today that are finding their way into women's breast tissue.  In my 
opinion, campaigns for clean water, clean air, organic food, natural beauty care 
products...all of these campaigns should join forces with breast cancer 
prevention and awareness - or actually in fact, the other way around - since 
women's awareness in this country of the issue of breast cancer is so strong and 
the pink-ribbon is so well known, what better way to grab national attention 
about the bigger picture of the toxic environment that we live in and raise our 
children in than to have the breast cancer organizations start to raise our 
awareness of prevention through creating a healthier environment. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  
R.M.  6 months ago  
 
And how does our pannel want young women to be screened, to prevent them 
from falling through the cracks?  What about the 35 year old woman whose 
breast cancer races to stage 3 in 6 months because her hormones are 
appropriately active? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Anon 6 months ago  
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One thing that is not always taken into account is that advanced breast cancers 
are being seen more and more in  younger women - who are too young to get a 
mammogram.  The mammogram could not decrease the number of advanced 
cancer diagnosis if those with the cancer are not actually getting mammograms. 
Older women may be getting diagnosed early because of the mammogram. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
swm  6 months ago  
 
If I were a female, this news would make me want to continue having 
mammography, but instead of reaching for surgery at the first finding of a lump,  
I would wait until a later mammography to decide whether the lump required 
immediate or deferred action. As a male beyond the age of 40,  I'm well aware 
that PSA spikes (which I have experienced), may be short lived, and may be 
meaningless ...  certainly nothing to risk surgery and possible loss of sexual 
function over. 
 
FPEx DH  6 months ago  
 
Women encounter two fears that shake them with regard to the new 
recommendations. There is, most obviously, dread of Cancer; the fact that many 
cancers may be slow-growing and non-life-threatening does little to ameliorate 
that dread.  The second fear is that of relegation to second-class citizen.  The 
inroads made by womens' liberation are not so substantial that there is no 
slippery slope.  There lurks a sad suspicion that women are still expendable, that 
the medical community pays less attention to women than to men and sees less 
need to be truly careful of them.  Only when both of these perceptions die out 
will recommendations of the sort now put forth be regarded with more 
rationality than emotion. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  
R.M.  6 months ago  
  
After an experience a few years ago, at age 52, during which I was given 
several mammograms and two different biopsies, including a surgical one, over 
the course of approximately five months I was left traumatized by the 
experience. Following the last procedure, I was basically told "never mind". 
Even if cancer had been found, it would have been the type that I would "die 
with" rather than "die of". Although I was thrilled not to have any cancer, the 
fear and anxiety caused by this entire experience was overwhelming. I consider 
myself a victim of needless invasive medical malpractice. I no longer have 
mammograms nor do I do self-exams and my trust in modern medicine in 
general remains greatly diminished. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Anon 6 months ago  
 
 
231 
I'm 57 and have had mammograms every 3- 5 years since I was 40. I have no 
family history of breast cancer and none of the other risk factors. Every time I 
get the test I have to go back to be tested again. They have never found 
anything, but this period of waiting is a big waste of time, causes a great deal of 
anxiety and I also worry about the cumulative effects of so much radiation 
giving me cancer.  6 months ago when I had my last mammogram the woman 
who operated the equipment nearly cried when I told her that I hadn't had the 
procedure in 3 years.  "Why, why, why did you wait so long?" she looked at me 
her eyes tearing. The people who support the mammogram industry act like 
they are in a cult.  Why isn't breast cancer or any other cancer for that matter 
detectable in a blood test? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
swm  6 months ago  
 
I am 45 and have had 2 mammograms since I turned 40.  After reading a lot of 
the research, I decided to have a mammogram only every other year.  My 2nd 
mammogram experience was a nightmare.  The technician who performed the 
mammogram was cold, unfriendly, and seemed hurried.  The next day, she 
called me to say that the result was "suspicious" and I needed to come in as 
soon as possible for a follow up.  She would not give me any other information; 
she wouldn't even tell me which breast was abnormal.  Her voice on the phone 
was like ice.  I was in a complete panic and spent the next 24 hours crying and 
thinking that I was going to die.  Even though I found some reassuring 
information on the internet, I also found a lot that terrified me.  So, I went in the 
next day and had a diagnostic mammogram.  Luckily, this time I got a different 
technician.  She was much kinder and more patient, and did a thorough job 
positioning me in the machine.  Waiting there for the radiologist to review my 
scans was the longest 15 minutes of my life. The outcome?  Negative.  The 
technician explained to me that probably some tissue had overlapped in my 
breast during the first scan, because my breast was not sufficiently compressed.  
(The hurried technician...)  I have decided I won't have another mammogram 
until I'm 50. 
BCEx DH  6 months ago  
 
The recommendations of not getting mammograms and not doing breast self 
exams is completely about the insurance companies saving money.  They will 
save millions.  And then there is us.  Well, for one, I would be dead.  DEAD.  I 
am a survivor and it is because of breast self exams and mammograms. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  
R.M.  6 months ago  
  
Women are being advised to discuss the pros and cons of having a mammogram 
before getting one automatically at age 40.  What is so controversial about 
having a woman be informed of her choices before making a medical decision? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 
232 
Anon 6 months ago  
 
No family history, never smoked and not overweight, I had a small, but invasive 
breast cancer found by an alert doctor screening a mammogram. so here I am, 
almost 17 years later...do as you wish and best of luck. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
swm  6 months ago  
 
Bad, bad idea.  I was diagnosed at age 46 with a tiny but extremely aggressive 
cancer via mammogram; it could not be felt in an examination. My last 
mammogram (totally 'clean') had been eighteen months before; now the cancer 
had already spread to the lymph nodes.  After surgery, chemo, and radiation, my 
predicted 10-year survival chances are 92%.  If I had waited until age 50...by 
that time the cancer would probably had already metastasized and I would be 
facing a death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly.  Have your first 
mammogram at age 40 or below (some doctors recommend starting at age 35) 
and keep having them every year.  It could save your life.  I know it saved mine. 
FPExRem DH  6 months ago  
 
It is far too naive to make a blanket statement that private insurance companies 
will continue to support mammography for women under 50 at low risk for 
breast cancer.  They may do it now as a public relations type move but these 
companies, for the most part, bend over backwards to maximize profits.  No one 
knows what will happen in the future as far as their policies. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  
R.M.  6 months ago  
  
Women have been harmed, and I bet they agree with this recommendation.  
These women have had radiologists tell them that an abnormality in their 
mammogram was"99% probability benign" but still recommend a biopsy.  After 
weeks of anxiety and unnecessary surgery, they now have permanent titanium 
foreign bodies in their breasts from the biopsies and each radiologist and 
hospital is several thousand dollars richer.  This is not effective use of our 
health care dollars.  It is CYA medicine. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Anon 6 months ago  
 
Women have been persuaded to undergo biopsies because mammograms 
showed "changes" in micro-calcifications. The biopsies that prove negative 
subject these women to invasive surgery, the costs of second opinions, scarred 
breasts, and psychological terror over a period of months.  These women have 
probably decided to have mammograms less often as a result.  I am convinced 
that while many doctors are quite earnest in their concerns, others are cynically 
simply pulling in more fees for the institutions they work for, usually large 
hospitals. 
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_______________________________________________________________ 
 
swm  6 months ago  
 
Yes, I certainly agree with this.  Mammograms can cause harm - emotional, 
physical, and financial harm.  Women may have a mammogram that comes 
back with "suspicious calcifications" in one spot.  They go back in for more 
views, and an ultrasound.  They have needle biopsies.  Still nothing conclusive.  
Some doctors may even suggest that they have the area surgically removed.  
Some of these women take the "watch and wait" option instead and nothing 
changes over a number of years - in fact, for some, the "suspicious 
calcifications" area seems to disappear.  They are told that they should feel 
lucky and grateful that they didn't have breast cancer after all that.  Strangely, 
many don't feel lucky; they feel suspicious about the whole medical-industrial 
system.  For every real microscopic cancer found, how other many hundreds of 
women will undergo numerous costly tests and be given unneeded surgery 
because of some tiny undefined spot?  How about all the emotional and 
psychological pain of being put on that medical testing treadmill?   It's like they 
give you one test, which leads another test,  which leads to more tests, or to a 
drug, which leads to another drug.  It's no wonder our medical system is so 
costly. 
BCExRem DH  6 months ago  
 
What one needs to understand with these new guidelines is that it acknowledges 
not that screening is useless, but that the tools with which we do screen are not 
adequate at this point. Currently there are no good predictive biomarkers that 
would stratify women into groups that would and would not benefit from early 
mammograms. A large percentage of women diagnosed in the 40s with breast 
cancer had no "risk factors" - again meaning that we probably don't understand 
risk factors enough. Clinical discoveries, in particular in the area of diagnosis, 
are developing rapidly today, as we do understand genetic and genomic risk 
factors more readily. The hope could be that in the near future better technology 
will make screening more accurate, and stratification more possible. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
  
R.M.  6 months ago  
  
Bad, bad idea.  Women in their 40s can be diagnosed with extremely aggressive 
cancer via mammogram; these tumors may not be able to be felt in an 
examination. Some of these women may have even had clean mammograms in 
the last two years, only to then find cancer that has already spread to the lymph 
nodes.  After surgery, chemo, and radiation, these women have a predicted 10-
year survival chances above 90%.  If they had waited until age 50...by that time 
the cancer would probably had already metastasized and they would be facing a 
death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly.  Have your first mammogram at 
age 40 or below (some doctors recommend starting at age 35) and keep having 
them every year.  It could save your life.  It has saved others. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Anon 6 months ago  
 
Good for all of you for whom this is an intellectual exercise. You're lucky. I can 
only tell you what happens to women who are diagnosed with cancer. Every 
year, women in their late 40s, with no family history and no symptoms, are 
being diagnosed with early stage breast cancer after having routine annual 
mammograms. They may have to have a lumpectomy and radiation. If these 
women waited until they felt a lump, or if their first screening had come at 50, I 
doubt their cancer would be found at an early stage. You can manipulate 
statistics in many ways...but these women probably have a different viewpoint 
and will take the mammograms. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
swm  6 months ago  
 
Breast cancer survivors are probably glad they had yearly mammograms.  Some 
of these women may have had tumors that were low-grade, well differentiated, 
and small.  But why would they want to wait until they or another could palpate 
the cancer and  surgery would require more removal of breast tissue and more 
disfigurement.? That counts for something.  Waiting could also result in a 
greater chance of lymphodema if lymph node dissection is required..  Even mild 
lymphodema is a pain.  Most breast cancers, I believe 70-80%, break out of the 
milk ducts  which makes them life threatening at some point.  Why wait?  It's 
not like the majority of prostate cancers which I understand grow so slowly that 
most men will die of something else. Survivors WANT to survive and early 
detection and treatment  is physically and mentally justifiable. 
 
Note. Conditions are as follows: NoInfo = no information control, NoComm = no 
comments control, FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, BCNoEx = 
mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-positive 
comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with 
exemplars, FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed, and 
BCExRem = mammogram-detected breast cancer comments with exemplars removed.   
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APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENTAL COMMENT POOLS 
 
 To construct sets of comments with the content and valence needed for each 
condition, as outlined in Table 4.1, comments were randomly drawn from seven pools of 
comments with 15 comments in each pool: user-generated false positive comments 
without exemplars, user-generated false positive comments with exemplars, false positive 
comments that were rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve content, length, and 
reading level, user-generated mammogram-detected cancer comments without exemplars, 
user-generated mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, mammogram-
detected cancer comments that were rewritten to remove exemplars but preserve content, 
length, and reading level, and neutral comments with no exemplars.  These full comment 
pools are included below in Tables E1 through E6. 
Table E1 
User-Generated False-Positive Comments Without Exemplars 
Comment text Readability 
(Flesch 
Kincaid 
reading 
ease) 
Length 
(in 
words) 
I recently read (in a book entitled The Estrogen Errors, if you're 
interested) that the error rate in interpreting mammograms is 
amazingly high. Even if the test itself is theoretically reliable 
and useful, the chances it's being read accurately are not that 
good. 39.2 45 
Consider that every time you get a mammogram you increase 
the risk of getting breast cancer by 2 percent so in 10 years 
you've increased the risk by 20 percent. Moreover, 70 to 80 
percent of all positive mammograms do not, upon biopsy, show 50.6 71 
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any presence of cancer. Probably more effective in the 
prevention of breast cancer is vitamin D3 intake (it is not 
actually a vitamin but a hormone). 
People need to realize that when they agree to a screening test, 
whatever it is, for heart disease, prostate cancer or breast 
cancer, the overwhelming likelihood is that it will not help them 
as an individual.  Screening is like a lottery, there are many 
players, but very few "winners."  The medical community needs 
to communicate better the true risks and gains from screening.  
If those who offered screening, that is, doctors, actually paid for 
the screening test themselves, I bet we'd see much less 
unnecessary screening of dubious benefit. 47.7 90 
One way to get a great 5 year survival rate is to unnecessarily 
treat healthy women who would have otherwise been just fine 
had never been told they had "cancer." Treating as many 
patients as we do in the USA, most unnecessarily, also gives the 
impression (falsely) that all breast cancer is curable.  For those 
interested, Lancet Oncology reported in July 2008 that the U S 
had the highest national 5 year breast cancer survival rate. Do 
you think that maybe, somehow, perhaps this had something to 
do with an agressive screening program? 49.5 93 
The time has come to take down the tacky pink ribbons and end 
Breast Cancer Awareness Month. Early detection does not save 
lives -- it leads to overdiagnosis and overtreatment. The 
thousands of mammogram screening programs in the US 
provide no benefit to women but are a huge source of revenue 
for the breast cancer industrial complex. Mammogram 
screening programs and the unnecessary treatment of harmless 
conditions are a primary reason why our healthcare costs are the 
highest in the world but our healthcare outcomes are the lowest 
in the developed world. Let us shout from the rooftops that the 
emperor has no clothes.  52.9 103 
For many treatments, but most especially for topical issues like 
breast or prostate cancer, we have allowed "common sense", 
strongly held or stated opinion or self-interest to guide 
recommendations. Only data should be used. Where the answer 
is "we don't know", such should be stated. Fears that this report 
will reduce mammograms assumes that mammograms are 
beneficial. The plural of anecdote is not data. All screening tests 
are a balance of benefit (lifespan or quality of life improved) 
and harms (costs, risks, discomfort, anxiety, false negatives or 
positives). Let us try to keep personal stories, opinions or 
wishes ("It should work!") out of this. What we really need are 
more studies (signal) not more media frenzy (noise).  59.8 119 
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The whole point of this discussion is not denying that there are 
some cases found that save some peoples lives but that many 
many more people undergo unnecessary treatment and often are 
harmed by it. In addition the cost of over-screening is large for 
the nation as a whole.  There is always a balance that has to be 
struck, and there will always be some that live or die as a result 
of that balance.  It is the same in everything we do in life trying 
to protect people from threats. The main thing is that 
researchers are more and more coming to the conclusion that 
mammography is being overused and the trade-offs need to be 
discussed openly. 65.4 120 
there are a lot of women who use this information to say, well, 
I'll just never have a mammogram... which is hardly the 
message that one should take --. But this is the message. 
Screening mammograms lead to unnecessary  followup testing, 
higher diagnosis rates of tiny masses of indolent cells that 
would never have been a problem, unnecessary invasive 
treatments, and most clearly do NOT save lives.  At this point, 
unfortunately, there is a whole industry of mammography, from 
charities raising funds that could have gone to worthwhile 
projects to screening clinics to treatment centers. This 
juggernaut is difficult to stop, especially when so many people 
have careers invested, and when so many women sincerely but 
falsely believe that screening saved them. 50.3 122 
The more "information you have about your own body" that 
comes from someone else, the more likely THEY are to want to 
DO THINGS TO YOU. Most of which will do you no good. 
Take routine prostate screening. Millions of men have had their 
prostates removed, with all the side effects that causes, when 
watchful waiting would have likely done just as well. Maybe 
some of them were saved from death, but statistically, the death  
rate from prostate cancer hasn't changed. In other words, we are 
doing more testing, more procedures and surgeries, but we are 
not changing the number of people who die from cancer. Just 
messing with those who wouldn't have died anyway, and raising 
the cost of health care.  Same with breast cancer. More breast 
irradiation, more tests, more biopsies, not really very many 
more women saved. And truthfully, even if you look at the 
comments here, you will discover many women, if not most, 
find their own tumors when they examine their own breasts. 
Not a doctor. Not a machine. YOU. 80.2 177 
The data was never very good about annual mammograms. 
Medicine often picks up a treatment or technology before 
"prime time" because it seems it ought to work. There are many 73.7 186 
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therapies and beliefs in medicine that have not held up under 
good studies. Why? Because we don't know a lot about the 
complex human body. We are better but we don't know 
everything. In almost 35 years of medicine I have seen a lot 
come and go. We do our best but when we can prove that a 
treatment (or an intervention of any sort) does no good or does 
harm, we should rethink its use.  Not that cost is not a factor in 
screening programs. It always has been. But should we spend 
100 million dollars a year on 100 people to save one live over a 
ten year period? An exaggeration perhaps but it makes the point 
that our system has limits.  Better to spend the limited money 
we have on things that work, like immunization programs and 
better delivery of healthcare. There is no need to see a 
conspiracy in this.  
This attitude of many physicians - to continue with 
mammograms despite the new recommendations - is a good 
example of a big problem of American medicine and why we 
need health care reform to change the fee-for-service system. 
Because doctors a paid a fee for each service, under the current 
system they will continue to get paid for the mammograms and 
for the unnecessary tests and treatment of patients that will 
follow false positive tests.  No matter that the tests there will be 
many more false positive tests than true positive tests in the age 
group of women 40-49. In that age group, mammograms are 
inefficient both in terms of promoting health and keeping costs 
down.  But consider what would happen if the payment system 
were reformed payment so that doctors would be paid capitation 
fees for the care of their patients. In that case, they would lose 
profit by doing unnecessary tests and procedures. In that case, 
doctors would take the time and trouble to explain to their 
women patients 40-49 why they should not get mammograms. 
The result would be that fewer women would be harmed by 
testing false positive and the health care system would save a 
lot of money. 56.6 205 
Heart disease is the number one killer of men and women.  Less 
is known about how to treat women who suffer from heart 
disease (and about how to detect it) because most trials were 
conducted on men.  While the breast cancer awareness folks 
have done an admirable job ensuring we are aware of the risks 
of (and spend more money on) breast cancer detection than just 
about anything else (including other, more fatal cancers), the 
statistics do not support the concept of spending that much time, 
effort and funds to save so (relatively) few when they might 
more effectively be spent on other health screening that would 40.7 216 
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save more lives.  The new breast cancer screening 
recommendations say that women with a family history of 
breast cancer SHOULD work with their physicians to determine 
when it's best to begin mammograms.  For some of the rest of 
us -- who have faithfully done what we were guided to do and 
have endured radiation exposure, angst and painful and invasive 
procedures to prove normal calcifications are not in fact cancer 
-- the new guidelines make eminent sense.  Not to diminish the 
fear some women honestly feel about getting breast cancer, how 
much of that fear might be attributed to the persistent, alarming, 
funds-seeking ways of breast cancer awareness groups?    
It's time to reassess not only routine mammogram screening, but 
also the universal adoption of expensive, flawed screening tests 
that lead to unnecessary procedures and angst. Why were we so 
quick to embrace a measure that costs 3.6 billion/yr (with the 
unnecessary biopsies, mastectomies, chemo and radiation it's 
likely over 4 billion) but provides little measurable benefit?  I 
don't believe that there is a vast conspiracy in place to bilk 
insurers, but mammography (like PSA) screening seems a poor 
use of our health care dollars. The problem is complicated. 
Women whose family or friends have had breast CA, as well as 
survivors concerned about reoccurrence are anxious and 
vulnerable. Even after negative biopsies, many patients remain 
fearful. Radiation and chemo are terrible to endure. The cost of 
a poor screening program is high.  Part of the answer may lie in 
carefully evaluating the sensitivity and specificity of screening 
tests in general populations before universal adoption. 
Evaluations must be balanced. Radiologists performing high 
volumes of mammograms and survivors convinced that a 
mammogram result helped them are not well suited to 
objectively evaluate the test.  The American Cancer Society 
needs to stop acting like a pseudo-scientific lobbying group. 
Not all cancer screening is beneficial. PSA demonstrably 
wasn't, but it took decades for ACS to drop its support of PSA 
screening. How many billions should we invest in 
mammography in the next decade? 44.7 237 
I think women need to be very careful with cancer screening. 
We get incomplete and biased information, slogans, scare 
campaigns and orders, you "should", you "must"...provided by a 
toxic mix of vested interests and politics who don't IMO, care 
about women. I'm constantly shocked by the 
dishonesty/unethical conduct of these programs and the medical 
profession. Most programs are not evidence based and are far 
more likely to harm us. If women want to test, consider an 51.7 251 
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evidence based program, the Dutch and Finns have evidence 
backed cervical screening. The Nordic Cochrane Institute (NCI) 
have produced a brochure on, "The Risks and Benefits of 
Mammograms", it's at their website. Be very careful accepting 
recommendations, especially in countries that engage in non-
evidence based screening, who push medical excess, and ignore 
informed consent (and even consent itself), like the States and 
Australia. Pap testing is not a clinical requirement for the Pill.  
The NCI tell us about 50% of screen detected breast cancers are 
over-diagnosed and any benefit of screening is wiped away by 
women dying from lung cancer/heart attacks after treatment 
with radiotherapy/chemo. So, the risks exceed any benefit.  The 
Dutch will scrap population pap testing and offer instead 5 HPV 
primary tests or HPV self-testing at ages 30,35,40,50 and 60 
and ONLY the roughly 5% who are HPV+ will be offered a 5 
yearly pap test. Most women are having unnecessary pap testing 
and risking excess biopsies/over-treatment. 
Dr. Phillip Strax was one of the early proponents of 
mammography. He partnered with HIP in New York City's 
Research Department in the late 1960's and early 1970's to 
study the impact of early detection via mammography on 
women. Dr. Strax I was led to believe became an advocate due 
to a personal loss to breast cancer in his family. He and HIP 
tried with all their skills and lots of funding from the 
government to show that mammography extended (often 
described by the emotional term 'saved') the lives of those 
women in significant ways. But as with more recent reports the 
conclusions at best were inconclusive. What all these tests come 
down to is (A) putting the fear of cancer into so-called high risk 
people and (B) driving people to take tests as a way to increase 
patient and  cash flow. Often we hear about the scientific 
method and its underlying value to distinguish allopathic 
medicine from all the alternatives including wellness, healthy 
lifestyles and improving the air, water and food we use. 
Americans die at alarming rates due to the very medical care 
received or suffer medical injury that is less consequential or 
eventually leads to restricted lives and death. Some claim that 
the number of deaths due to medical care received runs between 
400,000 and 1,000,000 each and every year. More important 
than misinforming women about mammography, men about 
PSA and everyone about useless, dangerous and expensive 
testing is the need to start a national wellness service that 
increases wellness, healthy life styles and improved air, water 
and food. Reduce alcoholic behavior and many diseases would 52.2 332 
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be reduced or eliminated. Stop smoking and heart, lung and 
cancer diseases would drop significantly. Fix our food and how 
we use it and diabetes, overweight, obesity, cancers, heart 
diseases and other conditions would drop also. Introduce 
needed supplements and many conditions including arthritis 
would be less common. Now do the difficult thing: THINK 
about wellness.  
Average 54.3 157.8 
 
Table E2 
User-Generated False-Positive Comments with Exemplars 
Comment text Readability 
(Flesch 
Kincaid 
reading 
ease) 
Length 
(in 
words) 
I have had the mandatory mammagrams. Always show lump in 
my dense breasts. Then have ultrasound that shows its nothing - 
they think. I then have to make a huge fuss to avoid every 
second mammogram because of the protocol that says it comes 
first.  All that extra radiation for nothing. 
71.5 50 
I am one of the women who was harmed, and I agree with this.  
My radiologist at Lenox Hill told me I had an abnormality in 
my mammogram that was "99% probability benign" but still 
recommended a biopsy.  Two weeks of anxiety and one 
unnecessary surgery later, I now have a permanent titanium 
foreign body in my breast and both she and the hospital are 
several thousand dollars richer.  This is not effective use of our 
health care dollars.  It is CYA medicine. 
55.4 83 
15 years ago, I was also persuaded to undergo a biopsy because 
the mammogram showed "changes" in micro-calcifications. The 
biopsy proved negative but subjected me to invasive surgery, 
the costs of second opinions, a scarred breast, and psychological 
terror over a period of nearly two months.  I am convinced that 
while many doctors are quite earnest in their concerns, others 
are cynically simply pulling in more fees for the institutions 
they work for, usually large hospitals. I have since restricted my 
mammograms to once every 3-4 years. 
39.8 89 
the whole breast cancer industrial complex is suspicious...all the 
pink, all the walks and runs, all the mammograms, but after all 
the billions of dollars it's still as deadly as ever, but with a 
58.6 93 
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strong genetic component. My wife was a faithful screener, but 
also very vulnerable to stress, and each year her mammgram put 
her through a few weeks of hell, not to mention two useIess 
biopsies that scarred her mentally and physically. The many 
studies showing the harmful results of stress should get as much 
attention as any others. 
My last mammogram showed something suspicious. I was 
rushed into an ultrasound for better diagnosis. Then a biopsy 
and it turned out to be nothing. Nothing except $900 out of my 
pocket. Every other year is fine with me. Maybe every second 
year even.  I blame the insurance companies for pushing all of 
the "preventive wellness" testing done. Supposedly to save them 
money - which is untrue. My grandmother refused 
mammograms. She also refused to have a mole removed from 
her face that the doctors told her would soon become cancerous 
if not removed. My beloved grandma passed away at the age of 
92, with the mole intact and never a mammogram.  
67 111 
Years ago I had a false alarm from a routine screening 
mammogram. It took a month to learn that the technician had 
not done the mammogram correctly -- a month of pure hell for 
me. I was in my early 40s and had elementary school- age 
children. Ironically, the several compounded mistakes that 
delayed the " all-clear" ultimately were chalked up to the fact 
that my initial screening and subsequent, delayed diagnostic 
exam were performed during October, "Breast Cancer 
Awareness" month. The clinics had hired badly trained 
temporary workers to handle the additional women who came 
in during the "awareness" month. These badly trained workers 
made several mistakes in my case that weren't uncovered until 
my ordeal finally ended.  
47.4 119 
No one mentioned the impact the refusal of women to get 
regular mammograms would have on the income of doctors and 
imaging clinics. It would be devastating for them.  I noticed 
many years ago that my mammograms always had to be 
repeated after a proper period of sleepless nights. Nevertheless, 
I had mammograms because my doctor would not let me have 
the hormone replacement therapy she told me  I could not live 
without until I had that mammogram first.  I no longer take 
advise from doctors, I am 72 and I am doing what kept my 
relatives alive and healthy in to their 80s and 90s - I stay away 
from doctors unless I have a broken bone or an open wound.. 
56.4 121 
After an experience a few years ago, at age 52, during which I 
was given several mammograms and two different biopsies, 
including a surgical one, over the course of approximately five 
51.7 122 
 
243 
months I was left traumatized by the experience. Following the 
last procedure, I was basically told "never mind". Even if cancer 
had been found, it would have been the type that I would "die 
with" rather than "die of". Although I was thrilled not to have 
any cancer, the fear and anxiety caused by this entire experience 
was overwhelming. I consider myself a victim of needless 
invasive medical malpractice. I no longer have mammograms 
nor do I do self-exams and my trust in modern medicine in 
general remains greatly diminished.  
I'm 57 and have had mammograms every 3- 5 years since I was 
40. I have no family history of breast cancer and none of the 
other risk factors. Every time I get the test I have to go back to 
be tested again. They have never found anything, but this period 
of waiting is a big waste of time, causes a great deal of anxiety 
and I also worry about the cumulative effects of so much 
radiation giving me cancer.  6 months ago when I had my last 
mammogram the woman who operated the equipment nearly 
cried when I told her that I hadn't had the procedure in 3 years.  
"Why, why, why did you wait so long?" she looked at me her 
eyes tearing. The people who support the mammogram industry 
act like they are in a cult.  Why isn't breast cancer or any other 
cancer for that matter detectable in a blood test?  
71.3 159 
So, OK -- mammograms don't work. We've been sold a bill of 
goods, billions down the drain for no protection. And before 
that, self-exams -- pushed EXTREMELY for DECADES by 
doctors, nurses, hospitals, advertising, cancer organizations -- 
all a waste of time. Even when done by a doctor.  How many 
times did my OB-GYN yell at me -- do your self exams...get 
your mammogram....so I did. Faithfully. Since age 35.  It did 
find a couple of small benign tumors in the first one at 35 -- had 
them removed -- never came back. So, I'm onto 20 years of 
having mammograms, all but the first "clean" -- I guess they did 
no good. How much radiation have I had unnecessarily????   
And the worst thing, not mentioned here: this was all sold to 
American women with the idea that we could SAVE OUR 
OWN LIVES by early detection and prevention....how'd that 
work out? Epic fail. Now that means -- THERE IS NOTHING, 
absolutely nothing, YOU CAN DO TO PREVENT BREAST 
CANCER.  Just sit there...wait until you get it....then 
die.Thanks, Medical Establishment, for nothing. 
79.6 186 
I have learned that in many instances, the medical establishment 
often provides conflicting advice, almost guess-like. I also have 
declined mammograms, having had only two by age 56, both 
required before an overseas posting. I get annual reminders 
46.6 191 
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which go ignored as there has been no breast cancer in my 
family and a sister underwent a frightening month before a false 
positive biopsy determination.  I have also taken the same 
approach to physicals, typically getting one every five years or 
so, usually when required by overseas postings.  While I haven't 
needed to do much medical research into specific conditions, I 
have done lots of research into nutrition after seeing Food,Inc. 
and have been stunned by the wealth of misinformation bandied 
about by the government and corporations on which the medical 
establishment is mostly silent, even though nutrition affects the 
most basic standard of health.  Since moving to a whole food, 
plant-based diet, my family hasn't even suffered a cold in three 
years. I wish we could get a break on health insurance that we 
do as safe drivers from auto insurers, since we rarely use it....  
Yes, I can certainly relate to (and agree with) this.  
Mammograms can cause harm - emotional, physical, and 
financial harm.   It's been about 12 years now for me; I had a 
mammogram that came back with "suspicious calcifications" in 
one spot.   I went back in for more views, and an ultrasound.  I 
had needle biopsies.  Still nothing conclusive.  I remember a 
doctor suggesting that I have the area surgically removed.   I 
took the "watch and wait" option instead.   I've been waiting 
now for 12 years and nothing has changed - in fact the 
"suspicious calcifications" area seems to have disappeared.  I'm 
told that I should feel lucky and grateful that I didn't have breast 
cancer after all that.  Strangely I don't feel lucky; I feel 
suspicious about the whole medical-industrial system.  For 
every real microscopic cancer found, how other many hundreds 
of women will undergo numerous costly tests and be given 
unneeded surgery because of some tiny undefined spot?  How 
about all the emotional and psychological pain of being put on 
that medical testing treadmill?   It's like they give you one test, 
which leads another test,  which leads to more tests, or to a 
drug, which leads to another drug.  It's no wonder our medical 
system is so costly.   
62.8 215 
I am 45 and have had 2 mammograms since I turned 40.  After 
reading a lot of the research, I decided to have a mammogram 
only every other year.  My 2nd mammogram experience was a 
nightmare.  The technician who performed the mammogram 
was cold, unfriendly, and seemed hurried.  The next day, she 
called me to say that the result was "suspicious" and I needed to 
come in as soon as possible for a follow up.  She would not give 
me any other information; she wouldn't even tell me which 
breast was abnormal.  Her voice on the phone was like ice.  I 
68.6 238 
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was in a complete panic and spent the next 24 hours crying and 
thinking that I was going to die.  Even though I found some 
reassuring information on the internet, I also found a lot that 
terrified me.  So, I went in the next day and had a diagnostic 
mammogram.  Luckily, this time I got a different technician.  
She was much kinder and more patient, and did a thorough job 
positioning me in the machine.  Waiting there for the radiologist 
to review my scans was the longest 15 minutes of my life. The 
outcome?  Negative.  The technician explained to me that 
probably some tissue had overlapped in my breast during the 
first scan, because my breast was not sufficiently compressed.  
(The hurried technician...)  I have decided I won't have another 
mammogram until I'm 50.   
I was a victim of an over zealous system designed to over 
diagnose breast cancer and profit from the measures necessary 
to treat it.  In 2006, at age 43 had my first mammogram.  I was 
subsequently called back to have a 2nd screening done based on 
something that looked abnormal.  After the 2nd level of 
screening, was told I needed a biopsy.  I first had a radiologist 
insert a needle gun into my breast and inject a small pea size 
metal pellet at the exact site of the abnormal looking breast 
tissue.  This was done as a marker for the biopsy and to pull out 
a very small amount of tissue to send to the lab.  Long story 
short, the very small biopsy was inconclusive, but the 
experience was dreadful.  The radiologist hit an artery and I lost 
a lot of blood there on the table.  It left the whole right side of 
my chest bruised.  Next, I scheduled my "biopsy" which I 
thought would be a simple procedure in-office.  However, I 
found out what they were calling "biopsy" was actually referred 
to by surgeons as a lumpectomy.  This required it be done in a 
hospital under general anesthesia.  When all was said and done, 
the diagnosis was not cancer, but rather a fibro-adenoma.  In 
other words, nothing to be concerned with.  As a result, I now 
have a permanent scar on my right breast and I no longer have 
symmetry, which has been very disturbing to me and has eroded 
my confidence. 
64.8 255 
I have been baffled at the volume of physicians who came out 
with knee-jerk reactions to this study--a surprising anti-
intellectual response. I think there are two things operating 
there: 1) many physicians took the minimum statistics required, 
and forgot most of it, and do not have a very good 
understanding of probability and statistics, and 2) there's a well-
known psychological bias that causes people to overestimate the 
likelihood of an event if they have had a personal experience of 
55.8 341 
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that event. Hence, the "it happened to one of my patients so it 
must be something everyone should be concerned about" 
attitude. General public has this problem too. The "my 
mother/sister/aunt/friend/teacher had this happen, so I need to 
be concerned about it as well"•. If we're going to use this as a 
rationale for potentially invasive screening, we should be 
getting routine lumbar punctures to screen for MS, or having 
routine EKGs to screen for potential heart problems. I think 
there's a case to be made for "enough".  And yes, I know people 
who have met an untimely end to breast cancer. They all were 
either in a population that doesn't get screened at all (20s) or 
had been having mammograms routinely that nevertheless 
didn't uncover the cancer until it was too late. I had a false 
positive on my first mammo, and my second, and my third. I 
did a pile of research and arrived at the conclusion that 
fibrocystic breasts were much more likely than any cancerous 
condition. And I resisted and will continue to resist a biopsy. I 
have also concluded that even if this "suspicous"• mass in my 
breast IS cancer, I will not do anything about it-- it hasn't been 
changing for years, and if it is cancer, it's clearly one of the 
super slow-moving and possibly never a problem cancers. The 
personal costs of getting it treated well outweigh any shreds of 
concern I might have over it. 
Average 59.8 158.2 
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Some women have had the mandatory mammagrams that then 
show lumps in their dense breasts. Then they have ultrasounds 
that show its nothing - the doctors think. Then women have to 
make a huge fuss to avoid every second mammogram because 
of the protocol that says it comes first.  All that extra radiation 
for nothing. 67.8 54 
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Women have been harmed, and I bet they agree with this 
recommendation.  These women have had radiologists tell them 
that an abnormality in their mammogram was"99% probability 
benign" but still recommend a biopsy.  After weeks of anxiety 
and unnecessary surgery, they now have permanent titanium 
foreign bodies in their breasts from the biopsies and each 
radiologist and hospital is several thousand dollars richer.  This 
is not effective use of our health care dollars.  It is CYA 
medicine. 42.4 78 
Women have been persuaded to undergo biopsies because 
mammograms showed "changes" in micro-calcifications. The 
biopsies that prove negative subject these women to invasive 
surgery, the costs of second opinions, scarred breasts, and 
psychological terror over a period of months.  These women 
have probably decided to have mammograms less often as a 
result.  I am convinced that while many doctors are quite 
earnest in their concerns, others are cynically simply pulling in 
more fees for the institutions they work for, usually large 
hospitals.  35.9 83 
the whole breast cancer industrial complex is suspicious...all the 
pink, all the walks and runs, all the mammograms, but after all 
the billions of dollars it's still as deadly as ever, but with a 
strong genetic component. Some women are faithful screeners, 
but also very vulnerable to stress, and each year their 
mammgrams put them through a few weeks of hell, not to 
mention useless biopsies that scar them mentally and 
physically. The many studies showing the harmful results of 
stress should get as much attention as any others. 58.2 91 
Some women have a mammogram that shows something 
suspicious and are rushed into an ultrasound for better 
diagnosis. Then a biopsy and it turns out to be nothing. Nothing 
except $900 out of their pocket. Every other year is fine. Maybe 
every second year even.  I blame the insurance companies for 
pushing all of the "preventive wellness" testing done. 
Supposedly to save them money - which is untrue. There are 
women who have refused mammograms. They may have also 
refused things like having pre-cancerous moles removed.  These 
women then go on to live to old ages, with suspicious moles 
intact and having never had a mammogram.  65.2 106 
Women can have false alarms from routine screening 
mammograms. In some cases, it's because technicians have not 
done the mammogram correctly, but it can take a month to 
figure this out -- a month of pure hell.  Some of these women 
are in their early 40s and have elementary school- age children. 53.7 116 
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Ironically, sometimes the mistakes that delay the " all-clear" can 
be chalked up to the fact that many screenings and diagnostic 
exams are performed during October, "Breast Cancer 
Awareness" month. The clinics hire badly trained temporary 
workers to handle the additional women who come in during 
the "awareness" month. These badly trained workers can make 
mistakes that may not be discovered until much later. 
No one mentioned the impact the refusal of women to get 
regular mammograms would have on the income of doctors and 
imaging clinics. It would be devastating for them.  I've noticed 
that for some women, mammograms always have to be repeated 
after a proper period of sleepless nights. Nevertheless, these 
women have mammograms because their doctors have told 
them they have to for one reason or another.  These women may 
want to no longer take advise from doctors, but instead may do 
what keeps people alive and healthy in to their 80s and 90s - 
stay away from doctors unless they have a broken bone or an 
open wound.. 59.7 109 
Women in their early 50s can have experiences where they are 
given several mammograms and multiple biopsies, including 
surgical ones, over the course of several months.  These women 
are left traumatized by their experiences. Then, following these 
procedures, they are basically told "never mind". Even if cancer 
had been found, it would have been the type that they would 
"die with" rather than "die of". Although these women are 
probably thrilled not to have any cancer, the fear and anxiety 
caused by this entire experience is overwhelming. I consider 
these women victims of needless invasive medical malpractice. 
These experiences probably lead them to no longer have 
mammograms or do self-exams and their trust in modern 
medicine in general likely remains greatly diminished.  50.8 123 
There are some women who are in their late 50s and have had 
mammograms every 3- 5 years since they were 40.  They have 
no family history of breast cancer and none of the other risk 
factors, yet every time they get the test they have to go back to 
be tested again. The radiologists never find anything, but this 
period of waiting is a big waste of time, causes a great deal of 
anxiety and I also worry about the cumulative effects of so 
much radiation giving these women cancer.  I've heard of 
women being asked by technicians with tears in their eyes why 
they haven't had the procedure in several years , "Why, why, 
why did you wait so long?"  The people who support the 
mammogram industry act like they are in a cult.  Why isn't 60.5 154 
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breast cancer or any other cancer for that matter detectable in a 
blood test?  
So, OK -- mammograms don't work. We've been sold a bill of 
goods, billions down the drain for no protection. And before 
that, self-exams -- pushed EXTREMELY for DECADES by 
doctors, nurses, hospitals, advertising, cancer organizations -- 
all a waste of time. Even when done by a doctor.  How many 
times are women yelled at by their OB-GYNs -- do your self 
exams...get your mammogram....so they do. Faithfully. Some 
since their mid-30s.  Some of these women have had small 
benign tumors removed that never came back. So, they're onto 
20 years of having mammograms, most of them "clean" -- I 
guess they did no good. How much radiation have they had 
unnecessarily????   And the worst thing, not mentioned here: 
this was all sold to American women with the idea that we 
could SAVE OUR OWN LIVES by early detection and 
prevention....how'd that work out? Epic fail. Now that means -- 
THERE IS NOTHING, absolutely nothing, YOU CAN DO TO 
PREVENT BREAST CANCER.  Just sit there...wait until you 
get it....then die.Thanks, Medical Establishment, for nothing. 78.5 181 
I have learned that in many instances, the medical establishment 
often provides conflicting advice, almost guess-like. Some 
women have declined mammograms, or have maybe had only a 
couple when they were required for some reason.  They may 
choose to ignore annual reminders because they have no breast 
cancer in their family or they know someone who has had a 
frightening false positive biopsy determination.  Some women 
have also taken the same approach to physicals, typically 
getting one every five years or so, usually when required for 
work .  While I haven't needed to do much medical research 
into specific conditions, I have done lots of research into 
nutrition after seeing Food,Inc. and have been stunned by the 
wealth of misinformation bandied about by the government and 
corporations on which the medical establishment is mostly 
silent, even though nutrition affects the most basic standard of 
health.  People who move to a whole food, plant-based diet, 
have families that are healthier and suffer from colds less 
frequently.  They should get a break on health insurance like 
safe drivers do from auto insurers, since they rarely use it....  48 188 
Yes, I certainly agree with this.  Mammograms can cause harm 
- emotional, physical, and financial harm.  Women may have a 
mammogram that comes back with "suspicious calcifications" 
in one spot.  They go back in for more views, and an ultrasound.  
They have needle biopsies.  Still nothing conclusive.  Some 60 203 
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doctors may even suggest that they have the area surgically 
removed.  Some of these women take the "watch and wait" 
option instead and nothing changes over a number of years - in 
fact, for some, the "suspicious calcifications" area seems to 
disappear.  They are told that they should feel lucky and 
grateful that they didn't have breast cancer after all that.  
Strangely, many don't feel lucky; they feel suspicious about the 
whole medical-industrial system.  For every real microscopic 
cancer found, how other many hundreds of women will undergo 
numerous costly tests and be given unneeded surgery because 
of some tiny undefined spot?  How about all the emotional and 
psychological pain of being put on that medical testing 
treadmill?   It's like they give you one test, which leads another 
test,  which leads to more tests, or to a drug, which leads to 
another drug.  It's no wonder our medical system is so costly.   
Some women in their mid-40s may have only had a couple of 
mammograms since turning 40.  After reading a lot of the 
research, they have decided to have a mammogram only every 
other year.  For some, the mammogram experience is a 
nightmare.  I have heard of some women who have experienced 
mammogram technicians who were cold, unfriendly, and 
seemed hurried.  Then they get a call from an icy technician to 
say that the result was "suspicious" and they need to come in as 
soon as possible for a follow up.  They may not even be given 
any other information, like which breast was abnormal.  These 
women then spend the time until their follow-up in a complete 
panic, crying and thinking that they are going to die.  Even 
though they can find some reassuring information on the 
internet, they will also find a lot that will terrify them.  So, then 
they go in and have a diagnostic mammogram.  If they are 
lucky, they might get a different technician who is kinder, more 
patient, and thorough. Even still, waiting there for the 
radiologist to review their scans seems like the longest 15 
minutes of their lives. The outcome?  Negative.  These women 
are then told that probably some tissue had overlapped in their 
breast during the first scan, because the breast was not 
sufficiently compressed.  No wonder many of these women 
decide not to have another mammogram until they're 50.   65.1 240 
There are women who are victims of an over zealous system 
designed to over diagnose breast cancer and profit from the 
measures necessary to treat it.  These women have their first 
mammograms in their 40s and are subsequently called back to 
have a 2nd screening done based on something that looks 
abnormal.  After the 2nd level of screening, they are told they 61.4 258 
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need a biopsy.  First they have a radiologist insert a needle gun 
into their breast and inject a small pea size metal pellet at the 
exact site of the abnormal looking breast tissue.  This is done as 
a marker for the biopsy and to pull out a very small amount of 
tissue to send to the lab.  Long story short, the very small 
biopsy may be inconclusive, but the experience can be dreadful.  
Sometimes, women can lose a lot of blood there on the table 
and have complications that leave the whole side of their chest 
bruised.  Then, they schedule "biopsies," which one might think 
would be a simple procedure in-office.  However,  what they 
call a "biopsy" is actually referred to by surgeons as a 
lumpectomy.  This is required to be done in a hospital under 
general anesthesia.  When all is said and done, the diagnosis 
may not even be cancer, but rather something like a fibro-
adenoma.  In other words, nothing to be concerned with.  As a 
result, some of these women now have permanent scars on their 
breasts and may no longer have symmetry, which can be very 
disturbing and erode their confidence. 
I have been baffled at the volume of physicians who came out 
with knee-jerk reactions to this study--a surprising anti-
intellectual response. I think there are two things operating 
there: 1) many physicians took the minimum statistics required, 
and forgot most of it, and do not have a very good 
understanding of probability and statistics, and 2) there's a well-
known psychological bias that causes people to overestimate the 
likelihood of an event if they have had a personal experience of 
that event. Hence, the "it happened to one of my patients so it 
must be something everyone should be concerned about" 
attitude. General public has this problem too. The "my 
mother/sister/aunt/friend/teacher had this happen, so I need to 
be concerned about it as well"•. If we're going to use this as a 
rationale for potentially invasive screening, we should be 
getting routine lumbar punctures to screen for MS, or having 
routine EKGs to screen for potential heart problems. I think 
there's a case to be made for "enough". And yes, I know people 
who have met an untimely end to breast cancer. They all were 
either in a population that doesn't get screened at all (20s) or 
had been having mammograms routinely that nevertheless 
didn't uncover the cancer until it was too late.  Some women 
have false positives on their first mammo, and their second, and 
their third. After doing a pile of research, they arrive at the 
conclusion that fibrocystic breasts are much more likely than 
any cancerous condition. Some of these women have resisted 
and will continue to resist a biopsy.  They may have even 55.4 342 
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concluded that if the "suspicous"• mass in their breast IS 
cancer, they will not do anything about it-- if it hasn't been 
changing for years, and it is cancer, it's clearly one of the super 
slow-moving and possibly never a problem cancers. The 
personal costs of getting it treated may well outweigh any 
shreds of concern they have.  
Average 57.5 155.1 
 
Table E4 
User-Generated Mammogram-Detected Cancer Comments without Exemplars 
Comment text 
Readability 
(Flesch 
Kincaid 
reading 
ease) 
Length 
(in 
words) 
And how does our pannel want young women to be screened, 
to prevent them from falling through the cracks?  What about 
the 35 year old woman whose breast cancer races to stage 3 
in 6 months because her hormones are appropriately active? 72.7 42 
Early detection not only saves lives, it may lead to 
discovering earlier cancers and lead to more breast-
conserving therapy. clearly as chemo gets better, the benefit 
of any screening will be lessened. We should continue to 
improve treatment for more advanced disease. Saving 18000 
lives with screening seems like a good thing to me.     65.2 55 
Thank you for this information.  But how can anyone imagine 
it would be ethical to dissuade women from looking for (and 
treating) tumors until there is some way to tell which ones are 
"harmless."  It would be like telling kids it is ok to cross the 
road with their eyes closed, since they probably won't get hit 
by a truck anyway. 72.6 62 
One thing that is not always taken into account is that 
advanced breast cancers are being seen more and more in  
younger women - who are too young to get a mammogram.  
The mammogram could not decrease the number of advanced 
cancer diagnosis if those with the cancer are not actually 
getting mammograms. Older women may be getting 
diagnosed early because of the mammogram. 55.3 63 
But when the opponents of regular  screening say that 
mammograms find many small tumors that would never 
become life-threatening they admit--if they are honest--that 47.8 67 
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they cannot say for certain which these cases are. Is it their 
contention that no lives are ever saved by treating small 
localized tumors found in regular screening and that none of 
these tumors if ignored would become life-threatening? 
I am shocked at how easily human lives are treated as just 
units of statistics. In my opinion, if (and this is a very big IF: 
a true scientific, fully independent analysis is necessary) 
saving even a single LIFE calls for testing 1900 women in 10 
years it is worth doing it. Lives are reduced to statistics in 
authoritarian regimes. In our democratic society every life 
must be considered sacred. 51.3 70 
I've never read a more contradictory or rediculous premise as 
that forwarded in this article.  The panel recommends a 
change, yet admits that the death rate from breast cancer is 
REDUCED when mammography is performed regularly from 
age 40 onwards.  Having witnessed my radiologist spouse 
diagnose breast cancer in young women time and time again, 
I can only say--don't let number crunchers make medical 
decision.  Statistics can be terribly deceiving.    46.9 73 
Are they out of their minds?  Have you gone to the forums at 
the cancer boards and read the forums.  A lot more women 
under 40 are getting breast cancer on a daily basis. Cutting 
back on mammograms might work for some people, but do 
you want to wait 2 years before you next one and then find 
out you have a stage IV cancer instead of a stage One? Get a 
grip on reality folks.  People are dying from cancer, not from 
'overtreatment' 83.9 84 
If I were a female, this news would make me want to 
continue having mammography, but instead of reaching for 
surgery at the first finding of a lump,  I would wait until a 
later mammography to decide whether the lump required 
immediate or deferred action. As a male beyond the age of 
40,  I'm well aware that PSA spikes (which I have 
experienced), may be short lived, and may be meaningless ...  
certainly nothing to risk surgery and possible loss of sexual 
function over. 55.5 84 
Maybe it's all about the coming government health care.  
They keep telling us that THEY are going to make "health 
care" cheaper.  Fewer mammograms will definitely cut costs, 
but will the true costs be seen in more radical surgery to 
rectify not catching the cancer earlier with mammograms in 
the first place.  About the only thing that this NEW health 
care is going to afford for women is an abortion...those we 71.9 91 
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will be able to have, but no early breast cancer detection.  
That's government for you.....stupid, stupid. 
I agree with the Harvard Professor of Medicine who said in 
this morning's Times, "This is crazy." I know of women who 
have been helped or who are dying from breast cancer. 
Without those mammograms what of the ones saved? Why 
are we doing to the women in health care what sounds so 
severe. Men determine whether abortions can be obtained 
with government funds. Now we have a panel that tells them 
about their breasts. How many women on the panel have 
suffered or had problems? This is exactly what the tea 
baggers and the Republicans and Fundamentalists and the 
Limbaughs and Becks want to hear. 75.5 107 
As a radiologist/mammographer I am astonished by the 
recommendations. Anxiety generated from a negative biopsy 
is nowhere near equivalent to missing a cancer. And why 
shouldn't women perform breast self examination? Granted it 
is a crude test, but it costs nothing and what is the alternative? 
Doing nothing?  Treating a person is different than treating a 
population. I have diagnosed too many women in their 40's 
with aggressive cancer, caught early to agree with the 
conclusions of this study. This basically says that let's not try 
and detect breast cancer in women in their 40's, it costs too 
much, both emotionally and financially. Good luck, we'll help 
you when you get to 50, maybe! 57.2 120 
Women please, please, please do not stop getting your 
screening mammograms! The death rate from breast cancer 
had been unchanged for 50 years until mammography 
screening began in the mid-1980's.  Soon after the death rate 
began to fall.  Each year there are now more than 30% fewer 
deaths each year as a result of early detection.  Therapy has 
improved, but therapy saves lives when breast cancers are 
found early.  The data clearly show that screening women 
beginning at the age of 40 saves the most lives and the most 
years of life lost to breast cancer.  It is completely cost 
effective.  The arguments against screening such as massive 
overdiagnosis have been fabricated.  Mammography is not 
perfect, but it is saving thousands of lives each year.  We 
need to move away from poor peer review and back to 
science based practice.  Annual mammography screening is 
the best advice that we can provide to women. 71.9 155 
Being of a suspicious nature, I tend to think this is another 
trick on women's health care. Another way for the insurance 
companies to spend less, kill more. But, beyond all this, it is 73.9 162 
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odd that these (are they doctors?) people in the federal 
government have decided to confuse and worry the issue of 
breast cancer. It doesn't take much to see that mammograms 
do detect breast cancer and do stop women from dying. And- 
what is really astounding is the discrediting of self-exams. 
What the!? If a woman has no insurance, she doesn't get a 
yearly physical. Therefore she does not get a breast exam by 
a doctor. If she has not been told to use breast self exams, 
how will she know if she has cancer until too late. It is 
another insane political game using women's health rights to 
smoke screen the real danger which is NO HEALTH CARE 
REFORMATION, NO UNIVERSAL SINGLE PLAYER. 
The recommendations, issued Monday by a federal advisory 
panel, reversed widely promoted guidelines and were 
intended to reduce overtreatment.  Issued by a federal 
advisory panel....hmmmm. My prediction is that this will be 
the first of many "federal advisory" panels to come.  Let's see 
next it will be heart screenings, prostate sreenings, blood 
tests, etc.  I mean really it's only 1 life in 2000.... come on 
now folks it really isn't that big of a deal. This is the 
beginning of rationing.  If you think medicine is all about 
money now wait until the government takes over.  Sorry but I 
still trust my doctor more then any politician or "federal 
advisory" board to tell me what I should and shouldn't do.  
Unfortunately I've known too many people who have gotten 
cancer but luckily enough were saved by early discovery.  
Until something better comes along the recommendations 
should remain the same.  If this is change we can believe in 
you can keep it. 63.1 167 
Average 64.3 93.5 
 
Table E5 
User-Generated Mammogram-Detected Cancer Comments with Exemplars 
Comment text  
Readability 
(Flesch 
Kincaid 
reading 
ease) 
Length 
(in 
words) 
No family history, never smoked and not overweight, I had a 
small, but invasive breast cancer found by an alert doctor 72.7 40 
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screening a mammogram. so here I am, almost 17 years 
later...do as you wish and best of luck. 
The recommendations of not getting mammograms and not 
doing breast self exams is completely about the insurance 
companies saving money.  They will save millions.  And then 
there is us.  Well, for one, I would be dead.  DEAD.  I am a 
survivor and it is because of breast self exams and 
mammograms.   72.1 51 
At age 39, a tumor too small to be felt was found by 
mamography, removed, and today I am alive and cancer free. 
Statistically speaking, yes, it may be seem that doing 
screening tests on younger women isn't worth the effort and 
price tag .... UNLESS IT IS YOUR LIFE THAT IS 
SAVED!!! Patients are not statistics, they are individuals. 70.4 60 
A mammogram at the age of 41 found suspicious sites that 
later turned out to be LCIS, DCIS and an invasive carcinoma 
(stage zero). After much agonizing (and a lumpectomy), I 
decided to have a mastectomy. There has been no recurrence 
since (I am now 50). So far as I am concerned, the 
mammogram detected cancer early enough to save my life. 61.5 62 
I can only tell this: I am one of the millions of women all 
over the world that are still alive thanks to a mammography 
at 4O. I had breast cancer two years ago with 41. I imagine 
my no future if the doctors and the authorities heard to this 
panel. Please, be careful with such recommendations. We are 
talking about life and death.  76.2 64 
I had a "routine" mammogram and they discovered a golf ball 
sized aggressive cancer.  Without the mammogram I would 
not have known.  I have finished my treatments and I would 
encourage women over 40 be screened because I felt great 
and had no idea I had cancer.  No a mammogram is not a cure 
but it does help us find out something is wrong.  How dare 
you say otherwise  80 69 
This has nothing to do with the statistics, but mammography 
detected a very small lump for me (undetectable from the 
outside), and, after a lumpectomy, spurred a genetic test that 
revealed that I was BRCA positive. Now, after a double 
mastectomy and a hysterectomy, my risks for breast and 
ovarian cancers are lower than average. My mother and my 
aunt died of ovarian and breast cancer. That mammogram 
definitely saved my life. 48.7 72 
My daughter was diagnosed with breast cancer detected by a 
mammogram when she was 43.  It was not palpable and 
fortunately had not spread to the lymph nodes.  She had a 60.7 79 
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lumpectomy and radiation, but did not require chemo.   She is 
now a 15 year survivor and I am grateful that it was caught 
early.  Mammograms use much less radiation than they did 
years ago.  I am an advocate of early detection with 
mammography in conjunction with self examination. 
I had dinner tonight with a friend who like me was shocked 
and angered by this news alert. I had my first mammogram at 
age 44 and cancer was discovered. Had I waited until 50 I 
never would have seen my 50th birthday. My friend lost a 
sister at age 40 to breast cancer ! I hope and expect this news 
will spark a huge outrage as it should. I am furious and I 
suspect this is a financial decision rather than a medical one. 82.8 84 
this is just the beginning of medicine by statistics.  aka 
obama-pelosi care.  i know three woman today in their 40's 
battling breast cancer of an aggressive type.  if not for the 
mammograms these would be unnoticed and untreated  for a 
few more years..no wait you can you treat cancer after the 
patient is dead right?it wont' belong before the statisticians 
information will filter to the provider and we will see  a 
resurgence of breast cancer deaths. if i am not mistaken 
england has a miserable survival rate!! 63.5 91 
Good for all of you for whom this is an intellectual exercise. 
You're lucky. I can only tell what happened to me. This year 
at 48, with no family history and no symptoms, I was 
diagnosed with a stage 1 invasive ductal carcinoma after my 
routine annual (digital) mammogram. I had a lumpectomy 
and radiation. If I waited until I felt a lump, or if my first 
screening had come at 50, I doubt my cancer would have 
been stage one. You can manipulate statistics in many 
ways...but I assure you...if it's your breast and your cancer, 
you have a different viewpoint. I'll take the mammograms, 
thank you. 71.1 113 
Bad, bad idea.  I was diagnosed at age 46 with a tiny but 
extremely aggressive cancer via mammogram; it could not be 
felt in an examination. My last mammogram (totally 'clean') 
had been eighteen months before; now the cancer had already 
spread to the lymph nodes.  After surgery, chemo, and 
radiation, my predicted 10-year survival chances are 92%.  If 
I had waited until age 50...by that time the cancer would 
probably had already metastasized and I would be facing a 
death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly.  Have your first 
mammogram at age 40 or below (some doctors recommend 
starting at age 35) and keep having them every year.  It could 
save your life.  I know it saved mine.   67.3 121 
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As an eight year survivor I am really glad I had yearly 
mammograms.  My tumor was low-grade, well differentiated, 
and small.  But my breasts were also small. Why would I 
want to wait until I or another could palpate the cancer and  
surgery would require more removal of breast tissue and 
more disfigurement.? That counts for something.  Waiting 
could also result in a greater chance of lymphodema if lymph 
node dissection is required..  I have mild lymphodema and 
even that is a pain.  Most breast cancers, I believe 70-80%, 
break out of the milk ducts  which makes them life 
threatening at some point.  Why wait?  It's not like the 
majority of prostate cancers which I understand grow so 
slowly that most men will die of something else. As a 
survivor you WANT to survive and early detection and 
treatment  is physically and mentally justifiable. 66.7 147 
these recommendations are primitive, phallo-centric, absurd, 
cruel, stastically immoral and the work of fools.  i turned 50 
this year.  in 2006, if not for mammography and highly-
trained, vigilant radiologists, i would be extremely ill now, 
my life most likely unrecoverable.  after a hx of normal 
screenings, i missed ONE mammography in '05 because i 
was caregiving a dying parent.  the tumor was not palpabable 
by the way and it was already a stage 1.  breast cancers do not 
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, class, whether 
pre-menopausal or post-menopausal, motherhood or lifestyle.  
there are many women who are in high-risk categories and 
many women who develop breast cancers who have no 
known risk at all.  if this is part of the assignment of "health 
care reform", then American women face very serious trouble 
in achieving an enduring worthiness and equality in this 
society.   46 149 
My mother received regular mammograms starting at 50.  
She was diagnosed with stage 4 breast cancer at 54.  At that 
time, she'd gone about eight months between mammograms.  
While she had been a smoker and had some other risk factors 
for various types of cancer, she was not in a high risk group 
for breast cancer.  She died this August of breast cancer, 
which had come back in her bones after six cancer-free years.  
I am not an oncologist and do not know how her cancer 
would have progressed untreated if, as recommended now, 
she had received a mammogram every two years.  But her 
cancer was aggressive, and it seems likely to me that, had she 
received mammograms less frequently, her doctor would not 
have caught it until it was even further advanced.  I think my 66.5 183 
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mother would have been deprived of ten years of life, during 
which she traveled, became a grandmother (twice over), and 
saw her middle child married.  Having lost my mother before 
she was even eligible for Social Security, I do not intend to 
follow this guideline.   
Average 67.1 92.3 
 
Table E6 
Mammogram-Detected Cancer Comments (from Table E5) Rewritten to Remove 
Exemplars but Preserve Content 
Comment text  
Readability 
(Flesch 
Kincaid 
reading 
ease) 
Length 
(in 
words) 
Women with no family history, who have never smoked and 
are not overweight can have small, invasive breast cancer 
found by alert doctors and screening mammograms. These 
women can then go on to live for many years...do as you wish 
and best of luck. 73.2 45 
The recommendations of not getting mammograms and not 
doing breast self exams is completely about the insurance 
companies saving money.  They will save millions.  And then 
there is us women.  Many women would be dead.  DEAD.  
There are survivors and it is because of breast self exams and 
mammograms.   65.6 49 
Some women in their late 30s can have tumors too small to 
be felt found by mamography, have them removed, and 
continue to live cancer free. Statistically speaking, yes, it may 
be seem that doing screening tests on younger women isn't 
worth the effort and price tag .... UNLESS IT IS YOUR LIFE 
THAT IS SAVED!!! Patients are not statistics, they are 
individuals. 70 63 
Women in their early 40s can have mammograms that find 
suspicious sites that later turn out to be LCIS, DCIS or 
invasive carcinomas. I could imagine that after much 
agonizing (and maybe a lumpectomy), some of these women 
then decide to have a mastectomy. If there is no recurrence, 
so far as I am concerned, the mammogram detected cancer 
early enough to save their lives. 53.4 65 
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I can only tell this: millions of women all over the world are 
still alive thanks to a mammography at 4O. Women have 
breast cancer in their early 40s. I imagine their no future if 
the doctors and the authorities heard to this panel. Please, be 
careful with such recommendations. We are talking about life 
and death.  72.1 57 
Women can have "routine" mammograms where they 
discover a golf ball sized aggressive cancer.  Without the 
mammogram they would not have known.  I would 
encourage women over 40 be screened because people can 
feel great and have no idea they have cancer.  No a 
mammogram is not a cure but it does help find out something 
is wrong.  How dare you say otherwise  78.6 63 
This has nothing to do with the statistics, but mammography 
can detect very small lumps (undetectable from the outside). 
After having a mammogram that detects a lump and possibly 
a lumpectomy, some women go on to have genetic tests that 
reveal they are BRCA positive. If these women have a double 
mastectomy and a hysterectomy, their risks for breast and 
ovarian cancers are lower than average. Those mammograms 
definitely saved their lives. 46.4 72 
Some women are diagnosed with breast cancer detected by a 
mammogram in their early 40s.  Some of these lumps may 
not be palpable, and, if women are fortunate, may be caught 
before cancer spreads to the lymph nodes.  Such tumors may 
require lumpectomy and radiation and possibly chemo.   
These women are survivors and I am grateful that their 
cancer can be caught early.  Mammograms use much less 
radiation than they did years ago.  I am an advocate of early 
detection with mammography in conjunction with self 
examination. 56 87 
I had dinner tonight with a friend who like me was shocked 
and angered by this news alert. Women can have cancer 
discovered by mammogram in their mid-40s. Had they 
waited until 50 they never would have seen their 50th 
birthdays. Some women even die of breast cancer in their 
early 40s! I hope and expect this news will spark a huge 
outrage as it should. I am furious and I suspect this is a 
financial decision rather than a medical one. 78.6 83 
this is just the beginning of medicine by statistics.  aka 
obama-pelosi care.  There are woman today in their 40's 
battling breast cancer of an aggressive type.  if not for the 
mammograms these would be unnoticed and untreated  for a 
few more years..no wait you can you treat cancer after the 63.1 90 
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patient is dead right?it wont' belong before the statisticians 
information will filter to the provider and we will see  a 
resurgence of breast cancer deaths. if i am not mistaken 
england has a miserable survival rate!! 
Good for all of you for whom this is an intellectual exercise. 
You're lucky. I can only tell you what happens to women 
who are diagnosed with cancer. Every year, women in their 
late 40s, with no family history and no symptoms, are being 
diagnosed with early stage breast cancer after having routine 
annual mammograms. They may have to have a lumpectomy 
and radiation. If these women waited until they felt a lump, or 
if their first screening had come at 50, I doubt their cancer 
would be found at an early stage. You can manipulate 
statistics in many ways...but these women probably have a 
different viewpoint and will take the mammograms. 64.7 114 
Bad, bad idea.  Women in their 40s can be diagnosed with 
extremely aggressive cancer via mammogram; these tumors 
may not be able to be felt in an examination. Some of these 
women may have even had clean mammograms in the last 
two years, only to then find cancer that has already spread to 
the lymph nodes.  After surgery, chemo, and radiation, these 
women have a predicted 10-year survival chances above 
90%.  If they had waited until age 50...by that time the cancer 
would probably had already metastasized and they would be 
facing a death sentence. Women, don't die needlessly.  Have 
your first mammogram at age 40 or below (some doctors 
recommend starting at age 35) and keep having them every 
year.  It could save your life.  It has saved others.  67.4 133 
Breast cancer survivors are probably glad they had yearly 
mammograms.  Some of these women may have had tumors 
that were low-grade, well differentiated, and small.  But why 
would they want to wait until they or another could palpate 
the cancer and  surgery would require more removal of breast 
tissue and more disfigurement.? That counts for something.  
Waiting could also result in a greater chance of lymphodema 
if lymph node dissection is required..  Even mild 
lymphodema is a pain.  Most breast cancers, I believe 70-
80%, break out of the milk ducts  which makes them life 
threatening at some point.  Why wait?  It's not like the 
majority of prostate cancers which I understand grow so 
slowly that most men will die of something else. Survivors 
WANT to survive and early detection and treatment  is 
physically and mentally justifiable. 61.9 139 
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these recommendations are primitive, phallo-centric, absurd, 
cruel, stastically immoral and the work of fools.  some 
women turning 50 this year have already had an experience 
with breast cancer.  if not for mammography and highly-
trained, vigilant radiologists, they would be extremely ill 
now, their lives most likely unrecoverable.  after a hx of 
normal screenings, and missing even one mammography, 
some of these women were diagnosed with tumors that may 
not have even been palpabable.  breast cancers do not 
discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, class, whether 
pre-menopausal or post-menopausal, motherhood or lifestyle.  
there are many women who are in high-risk categories and 
many women who develop breast cancers who have no 
known risk at all.  if this is part of the assignment of "health 
care reform", then American women face very serious trouble 
in achieving an enduring worthiness and equality in this 
society.   40.8 148 
Even women who receive regular mammograms starting at 
50 may be diagnosed with late-stage breast cancer in their 
50s.  Sometimes these cancers are found in between annual 
mammograms.  While some of these women may be smokers 
and have other risk factors for various types of cancer, they 
may not be in a high risk group for breast cancer.  A number 
of these women may go on to die of breast cancer which can 
come back in another part of their body after the woman has 
been cancer-free for a number of years.  I am not an 
oncologist and do not know how these cancers would have 
progressed untreated if, as recommended now, these women 
had received a mammogram every two years.  But when their 
cancer is aggressive, it seems likely to me that, had they 
received mammograms less frequently, their doctors would 
not have caught it until it was even further advanced.  I think 
these women would have been deprived of additional years of 
life, during which they could have been traveling, becoming 
grandmothers, and seeing their children get married.  I do not 
intend to follow this guideline.   61.2 190 
Average 63.5 93.2 
 
Table E7 
Neutral or Balanced Nonexemplar Comments 
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Comment text 
Readability 
(Flesch 
Kincaid 
reading 
ease) 
Length 
(in 
words) 
I'll bet you ten to one that physicians who own 
mammography units will be slower to adopt the new 
guidelines than those refer out mammograms.  50.3 26 
Women are being advised to discuss the pros and cons of 
having a mammogram before getting one automatically at 
age 40.  What is so controversial about having a woman be 
informed of her choices before making a medical decision? 41.7 39 
A problem with the mammography screening studies is their 
end-points: number of false positives vs number of deaths 
averted. Very few studies look at another endpoint - 
morbidity from chemotherapy. How many cancers could be 
treated by just surgery or surgery and radiation vs 
chemotherapy?  33.7 45 
Hopefully, what will eventually evolve from the current 
debate is a serious discussion between every woman and her 
physician regarding the risks and benefits of yearly screening. 
Of course, we will have to wait until all of the irrational 
screaming stops to get to that point. 41.9 46 
It is far too naive to make a blanket statement that private 
insurance companies will continue to support mammography 
for women under 50 at low risk for breast cancer.  They may 
do it now as a public relations type move but these 
companies, for the most part, bend over backwards to 
maximize profits.  No one knows what will happen in the 
future as far as their policies. 61.7 67 
I wish instead of telling women not to get screened that 
science would direct more effort to distinguishing which non-
invasive cancers are dangerous and which aren't.  Dying of 
breast cancer isn't pleasant, for that matter neither is systemic 
therapy. A woman with a history of breast cancer -personal or 
familial- is not overzealous in wanting to avoid dying or even 
being treated in a major way for the disease.  Right now the 
tools for distinguishing life threatening cancers from those 
that aren't are non-existent. Progress would be appreciated.  51.5 93 
It has been the norm in Canada for many years for women to 
begin having mammograms at the age of 50. The extra 
anxiety that women in the US have been experiencing with 
early breast screening,for the most part, has not been a part of 
Canadian women's lives. Obviously, in some individual 47.4 95 
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cases, early screening has been life-saving and in Canada 
women with cause for concern do receive the necessary 
mammograms and further testing. It would be interesting to 
know more about the health policies and statistics regarding 
mammograms in other countries. 
This appears to be a recession/depression problem, that is, a 
recession happens to a population whereas a depression 
happens to a person.  The decision is set based on the 
cost/benefits of screening a population but the consequences 
are terrible if that one person in 1-10,000 who is not saved is 
you.  After people get used to the new standards or a new 
generation of women who get used to screening at 50 replace 
the current group, I would predict that there will be no 
difference in people's reactions to the new threshold as 
compared to the old.   49.6 102 
What I find interesting is how free some of the MD's feel to 
use their own subjective judgment on treatment 
recommendations. MD's are not machines, nor should they 
be, but it seems that the medical profession could do a better 
job of training MD's to use science and consensus-based 
recommendations. Not just with this screening example, but 
how large of a role do emotions and subjective judgement 
play in choosing one prescription drug over another (think 
pharmaceutical rep influence)or in choosing when a cesarean 
delivery is necessary? My hunch is the medical profession 
could use a change in culture.   48.7 104 
Women encounter two fears that shake them with regard to 
the new recommendations. There is, most obviously, dread of 
Cancer; the fact that many cancers may be slow-growing and 
non-life-threatening does little to ameliorate that dread.  The 
second fear is that of relegation to second-class citizen.  The 
inroads made by womens' liberation are not so substantial 
that there is no slippery slope.  There lurks a sad suspicion 
that women are still expendable, that the medical community 
pays less attention to women than to men and sees less need 
to be truly careful of them.  Only when both of these 
perceptions die out will recommendations of the sort now put 
forth be regarded with more rationality than emotion. 54.2 121 
What one needs to understand with these new guidelines is 
that it acknowledges not that screening is useless, but that the 
tools with which we do screen are not adequate at this point. 
Currently there are no good predictive biomarkers that would 
stratify women into groups that would and would not benefit 
from early mammograms. A large percentage of women 42.3 126 
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diagnosed in the 40s with breast cancer had no "risk factors" - 
again meaning that we probably don't understand risk factors 
enough. Clinical discoveries, in particular in the area of 
diagnosis, are developing rapidly today, as we do understand 
genetic and genomic risk factors more readily. The hope 
could be that in the near future better technology will make 
screening more accurate, and stratification more possible. 
A very difficult situation. We grew up, as physicians, to 
recommend mammograms almost as dogma, at least from the 
standpoint of legal exposure, heavens forbid this study was 
skipped and cancer developed later on (in a given patient). 
The fact is that a mammogram may indeed help diagnose 
cancer a bit earlier, perhaps allowing earlier treatment. The 
question remains as to its benefit to make a difference in 
prognosis, to catch the disease before it spreads, when it is 
performed on all women, independent of known factors that 
increase the incidence (i.e. family history). The 
recommendation for the routine mammogram on a yearly 
basis may not change as long as it is recommended by 
professional specialties, is covered by Insurance and the 
feared Liability hangs in the equation.  44.5 129 
I am always surprised that breast cancer awareness 
campaigns, and articles always look at screenings, detection, 
research into technologies and medications to "eradicate" the 
cancer...but they rarely take a strong look at the pollutants in 
our world today that are finding their way into women's 
breast tissue.  In my opinion, campaigns for clean water, 
clean air, organic food, natural beauty care products...all of 
these campaigns should join forces with breast cancer 
prevention and awareness - or actually in fact, the other way 
around - since women's awareness in this country of the issue 
of breast cancer is so strong and the pink-ribbon is so well 
known, what better way to grab national attention about the 
bigger picture of the toxic environment that we live in and 
raise our children in than to have the breast cancer 
organizations start to raise our awareness of prevention 
through creating a healthier environment.  32.5 152 
Screening and treatment are important pieces of the 
conversation about breast cancer in the US, but what's 
missing from so many discussions is prevention. (And I don't 
mean early detection, which is what screening can provide, 
albeit with the crucial caveats). What we spend on 
prevention, both in terms of research and actual programs, 
pales in comparison to investments in detection and 41.9 176 
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treatment. And yet, robust prevention efforts could 
potentially save more lives than anything else, and at a 
fraction of the cost to the health care system and society at-
large. What we do know about breast cancer prevention, 
especially the importance of diet and exercise, is not given 
the attention or budget necessary for implementation. Nor are 
the lifestyle recommendations we lackadaisically prescribe 
currently feasible for many of the women who are most at 
risk of death from breast cancer. Scaling up our meager 
investments in healthy, unprocessed food for everyone, 
especially the poor, as well as the creation of environments 
suitable for exercise in all communities would be a good 
start. 
Screening mammograms help some women, but not as many 
as if often believed. New recommendations suggest women 
stop annual screening and 40 and wait until 50 to start every 
other year screening until 74. Based on numerous studies, this 
small shift will dramatically reduce false positive but will not 
increase breast cancer mortality. Right now, 60% of breast 
cancers are found through screening, which means that 40% 
of cancers are found another way. Women find lumps in a 
number of ways. Breast self exam is not recommended 
because larges studies show it's not effective. However, 
women do inadvertently feel lumps while bathing (or a 
woman's partner might feel a lump while touching her.) Some 
women notice physical changes in the mirror. A woman 
might feel discomfort as she fastens her bra or she might feel 
pain in her breast that leads her to touch it or see a doctor. 
Finally, a lump might be detected during a physical exam by 
a doctor. The fact that screening is recommended only every 
other year after 50 and breast self exams are not 
recommended, does not mean women should do nothing if 
they suspect something is wrong. 62.7 196 
Average 47.0 101.1 
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APPENDIX F 
DETAILED RESULTS OF MEDIATION ANALYSES 
The following tables summarize the details of mediational analyses conducted in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Table F1  
Transportation as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have Mammogram in Next Two Years 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M 
(transportation), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(transportation) 
on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect effect 
of X on Y 
through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
 transportation 
4.313 
(0.111)*** 
-0.000 (0.165) __ __ 0.000 
0.000 (1, 
289), p = 
.998 
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Transportation  
intention;   FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx intention 
5.086 
(0.368)*** 
__ 0.087 (0.078) -0.255 (0.219) 0.009 
1.291 (2, 
288), p = 
.277 
0.000 (-0.044, 
0.044) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 transportation 
4.294 
(0.136)*** 
0.019 (0.191) __ __ 0.000 
0.010 (1, 
256), p = 
.921 
 
Transportation  
intention;  FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
5.196 
(0.378)*** 
__ -0.012 (0.079) 0.062 (0.240) 0.000 
0.046 (2, 
255), p = 
.955 
0.000 (-0.039, 
0.032) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 transportation 
4.390 
(0.131)*** 
0.145 (0.176) __ __ 0.003 
0.681 (1, 
253), p = 
.410 
 
Transportation  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
intention 
4.845 
(0.409)*** 
__ 0.187 (0.084)* 0.001 (0.236) 0.019 
2.483 (2, 
252), p = 
.086 
0.027 (-0.028, 
0.133) 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
transportation 
4.292 
(0.123)*** 
0.244 (0.171) __ __ 0.007 
2.017 (1, 
270), p = 
.157 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Table F2 
 
Transportation as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Wait until Age 50 to Have Mammogram 
Transportation  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
4.488 
(0.374)*** 
__ 0.217 (0.079)** 0.222 (0.223) 0.033 
4.561 (2, 
269), p = 
.011 
0.053 (-0.010, 
0.172) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M 
(transportation), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(transportation) 
on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect effect 
of X on Y 
through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-corrected 
95% CI) 
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FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
 transportation 
4.313 
(0.112)*** 
0.000 (0.165) __ __ 0.000 
0.000 (1, 
289), p = 
.998 
 
Transportation  
intention;   FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx intention 
1.971 
(0.335)*** 
__ 0.088 (0.071) 0.193 (0.200) 0.009 
1.24 (2, 
288), p = 
.291 
0.000 (-0.043, 
0.041) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 transportation 
4.294 
(0.136)*** 
0.019 (0.191) __ __ 0.000 
0.010 (1, 
256), p = 
0.921 
 
Transportation  
intention;  FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
2.501 
(0.334)*** 
__ -0.008 (0.069) 0.077 (0.212) 0.001 
0.073 (2, 
255), p = 
.930 
0.000 (-0.033, 
0.027) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 transportation 
4.390 
(0.131)*** 
0.145 (0.176) __ __ 0.003 
0.681 (1, 
253), p = 
.410 
 
Transportation  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
intention 
3.067 
(0.337)*** 
__ -0.211 (0.069)** -0.025 (0.194) 0.036 
4.670 (2, 
252), p = 
0.010 
-0.031 (-0.138, 
0.033) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F3 
Attitude toward Mammography as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have Mammogram in Next Two Years 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
transportation 
4.292 
(0.123)*** 
0.244 (0.171) __ __ 0.007 
2.017 (1, 
270), p = 
.157 
 
Transportation  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
3.101 
(0.318)*** 
__ -0.205 (0.067)** -0.086 (0.189) 0.036 
4.949 (2, 
269), p  = 
.008 
-0.050 (-0.154, 
0.011) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (attitude), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(attitude) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect effect 
of X on Y 
through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
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bias-corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
attitude 
5.409 
(0.127)*** 
-0.081 (0.189) __ __ 0.001 
0.182 (1, 
290), p = 
0.670 
 
Attitude  intention;   
FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
intention 
2.493 
(0.350)*** 
__ 
0.551 
(0.060)*** 
-0.224 (0.193) 0.230 
43.050 (2, 
289), p < .001 
-0.044 (-0.245, 
0.168) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 attitude 
4.875 
(0.150)*** 
0.453 (0.211)* __ __ 0.018 
4.639 (1, 
259), p = 
0.032 
 
Attitude  intention;  
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
intention 
2.414 
(0.331)*** 
__ 
0.561 
(0.610)*** 
-0.200 (0.208) 0.249 
42.695 (2, 
258), p < .001 
0.254 (0.026, 
0.521) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 attitude 
5.464 
(0.156)*** 
0.075 (0.208) __ __ 0.001 
0.129 (1, 
251), p = .720 
 
Attitude  intention;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 intention 
3.34 
(0.399)*** 
__ 
0.427 
(0.067)*** 
-0.021 (0.220) 0.141 
20.591 (2, 
250), p < .001 
0.032 (-0.147, 
0.215) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 attitude 
5.280 
(0.138)*** 
0.259 (0.192) __ __ 0.007 
1.82 (1, 270), 
p = .178 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F4 
 
Attitude toward Delaying Mammography as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Wait until Age 50 to Have 
Mammogram 
Attitude  intention;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 intention 
2.976 
(0.376)*** 
__ 
0.463 
(0.066)*** 
0.141 (0.207) 0.161 
25.779 (2, 
269), p < .001 
0.120 (-0.049, 
0.310) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (attitude), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(attitude) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect effect 
of X on Y 
through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-corrected 
95% CI) 
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FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
attitude 
3.459 
(0.135)*** 
0.001 
(0.201)** 
__ __ 0.000 
0.000 (1, 
289), p = .998 
 
Attitude  intention;   
FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
intention 
0.820 
(0.220)*** 
__ 
0.448 
(0.053)*** 
0.159 (0.180) 0.202 
36.377 (2, 
288), p < .001 
0.000 (-0.191, 
0.177) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 attitude 
3.354 
(0.147)*** 
0.105 (0.206) __ __ 0.001 
2.759 (1, 
258), p = .609 
 
Attitude  intention;  
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
intention 
0.800 
(0.229)*** 
__ 
0.502 
(0.056)*** 
-0.007 (0.185) 0.240 
40.567 (2, 
257), p < .001 
0.053 (-0.154, 
0.255e) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 attitude 
3.254 
(0.168)*** 
-0.232 (0.226) __ __ 0.004 
1.062 (1, 
252), p = .304 
 
Attitude  intention;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 intention 
1.311 
(0.222)*** 
__ 
0.255 
(0.053)*** 
0.017 (0.189) 0.086 
11.733 (2, 
251), p < .001 
-0.059 (-0.196, 
0.048) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 attitude 
3.333 
(0.152)*** 
-0.312 (0.211) __ __ 0.008 
2.195 (1, 
270), p = .140 
 
Attitude  intention;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 intention 
0.980 
(0.211)*** 
__ 
0.368 
(0.051)*** 
0.008 (0.176) 0.165 
26.553 (2, 
269), p < .001 
-0.115 (-0.300, 
0.030) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F5 
 
Norms Related to Having Mammogram in Next Two Years as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intention to Have 
Mammogram 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) 
on M 
(norm), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(injunctive 
norm) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(descriptive 
norm) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  
injunctive norm 
4.838 
(0.137)*** 
0.035 
(0.204) 
__ __ __ 0.000 
0.029 
(1, 291), 
p = .865 
0.0138 (-
0.154, 0.170) 
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FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  
descriptive norm 
4.888 
(0.129)*** 
-0.226 
(0.191) 
__ __ __ 0.005 
1.401 
(1, 291), 
p = .238 
-0.029 (-0.141, 
0.010) 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;   
FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx 
intention 
2.909 
(0.357)*** 
__ 
0.398 
(0.064)*** 
0.1295 
(0.069) 
-0.2503 
(0.197) 
0.196 
23.506 
(3, 289), 
p < .001 
 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem  
injunctive norm 
4.516 
(0.149)*** 
0.357 
(0.209) 
__ __ __ 0.011 
2.907 
(1, 259), 
p = 
0.089 
0.167 (-0.019, 
0.387) 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
descriptive 
norm 
4.945 
(0.136)*** 
-0.284 
(0.190) 
__ __ __ 0.009 
2.220 
(1, 259), 
p = .138 
-0.050 (-0.183, 
0.007) 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;   
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
2.160 
(0.391)*** 
__ 
0.467 
(0.069)*** 
0.178 
(0.076)* 
-0.062 (0.210) 0.244 
27.715 
(3, 257), 
p < .001 
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BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
injunctive norm 
4.974 
(0.163)*** 
-0.086 
(0.219) 
__ __ __ 0.001 
0.154 
(1, 257), 
p = 
0.695 
-0.026 (-0.164, 
0.106) 
BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
descriptive norm 
4.914 
(0.137)*** 
-0.040 
(0.184) 
__ __ __ 0.000 
0.0465 
(1, 257), 
p = 
0.829) 
-0.005 (-0.093, 
0.039) 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;  
BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
intention 
3.524 
(0.431)*** 
__ 
0.297 
(0.077)*** 
0.123 (0.091) 0.126 (0.224) 0.113 
10.875 
(3, 255), 
p < 
0.001 
 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
injunctive norm 
4.758 
(0.147)*** 
0.131 
(0.204) 
__ __ __ 0.002 
0.410 
(1, 273), 
p = 
0.522 
0.044 (-0.087, 
0.195) 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
descriptive 
norms 
4.894 
(0.129)*** 
-0.020 
(0.179) 
__ __ __ 0.000 
0.012 
(1, 273), 
p = 
0.912 
-0.006 (-0.112, 
0.098) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F6 
 
Norms Related to Waiting Until Age 50 to Have Mammograms as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intention to Have 
Mammogram 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;  
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
2.453 
(0.369)*** 
__ 
0.340 
(0.073)*** 
0.278 
(0.083)*** 
0.229 (0.197) 0.234 
27.527 
(3, 271), 
p < .001 
 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) 
on M 
(norm), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(injunctive 
norm) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(descriptive 
norm) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
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corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  
injunctive norm 
2.706 
(0.119)*** 
0.001 
(0.177) 
__ __ __ 0.000 
0.000 
(1, 291), 
p = .998 
0.000 (-0.182, 
0.188) 
FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  
descriptive norm 
3.300 
(0.127)*** 
0.001 
(0.189) 
__ __ __ 0.000 
0.000 
(1, 291), 
p = 
0.997 
0.000 (-0.072, 
0.084) 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;   
FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx 
intention 
0.3122 
(0.211) 
__ 
0.526 
(0.064)*** 
0.193 
(0.060)** 
0.166 (0.163) 0.344 
50.420 
(3,289), 
p < .001 
 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem  
injunctive norm 
2.930 
(0.134)*** 
-0.223 
(0.188) 
__ __ __ 0.005 
1.409 
(1, 259), 
p = 
0.236 
-0.102 (-0.288, 
0.062) 
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
descriptive 
norm 
3.227 
(0.133)*** 
0.074 
(0.187) 
__ __ __ 0.001 
0.158 
(1, 259), 
p = 
0.691 
0.021 (-0.082, 
0.144) 
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Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;   
FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
0.209 
(0.238) 
__ 
0.459 
(0.066)*** 
0.289 
(0.067)*** 
0.138 (0.173) 0.339 
43.911 
(3, 257), 
p < .001 
 
BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
injunctive norm 
2.757 
(0.145)*** 
-0.218 
(0.195) 
__ __ __ 0.005 
1.246 
(1, 256), 
p = .265 
-0.065 (-0.213, 
0.039) 
BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
descriptive norm 
3.052 
(0.145)*** 
0.409 
(0.194)* 
__ __ __ 0.017 
4.445 
(1, 256), 
p = .036 
0.070 (0.008, 
0.190) 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;  
BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx  
intention 
0.786 
(0.232)*** 
__ 
0.298 
(0.067)*** 
0.171 
(0.068)** 
-0.052 (0.182) 0.172 
17.630 
(3, 254), 
p < 
.0010 
 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
injunctive norm 
2.689 
(0.126)*** 
-0.151 
(0.174) 
__ __ __ 0.003 
0.749 
(1, 273), 
p = 
0.388 
-0.049 (-0.178, 
0.061) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F7 
 
Self-Efficacy as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Intentions to Have Mammogram in 
Next Two Years 
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
descriptive 
norms 
3.265 
(0.137)*** 
0.1-0.096 
(0.189) 
__ __ __ 0.004 
1.077 
(1, 273), 
p = 
0.300 
0.043 (-0.178, 
0.061) 
Injunctive norm, 
descriptive norm 
 intention;  
BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
0.627 
(0.226)** 
__ 
0.325 
(0.072)*** 
0.218 
(0.066)** 
-0.122 (0.171) 0.212 
24.279 
(3, 271), 
p < 
0.001 
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Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (self-
efficacy), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of M 
(self-efficacy) 
on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 self-efficacy 
8.565 
(0.279)*** 
0.239 (0.375) __ __ 0.002 
0.406 (1, 
256), p = .525 
 
Self-efficacy  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx   
intention 
4.758 
(0.379)*** 
__ 0.099 (0.039)* 0.067 (0.236) 0.025 
3.271 (2, 
255), p = 
0.040 
0.024 (-0.044, 
0.124) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 self-efficacy 
8.296 
(0.249)*** 
0.509 (0.345) __ __ 0.008 
2.169 (1, 
273), p = .142 
 
Self-efficacy  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
3.533 
(0.339)*** 
__ 
0.229 
(0.037)*** 
0.151 (0.210) 0.131 
20.405 (2, 
272), p < .001 
0.116 (-0.032, 
0.305) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F8 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Five-Year Risk of 
Breast Cancer (Measured as a Frequency) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 negative affect 
1.794 
(0.071)*** 
-0.038 (0.0953) __ __ 0.001 
0.1586 (1, 
256), p = 
0.691 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F9 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast 
Cancer (Measured as a Frequency) 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
13.644 
(3.602)*** 
__ 
9.961 
(1.697)*** 
-5.547 (2.589)* 0.135 
19.855 (2, 
255), p < .001 
-0.378 (-2.415, 
1.39) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 negative affect 
1.819 
(0.072)*** 
-0.063 (0.100) __ __ 0.002 0.401 (1, 271)  
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
15.485 
(3.163)*** 
__ 
6.566 
(1.455)*** 
-1.428 (2.395) 0.072 
10.480 (2, 
270), p < .001 
-0.416 (-1.926, 
0.831) 
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Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect effect 
of X on Y 
through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 negative affect 
1.794 
(0.071)*** 
-0.038 (0.095) __ __ 0.001 
0.159 (1, 
256), p = 
0.691 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
25.147 
(3.702)*** 
__ 
6.476 
(1.744)*** 
-0.673 (2.661) 0.052 
6.958 (2, 
255), p = .001 
-0.246 (-1.669, 
0.907) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 negative affect 
1.819 
(0.072)*** 
-0.063 (0.100) __ __ 0.002 
0.401 (1, 
271), p = .527 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
28.304 
(3.470)*** 
__ 
4.378 
(1.596)** 
-0.146 (2.627) 0.027 
3.774 (2, 
270), p = .024 
-0.277 (-1.409, 
0.507) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F10 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Five-Year Risk of 
Breast Cancer (Measured as a Percentage) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 negative affect 
1.794 
(0.071)*** 
-0.038 (0.095) __ __ 0.001 
0.159 (1, 
256), p = .691 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
2.298 
(3.771) 
__ 
12.277 
(1.776)*** 
-0.303 (2.710) 0.158 
23.927 (2, 
255), p < .001 
-0.466 (-2.855, 
1.836) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F11 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast 
Cancer (Measured as a Percentage) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 negative affect 
1.812 
(0.073)*** 
-0.057 (0.100) __ __ 0.001 
0.318 (1, 
270), p = .573 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
7.826 
(3.558)* 
__ 
9.608 
(1.64)*** 
-1.145 (2.699) 0.114 
17.356 (2, 
269), p < .001 
-0.543 (-2.535, 
1.388) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 negative affect 
1.794 
(0.071)*** 
-0.038 (0.095) __ __ 0.001 
0.159 (1, 
256), p = .691 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
9.197 
(4.000)* 
__ 
11.480 
(1.884)*** 
-0.223 (2.875) 0.127 
18.584 (2, 
255), p < .001 
-0.436 (-2.661, 
1.704) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 negative affect 
1.812 
(0.073)*** 
-0.057 (0.100) __ __ 0.001 
0.318 (1, 
270), p = 
0.573 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
14.821 
(3.700)*** 
__ 
8.555 
(1.705)*** 
-0.710 (2.806) 0.086 
12.674 (2, 
269), p < .001 
-0.480 (-2.262, 
1.186) 
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*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F12 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a 
Positive Mammogram (Measured as a Frequency) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 negative affect 
1.794 
(0.071)*** 
-0.037 (0.096) __ __ 0.001 
0.149 (1, 
255), p = .700 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
8.650 
(3.249)** 
__ 
7.970 
(1.530)*** 
-1.971 (2.338) 0.100 
14.033 (2, 
254), p < .001 
-0.294 (-2.039, 
1.120) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F13 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of Mammogram-Detected Breast Cancer Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a 
Positive Mammogram (Measured as a Percentage) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 negative affect 
1.819 
(0.072)*** 
-0.062 (0.100) __ __ 0.001 
0.385 (1, 
270), p = .536 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
13.056 
(2.938)*** 
__ 
5.931 
(1.352)*** 
-2.794 (2.228) 0.073 
10.638 (2, 
269), p < .001 
-0.369 (-1.819, 
0.736) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, BCEx = 
mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars 
removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F14 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 negative affect 
1.794 
(0.071)*** 
-0.037 (0.096) __ __ 0.001 
0.149 (1, 
255), p = .700 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
2.931 
(3.136) 
__ 
10.261 
(1.477)*** 
-3.313 (2.257) 0.167 
25.477 (2, 
254), p < .001 
-0.378 (-2.434, 
1.461) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 negative affect 
1.819 
(0.072)*** 
-0.062 (0.100) __ __ 0.001 
0.385 (1, 
270), p = .536 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;  
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
9.068 
(3.130)** 
__ 
7.130 
(1.440)*** 
-3.947 (2.373) 0.094 
13.976 (2, 
269), p < .001 
-0.443 (-2.154, 
0.891) 
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Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of False-Positive Mammogram Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a False-Positive 
Mammogram (Measured as a Frequency) 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
negative affect 
1.733 
(0.073)*** 
0.132 (0.109) __ __ 0.005 
1.474 (1, 
291), p = .226 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;   
FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
perceived risk 
17.923 
(2.916)*** 
__ 
6.232 
(1.365)*** 
1.555 (2.541) 0.070 
10.867 (2, 
290), p < .001 
0.824 (-0.377, 
2.584) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 negative affect 
1.819 
(0.078)*** 
0.046 (0.109) __ __ 0.001 
0.176 (1, 
258), p = .675 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;   
31.485 
(3.413)*** 
__ 2.482 (1.545) -5.016 (2.707) 0.022 
2.93 (2, 257), 
p = .055 
0.114 (-0.299, 
1.304) 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, FPEx = false-positive comments 
with exemplars, and FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F15 
 
Negative Affect as a Mediator of the Effects of False-Positive Mammogram Exemplars on Perceived Risk of Having a False-Positive 
Mammogram (Measured as a Percentage) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
perceived risk 
Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (negative 
affect), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(negative 
affect) on Y 
(perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
negative affect 
1.733 
(0.073)*** 
0.132 (0.109) __ __ 0.005 
1.474 (1, 
291), p = .226 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: FPNoEx = false-positive comments without exemplars, FPEx = false-positive comments 
with exemplars, and FPExRem = false positive comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F16 
 
Perceived Five-Year Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Frequency) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to 
Have Mammogram in Next Two Years 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;   
FPEx vs. FPNoEx 
perceived risk 
13.971 
(3.217)*** 
__ 
7.845 
(1.506)*** 
0.581 (2.803) 0.087 
13.74 (2, 
290), p < .001 
1.037 (-0.500, 
3.068) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 negative affect 
1.819 
(0.078)*** 
0.046 (0.109) __ __ 0.001 
0.176 (1, 
258), p = .675 
 
Negative affect  
perceived risk;   
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
perceived risk 
29.916 
(3.979)*** 
__ 2.908 (1.802) -6.157 (3.156) 0.024 
3.125 (2, 
257), p = .046 
0.133 (-0.382, 
1.449) 
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Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(perceived 
risk) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
perceived risk 
25.169 
(1.806)*** 
-0.364 (2.681) __ __ 0.000 
0.019 (1, 
291), p = .892 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;   FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  intention 
5.271 
(0.189)*** 
__ 0.008 (0.005) -0.263 (0.217) 0.014 
2.121 (2, 
290), p = .122 
-0.003 (-0.066, 
0.040) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 perceived risk 
24.492 
(1.883)*** 
0.312 (2.638) __ __ 0.000 
0.014 (1, 
259), p = .906 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
5.001 
(0.217)*** 
__ 0.006 (0.006) 0.053 (0.237) 0.005 
0.609 (2, 
258), p = .544 
0.002 (-
0.0345, 0.062) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
31.362 
(2.039)*** 
-5.775 (2.744)* __ __ 0.017 
4.430 (1, 
257), p = .036 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F17 
 
Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Frequency) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have 
Mammogram in Next Two Years 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx   
intention 
5.300 
(0.243)*** 
__ 0.010 (0.005) 0.152 (0.238) 0.013 
1.704 (2, 
256), p = .184 
-0.056 (-0.183, 
0.004) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
27.568 
(1.774)*** 
-1.981 (2.460) __ __ 0.002 
0.648 (1, 
273), p = .421 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
5.260 
(0.221)*** 
__ 0.006 (0.006) 0.280 (0.223) 0.010 
1.365 (2, 
272), p = .257 
-0.012 (-0.091, 
0.014) 
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Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(perceived 
risk) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
perceived risk 
32.025 
(1.727)*** 
-0.130 (2.564) __ __ 0.000 
0.003 (1, 
291), p = .960 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;   FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  intention 
5.112 
(0.215)*** 
__ 0.011 (0.005)* -0.264 (0.216) 0.022 
3.284 (2, 
290), p = .039 
-0.001 (-0.072, 
0.057) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 perceived risk 
30.516 
(1.870)*** 
1.379 (2.619) __ __ 0.001 
0.277 (1, 
259), p = .600 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
4.844 
(0.240)** 
__ 0.010 (0.006) 0.041 (0.236) 0.012 
1.618 (2, 
258), p = .200 
0.014 (-0.029, 
0.101) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
36.853 
(2.017)*** 
-1.007 (2.715) __ __ 0.001 
0.138 (1, 
257), p = .711 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F18 
 
Perceived Five-Year Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Percentage) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to 
Have Mammogram in Next Two Years 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx   
intention 
5.198 
(0.266)*** 
__ 0.011 (0.005)* 0.107 (0.236) 0.017 
2.14 (2, 256), 
p = .120 
-0.011 (-0.101, 
0.043) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
36.205 
(1.905)*** 
-0.358 (2.641) __ __ 0.000 
0.018 (1, 
273), p = .892 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
5.325 
(0.245)** 
__ 0.003 (0.005) 0.269 (0.223) 0.007 
0.885 (2, 
272), p = .414 
-0.001 (-0.048, 
0.024) 
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Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(perceived 
risk) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
perceived risk 
20.786 
(1.844)*** 
1.958 (2.732) __ __ 0.002 
0.514 (1, 
290), p = .474 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;   FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  intention 
5.272, 
0.174)*** 
__ 0.011 (0.005)* -0.315 (0.215) 0.025 
3.685 (2, 
289), p = .026 
0.021 (-0.030, 
0.106) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 perceived risk 
23.750 
(2.080)*** 
-1.006 (2.914) __ __ 0.001 
0.119 (1, 
259), p = .730 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
4.811 
(0.205)*** 
__ 
0.014 
(0.005)** 
0.069 (0.234) 0.031 
4.092 (2, 
258), p = .018 
-0.014 (-0.115, 
0.059) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
24.259 
(2.180)** 
-0.706 (2.934) __ __ 0.000 
0.058 (1, 
257), p = .810 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table F19 
 
Perceived Lifetime Risk of Breast Cancer (Measured as a Percentage) as a Mediator of the Effects of Exemplars on Intentions to Have 
Mammogram in Next Two Years 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx   
intention 
5.289 
(0.212)*** 
__ 
0.013 
(0.005)** 
0.105 (0.235) 0.026 
3.457 (2, 
256), p = .033 
-0.009 (-0.102, 
0.064) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
25.626 
(2.058)*** 
-2.074 (2.849) __ __ 0.002 
0.530 (1, 
272), p = .467 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
5.296 
(0.202)*** 
__ 0.005 (0.005) 0.282 (0.224) 0.010 
1.319 (2, 
271), p = .269 
-0.011 (-0.088, 
0.012) 
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Model paths 
Constant, 
Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
M (perceived 
risk), Coeff. 
(SE) 
Effect of M 
(perceived 
risk) on Y 
(intention), 
Coeff. (SE) 
Effect of X 
(condition) on 
Y (intention), 
Coeff. (SE) R2 F (df), p 
Indirect 
effect of X on 
Y through M, 
Coeff. 
(bootstrapped 
bias-
corrected 
95% CI) 
FPEx vs. FPNoEx  
perceived risk 
26.413 
(1.861)*** 
2.738 (2.762) __ __ 0.003 
0.983 (1, 
291), p = .322 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;   FPEx vs. 
FPNoEx  intention 
5.224 
(0.190)*** 
__ 0.009 (0.005)* -0.291 (0.217) 0.019 
2.781 (2, 
290), p = .064 
0.025 (-0.018, 
0.112) 
FPEx vs. FPExRem 
 perceived risk 
28.422 
(2.100)*** 
0.729 (2.941) __ __ 0.000 
0.061 (1, 
259), p = .805 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  FPEx vs. 
FPExRem 
intention 
4.780 
(0.219)*** 
__ 
0.013 
(0.005)** 
0.045 (0.234) 0.026 
3.453 (2, 
258), p = .033 
0.009 (-0.069, 
0.098) 
BCEx vs. BCNoEx 
 perceived risk 
29.931 
(2.274)*** 
-0.798 (3.060) __ __ 0.000 
0.068 (1, 
257), p = .794 
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Note. Experimental conditions are as follows: BCNoEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with no exemplars, FPEx = false-
positive comments with exemplars, BCEx = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars, FPExRem = false positive 
comments with exemplars removed, and BCExRem = mammogram-detected cancer comments with exemplars removed. 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCNoEx   
intention 
5.115 
(0.223)*** 
__ 
0.016 
(0.005)*** 
0.109 (0.232) 0.045 
6.036 (2, 
256), p = .003 
-0.013 (-0.121, 
0.082) 
BCEx vs. BCExRem 
 perceived risk 
30.626 
(2.104)*** 
-1.493 (2.913) __ __ 0.001 
0.263 (1, 
272), p = .609 
 
Perceived risk  
intention;  BCEx vs. 
BCExRem  
intention 
5.100 
(0.214)*** 
__ 0.011 (0.005)* 0.288 (0.222) 0.025 
3.445 (2, 
271), p = .033 
-0.016 (-0.102, 
0.043) 
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APPENDIX G 
This appendix includes additional moderation results that were not included in the main 
text. 
 
Figure G1.  Reading time as a moderator of the effect of FPEx (vs. FPExRem) on 
perceived risk of a false positive, measured as a frequency.  Reading time groups were 
created by dividing participants into those with an abnormally brief reading time (less 
than half of the median reading time for their respective condition) and those with a 
reading time equal to or greater than half the median. 
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Figure G2.  Reading time as a moderator of the effect of FPEx (vs. FPExRem) on 
perceived risk of a false positive, measured as a percentage.  Reading time groups were 
created by dividing participants into those with an abnormally brief reading time (less 
than half of the median reading time for their respective condition) and those with a 
reading time equal to or greater than half the median. 
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